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INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 declares that securities
prices are susceptible to manipulation 2 and that manipulation precipi-
tates, intensifies and prolongs national emergencies like the depres-
sion that followed the stock market crash of 1929.3 The Exchange Act
addresses the problem by forbidding a variety of trading practices that
t Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
I would like to thank Mark Bagnoli, Victor Brudney, Roberto Finzi, Jill Fisch, George
Hay, Tom Hazen, Ed Kitch, Don Langevoort, Louis Loss, Norman Poser, Dan Richman,
Stewart Schwab, Alan Schwartz, Todd Sullivan, Patricia Thel and Bill Williams for their
help with this Article.
1 Pub. L. No. 7--291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1988)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1988).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1988).
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it labels manipulative 4 and subjecting others to regulation. 5 It also
gives the Securities and Exchange Commission plenary authority to
regulate the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance" in connection with securities transactions. 6 These laws were
designed to prevent securities manipulation.
7
Daniel R. Fischel and DavidJ. Ross recently offered a provocative
reexamination of the subject of manipulation.8 Although Fischel and
Ross begin their article with the observation that "[m]uch of the regu-
lation of financial markets seeks to prevent manipulation,"9 their pur-
pose is not to show how the law might achieve this goal. On the
contrary, their position is that manipulation is not really a problem at
all. After offering what they call the first "principled analysis of the
concept of manipulation,"'10 Fischel and Ross argue that the law's ef-
forts to prevent manipulation are misguided. They conclude that "the
concept of manipulation should be abandoned altogether.... Actual
trades should not be prohibited as manipulative regardless of the in-
tent of the trader.""
As Fischel and Ross see it, there is no reason to prohibit manipu-
lative trading because there is nothing to prohibit. They maintain
that people would not engage in manipulative trading even if it were
legal, because it is so difficult to profit by manipulating security prices
with trades. "Profitable (successful) manipulations," they assert, "re-
quire two conditions: first, trading must cause the price of the rele-
vant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be able to sell
4 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)-(5) (1988).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(6), (b), 78j(a) (1988).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1988). The Exchange Act directly forbids manipulation in par-
ticular contexts. The Act forbids brokers and dealers to use manipulative devices and con-
trivances in the over-the-counter market, and charges the SEC with defining such devices
and contrivances as are manipulative. Id. § 78o(c) (1)-(2). The Act also prohibits any per-
son from engaging in manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer, and
charges the SEC with defining and prescribing means reasonably designed to prevent ma-
nipulative acts and practices. Id. § 78n(e). The organized securities markets also have
rules against manipulation. See, e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9224 (Nov. 1989)
(prohibiting trades for the purpose of influencing market price); Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers
Manual (CCH) 2155, 2168 (Sept. 1, 1976) (prohibiting manipulative quotations and
the use of manipulative devices in connection with transactions); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2435 (May 1990) (prohibiting the effecting of trades for the purpose of improperly influ-
encing the market); see also id. 2342.21, 2351(e) (Nov. 1992) (requiring members to
review trades).
7 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); see Steve Thel, The Original Concep-
tion of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
8 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial
Markets?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 503 (1991); see alsoJunda Woo, Law Theorists Call Stock Manipu-
lation a Vague Concept, Seek to Abolish Term, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1992, at B4A (recording
reaction to the Fischel & Ross article).
9 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 503.
10 Id. at 506.
11 Id. at 507, 553.
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at a price higher than the price at which the manipulator
purchased."' 2 Unfortunately for the would-be manipulator, purchases
seldom move prices up, and if they do, it is difficult to effect sales at
the inflated price. Accordingly, manipulative schemes are unlikely to
be successful. Given the fact that trading is costly, Fischel and Ross
argue that people will not even try to manipulate security prices.' 3
Fischel and Ross also argue that prohibiting manipulative trades
results in significant social costs. 14 Because manipulative intent is
hard to identify, a rule prohibiting manipulative trades is expensive to
administer and deters some appropriate trading. They conclude that,
on balance, such a rule is unwise because significant social costs out-
weigh any minimal benefits that the rule might yield.15 Fischel and
Ross are less hostile toward rules against the classic manipulative de-
vices of wash sales and matched trades, but they insist that such trans-
actions be analyzed as a form of fraud.'
6
This Article shows that manipulation is not self-deterring. Manip-
ulators can move prices by trading and can profit by doing so.17 Fis-
chel and Ross base their analysis of the relationship between prices
and trading on empirical research into the impact of securities trad-
ing on prices in the organized securities markets, particularly the New
York Stock Exchange. This literature offers important insights into
the effect that trading has on prices. Inasmuch as it shows that many
trades do not change prices and that those trades that do change
prices usually do not change them much, it suggests that manipula-
tion may be quite difficult. Nevertheless, studies consistently show
that some trades occasion price changes. Manipulators can profit
from very small, short-lived price changes, and the evidence in the
economic literature in fact indicates that manipulation is easier to ac-
complish than Fischel and Ross admit.
12 Id. at 512.
13 Id. at 512-19.
14 Id. at 522-23.
15 Id. at 522-23.
16 Id. at 507, 510-12.
17 When used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the word "manip-
ulation" means buying a security for the purpose of increasing the reported price or selling
a security for the purpose of decreasing the reported price. I think that Fischel and Ross
use the word in a similar way, although they discuss the definition at length. Fischel &
Ross, supra note 8, at 507-10. See also id. at 510-12 (comparing manipulation with fraud);
Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation, 89
MICH. L. Rav. 30 (1990) (discussing the concept of manipulation in commodities regula-
tion); Thel, supra note 7, at 461-64 (discussing the scope of the SEC's authority to regulate
manipulative devices); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security
Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 359, 377-88




More importantly, this evidence is only of limited relevance to the
question of whether manipulators can change prices with trades. Mar-
ket prices are the record of the transactions of profit-maximizing trad-
ers. The vast majority of traders (virtually all traders, according to
Fischel and Ross) want to trade at the best price possible, that is, to
buy low and sell high. These traders want to minimize the effect of
their trading on price, and they support a variety of institutions that
minimize the impact that trading might otherwise have on price. 18
Reported market prices are dominated by the trades of people trying
to avoid moving prices. Because manipulators try to do just the oppo-
site, findings based on reported prices cannot be extrapolated to their
trading.
A substantial body of recent literature in the field of finance fo-
cuses directly on the subject of manipulative trading, much of it draw-
ing explicitly or implicitly on game theory.' 9 The models developed
in this work indicate that manipulation is possible, with some authors
even suggesting that it may be common. Nonetheless, the only way to
determine whether manipulation actually occurs may be to study ac-
tual cases. Yet, trades designed to move prices are presumably rela-
tively rare, and they are certainly hard to identify. Traders who want
18 Fischel and Ross sketch a market in which prices are spontaneous and the services
of the market are provided free to all who trade. However, markets are costly and trading
services are not provided automatically. SeeJ. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices are Property: The
Organization of Financial Exchanges From a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & EcoN. 591
(1991) (developing the thesis that the product of financial exchanges is prices and that the
function of exchanges is to establish property rights in price quotations); see also ROBERT A.
Sci-VARrz, EQurrY MARKETS: STRUCTURE, TRADING, AND PERFORMANCE 514-29 (1988) (dis-
cussing the price discovery process);Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as
a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1007 (1990) (discussing "listings" as the primary product of competitive ex-
changes); David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
Financial Assets, 32 B.C.L. REV. 967 (1991) (explaining the market as a property-based
system).
19 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503
(1992); Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure and
Asymmetric Information, 36 EUR. ECON. REv. 624 (1992); Bruno Gerard & Vikrarn Nanda,
Trading and Manipulation around Seasoned Equity Offerings, 48 J. FIN. 213 (1993); Robert A.
Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes, 27J. FIN. & QUANTITATWvE
ANALYSIS 311 (1992); Praveen Kumar & Duane J. Seppi, Futures Manipulation with "Cash
Settlement," 47J. FIN. 1485 (1992); Robert A. Wood, Survival Strategies for Exchanges, in THE
CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE SECURITIES MARKETS 140 (Henry C. Lu-
cas, Jr. & Robert A. Schwartz eds., 1989) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY]; MARK
BAGNOLI & BARTON L. LIPMAN, STOCK PRICE MANIPULATION THROUGH TAKEOVER BIDS (Indi-
ana University Department of Finance Working Paper, 1992) (on file with author); Kath-
leen Weiss Hanley et al., Price Stabilization in the Market for New Issues, 34J. FIN. EcoN. 177
(1993); Judith S. Ruud, Underwriter Price Support and the IPO Underpricing Puzze, 3 4 J. FIN.
ECON. 135 (1993); see also Jean-Luc Vila, Simple Games of Market Manipulation, 29 ECON.
LETTERS 21 (1989) (presenting two games of market manipulation relevant to financial
economics). For an extended discussion of manipulation in the futures markets, see THE
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF FtrrmEs MARKETS (Ronald W. Anderson ed., 1984).
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to move prices are likely to keep their intentions secret, both because
prices may not move if their intentions are known and because trad-
ing with the intention of moving prices may be illegal.20 Accordingly,
the study of actual manipulative trading may be unavoidably anecdo-
tal. Many of the players are notorious and their stories fascinating,
however, so this may not be all for the bad. For example, when John
Mulheren bought 75,000 shares of the common stock of Gulf & West-
ern Industries in six minutes on October 17, 1985, in response to a
telephone call from Ivan Boesky, Boesky earned an extra $850,000 on
the resulting twenty-five percent rise in the stock's price.2 ' Manipula-
tion is theoretically possible, and it probably occurs fairly often.
If manipulation can be profitable, it cannot be ignored on the
theory that it is self-deterring. Nevertheless, the law should not pur-
sue manipulators unless doing so will actually do some good. As Fis-
chel and Ross emphasize, manipulative intent is often hard to identify,
and the possibility of erroneous prosecution may discourage appropri-
ate trading. Moreover, even an effective rule against intentional ma-
nipulation would be an incomplete solution to the underlying
problem, because price-affecting trades may cause damage regardless
of the reason that those trades are undertaken.
These difficulties suggest that the law should respond carefully to
manipulative trading. The sponsors of the Exchange Act understood
this. They recognized that securities-market practices change quickly
and that the process of price formation is not fully understood. Faced
with what they knew was a complicated problem, they concluded that
the law should be carefully calibrated to eliminate destructive prac-
tices without unduly interfering with appropriate trading, and that the
law should develop as market practices change and understanding of
20 It may sometimes be possbile to document the extent of manipulative trading indi-
rectly without studying particular cases of manipulation. For example, several recent stud-
ies have explored the extent and effect of underwriter price stabilization in connection
with initial public offerings by analyzing market data. See Hanley et al., supra note 19;
Ruud, supra note 19. Firms are sometimes said to repurchase their stock in order to in-
crease its price, and these trades are typically disclosed. Issuer repurchases may not be
analogous to the manipulative trading considered here, however. While opportunities for
'manipulation may exist in this context, the matter might better be analyzed as fraud. The
price effect of repurchases may come not from the trades, but from the information con-
veyed by the fact that the issuer is buying, and this information is typically conveyed by the
explicit announcement that the issuer is repurchasing. See Theo Vermaelen, Common Stock
Repurchases and Market Signalling, 9J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1981); cf Richard A. Booth, Discounts
and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL L. REV. 1053, 1087-91, 1114-16 (1991) (re-
jecting the signalling explanation of price impact of issuer repurchases in favor of elastic
demand, and thus concluding that repurchases are not manipulative).
21 See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 366-68 (2d Cir. 1991); see also infra
notes 155-74 and accompanying text. The allegations against Mulheren were litigated, and
Boesky, who pleaded guilty to his own crimes, testified at Mulheren's trial. Mulheren did
not deny receiving the call or trading. Rather, the primary issue was whether Mulheren
was a willing conspirator or whether Boesky had manipulated him as well as the market.
1994]
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the market grows. Instead of broadly prohibiting securities manipula-
tion, the Exchange Act charges regulators with studying the problem
and adopting appropriate rules in response.
I
MANIPULATING PRICES WITH TRADES
A. Trades Sometimes Change Price
Securities are often traded without any apparent effect on market
prices, and trades affect security prices much less than most people
probably think they do.22 The vast majority of trades on the New York
Stock Exchange, for example, take place at or near the same price as
the previous trade,23 and even relatively large trades are often effected
at prevailing prices.24 In considering the issue of manipulative trad-
ing, it is important to recognize that trades do not automatically
change price. Fischel and Ross are probably right when they suggest
that many legal commentators and institutions have underestimated
the difficulty of manipulating price with trades.
2 5
One might assume that entering the market to buy a security in-
creases the demand for the security and thus tends to increase its
price. One might also assume that entering the market to sell in-
creases supply and thus tends to depress price. Purchases and sales
are supposed to change price because they must be made with people
who will sell only at a premium or buy only at a discount.2 6 The na-
ture of securities is such, however, that the relationship between trad-
ing and security prices is more attenuated than conventional wisdom
suggests.
For many market participants, a security is simply the right to a
stream of income. These people view different securities as substi-
tutes for each other, especially within a diversified portfolio, and they
are willing to replace one security with another without insisting
on a premium.27 It follows that "the supply of near-perfect substi-
22 Cf RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
307-08 (4th ed. 1991) (criticizing the common belief that new stock can be sold only at
substantial discounts).
23 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE FACT BOOK 22 (Ellen Duttweiler ed., 1990) ("In
1989, 95.9% of all transactions occurred with no change or a 1/8 point variation.") [herein-
after NYSE FACT BOOK].
24 See id. at 22 (In 1989, "the average stock showed no change or 1/8 point change in
3,000 shares of volume 87.1% of the time.").
25 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 512-19.
26 See Booth, supra note 20, at 1071.
27 See BREALE & MYERS, supra note 22, at 13149, 307-08; JAMES H. LORIE ET AL., THE
STOCK MARKET. TmoIES AND EVIDENCE 108-31 (2d ed. 1985);JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 55-76 (7th ed. 1986); Booth, supra note 20, at 1077-79; Fis-
chel & Ross, supra note 8, at 513-14; Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 124143 (1990).
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tutes for any particular security is likely to be much larger than the
supply of the security itself" 28 and because substitutes are avail-
able, "theoretically, trading need not have any effect on securities
prices."
29
The fact that very large quantities of securities are regularly
bought and sold at prevailing market prices might seem to suggest
that trades do not affect price at all. If trading did not influence
prices, manipulation by trading would be impossible.30 However not
all trades are effected at prevailing prices, and trading and price
changes are connected.31
28 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 514.
29 Id.; see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 22, at 307-08; Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins,
Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62 (1986); William J. Carney,
Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Meigers: The Case Against Fiduciary
Duties, 1983 AM. B. Foum. RES. J. 341, 355-57; RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 629-30 (1984); Lawrence Harris &
Eitan Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 List. New Evidence
for the Existence of Pice Pressures, 41J. FIN. 815, 815 (1986); Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price
Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27J. FIN. 569, 569-70 (1972); Stout,
supra note 27, at 1238 n.24, 1241-42.
The figure below illustrates situations in which any trade can be made at the prevailing
price.





Quantity of securities sold or bought
If investors will buy or sell any amount of a security at a certain price, the net demand for
that security can be illustrated by a horizontal line intersecting the price axis at that price.
The lines labeled D, and D2 each represent such an excess demand function, with a higher
market price for the security whose excess demand is represented by line D2. All trades will
occur at the market price, and trades will not move price merely because of their size,
because investors can buy or sell an unlimited quantity of the security at the market price.
30 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517.
31 Many commentators attribute the stock market break of October 1987 at least in
part to the concerted selling of institutional investors, especially those engaged in program
trading or following reactive portfolio insurance plans. See, e.g., REPORT or Tm PRESmEN-
TmQA TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS at v, 29 (Jan. 1988); DiviSION OF MARKET REGULA-
TION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKEr
BREAK at xiii (Feb. 1988) (with changes in investor perceptions regarding such fundamen-
tals "as the 'trigger,' institutional stock selling was the largest single direct factor responsi-
ble for the initial opening declines on October 19. Finally, panic selling... was primarily
responsible for the free-fall decline."). See generalyJonathan R Macey et al., Restrictions on
Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in riew of the October 1987 Stock Market
Crash, 74 CORNELL L. Rxv. 799, 822-32 (1989) (discussing the effects of program trading
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At the extreme, a substantial premium over market price must
typically be paid to buy enough stock to acquire control of a publicly
held company.3 2 This is the case whether the buyer acquires control
from a large holder in a single purchase33 or from dispersed share-
holders through a tender offer.34 Similarly, when issuers repurchase
their stock, the more they buy, the higher the price they pay.35 Con-
versely, prices typically decline when issuers or substantial holders sell
large quantities of securities.
3 6
Large transactions effected in the normal course of trading may
affect price as well, with seller-initiated trades depressing price and
buyer-initiated trades increasing it.a7 About one-half of very large
trades effected on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are reported
to occur at a price different from the previously prevailing price, and
and the contemporary response). The impact that large trades have on prices also under-
lies the controversy over front-running, that is, the practice of trading a security while
aware of an impending large trade in the same or a related security, with a view toward
profiting from the price change occasioned by the large trade. See Jerry W. Markham,
"Front-Running"-Insider Trading under the Commodity Exchange Ac 38 CAmr. U. L. REV. 69
(1988); see also David P. Doherty et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Regulation of Market
Manipulation, in MARxET MANIPULATION 141 (Theodore A. Levine & Joseph I. Goldstein
eds., 1989); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Protecting the Market-An Overview of Regulatory Efforts to
Combat Market Manipulation on the Stock Exchanges, in MAR=ET MANr'uLATIo, id. at 94, 118-
24; Mahlon M. Frankhauser & David S. Frye, Front Running 21 REv. SEC. & COMMODrnEs
REG. 179 (1988); Mark S. Howard, Frontrunning in the Marketplace: A Regulatory Dilemma, 19
SEC. REG. LJ. 263 (1991); Thomas A. Russo & SusanJ. Lobel, Frontrunning and Block Trad-
ing, 23 REv. SEC. & COMMODrrEs REG. 75 (1990).
32 See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate ControL The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:
The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891,
908 (1988); Richard Roll, Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth, in
KNIGHTs, RAIDERS, AND TARGE-rs 241 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
33 See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, The Law and Large-Block Trades, 35
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1992).
34 Ellen B. Magenheim & Dennis C. Mueller, Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off
After an Acquisition?, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGErS, supra note 32, at 171, 188.
35 See Laurie Simon Bagwell, Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder Hetero-
geneity, 47J. FIN. 71 (1992) [hereinafter Bagwell, Dutch Auctions); Laurie Simon Bagwell,
Shareholder Heterogeneity: Evidence and Implications, 81 AM. EcoN. REv. 218 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Bagwell, Heterogeneity].
36 See Asquith & Mullins, supra note 29; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Wayne H. Mikkel-
son & M. Megan Partch, Stock Price Effects and Costs of Secondary Distributions, 14J. FIN. ECON.
165 (1985); John E. Parsons & Artur Raviv, Undeipricing of Seasoned Issues, 14J. FIN. ECON.
377, 381-92 (1985); Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pres-
sure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45J. Bus. 179 (1972).
37 SeeRobertW. Holthausenetal., The Effect of Large Block Transactions on Security Prices,
19J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1987); NYSE FACT Boor, supra note 23, at 22 (noting that, in 1989,
the average stock moved more than 1/8 point on 3000 shares of volume about 13% of the
time); Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29. For particular examples, see infra notes 141-62, 235-47
and accompanying text; cf. Stout, supra note 27, at 1254-55 (discussing how index funds
buy substantial amounts of stocks included in the S&P 500 Index, and noting that when a
stock is added to the index, its price typically increases).
226 [Vol. 79:219
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the larger the trade, the more likely price will change.38 Moreover,
due to rules on the priority of orders, the record of completed trades
understates the frequency with which large trades actually change
price.a9 Finally, prices are volatile, and much of this volatility is re-
lated to trading. Prices change as market makers and other market
participants respond to orders entering the market.
40
B. Using Trades to Change Price
In sum, trades sometimes change prices. Economists disagree
about the reasons that trades influence price, but broadly speaking
they offer three explanations.41 A trade may affect the price of a se-
curity because market participants disagree about the value of the
traded security; because offsetting trading interest may be temporarily
absent from the market when the trade is effected; or because the
trade communicates information about the value of the security.
So long as trades can change reported price, manipulation may
be possible regardless of what causes the price change. Although a
manipulator need not understand why prices change, it may be diffi-
cult to construct legal responses to manipulation without understand-
ing the process by which trades influence prices.42 Unfortunately, the
discord among economists will not be resolved easily, inasmuch as the
price effects attending particular trading practices are consistent with
38 Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 244-47; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 582-83;
cf Joel Hasbrouck, Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades, 46J. FIN. 179, 199-200
(1991) (noting that trades in smaller issuers have greater impact on price than trades in
larger issues).
39 NYSE rules generally require that, before a block trade is executed, all limit orders
between the previous price and the block price, and all earlier-entered orders at the block
price, must be satisfied. See 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2127; see also 5 Louis Loss &JOEL
SELIGMAN, SEcU~rTES REGULATiON 2575 n.265 (3d ed. 1990). The exchange member han-
dling the block trade satisfies these public orders when the block trade is executed. If the
last public order effected is executed at the block price, the tape will show that the block
traded at the prevailing price even though the block traded at a price different from that
prevailing at the time that the block came to the floor (which different price presumably
would have continued to prevail had the block trade not been effected). Accordingly,
large blocks presumably move price more often (and to a greater degree) than the analysis
of trading data indicates. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 257-60, 266; see also id. at
266 ("Block brokers contend that the mechanics of block trading can cause some buyer- or
seller-initiated transactions to trade at the same price as the prior trade .... even though
the block price is different from the market price prior to the block."); Kraus & Stoll, supra
note 29, at 582-83.
40 See Victor Niederhoffer & M.F.M. Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock
Exchange, 61J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 897 (1966); see also infra notes 70-76, 180-89 and accompany-
ing text.
41 See Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at 815-16; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 239-
42; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 569-71;J. Randall Woolridge & Chinmoy Ghosh, Institu-
tional Trading and Security Prices: The Case of Changes in the Composition of the S&P 500 Index, 9
J. FiN. REs. 13 (1986).
42 See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
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more than one hypothesis.43 In addition, because the process by
which trades influence price is complicated, and because trades are
handled differently in different securities markets, similar trading
practices may affect prices differently in different markets. 44 In regu-
lating trading, policy makers should recognize that the premises un-
derlying regulation are necessarily complicated and controversial. In
any case, I have no firm view about why trades sometimes change se-
curity prices, and I do not intend the commentary that follows to rest
on any particular vision.45
1. Disparate Valuation
The perfect substitution hypothesis rests on the presumption that
all market participants agree on the value of all securities. As a result,
the theory goes, it should be possible to buy or sell any amount of a
security at the current market price. The remarkable depth of the
securities markets does suggest that many market participants are will-
ing to buy or sell at current prices. Securities are more easily replaced
than almost anything else conventionally thought to be unique. Even
someone who will not accept a substitute for a particular security will
not need to pay a premium price for it if those from whom she must
buy are prepared to accept substitutes. A startlingly large amount of
43 Cf Asquith & Mullins, supra note 29 (finding that price effects of seasoned equity
issues are consistent with sloping demand curves and information); Bagwell, Dutch Auc-
tions, supra note 35, at 79-80 (discussing various explanations for the price effects of large
block sales); id. at 86-88 (stating that, if supply curves slope because holders have different
information, "then the change to a new marginal shareholder may be tantamount to a
change in the information impounded in the market price."); Fischel & Ross, supra note 8,
at 517 (discussing alternative explanations for price effects of changes in the composition
of the S&P 500 Index); Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at 815-16 (noting that the price
effects of block sales and new issues may be explained by price pressure or new informa-
tion); Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 569-71; Richard H. Pettway & Robert C. Radcliffe,
Impacts of New Equity Sales Upon Electric Utility Share Prices, 14 FIN. McaMT. 16 (1985) (classify-
ing price changes associated with new issues of stock by public utilities according to infor-
mation and liquidity effects); Stout, supra note 27, at 1253-54 (conceding that several
hypotheses can explain the price effects of large transactions).
44 See KALMAN J. COHEN ET AL, THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS 15-70
(1986) (comparing stock exchange trading arrangements);JOEL HASBROUCK & ROBERT A.
ScI-wvARTz, THE EFFICIENCY OF STOCK EXCHANGE AND OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS 31-33
(Salomon Bros. Ctr. for the Study of Fin. Insts. Working Paper No. 390, 1986) (concluding
that trading-system design influences the accuracy of market prices).
45 I understand Fischel and Ross to be agnostic as well. At times, however, they seem
reluctant to concede that some trades do affect prices. For example, they introduce their
discussion of manipulation with the statement: "If trading has no effect on price because of
the substitution effect, a successful manipulation is impossible." Fischel & Ross, supra note
8, at 517. In addition, they maintain that considerable evidence supports the proposition
that trading need not have any effect on price. Id. at 514. On the other hand, they ac-
knowledge that "many block trades have stock price consequences," and state that because
of bid-ask spreads, the sequence with which random buy and sell orders arrive in the mar-
ket will cause price reversals. Id. at 515-16.
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most securities can be bought or sold at or near the prevailing price,46
and the demand for most actively publicly traded securities seems
quite elastic. 47
The fact that many large trades are made at prevailing prices does
not prove that all market participants believe that all securities are
worth the prevailing price, however.48 The resources devoted to find-
ing buyers for large secondary offerings that might simply be sold into
the market suggests that not all investors ascribe the same value to all
securities. 49 Heterogeneous shareholder valuation may also help ex-
plain why buyers often must pay more than the prevailing market
price to buy a very large amount of a particular security.50 In any
event, as skeptical commentators frequently remark, the assumption
that all market participants have homogeneous expectations and
ascribe the same value to all securities runs counter to common expe-
rience and intuition.
5'
Even if most securities have many near-perfect substitutes for
most purposes, sometimes no adequate substitute exists for a particu-
lar security. A security is more than just the right to an income
stream; it is the right to a particular income stream, with common
stock also carrying the right to participate in the management of the
46 See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
47 But see Stout, supra note 27, at 1252-58 (discussing evidence of unit elasticity).
48 Although Fischel and Ross appear to acknowledge the possibility that the supply
and demand for any given security might not be perfectly elastic, they seem unconvinced.
See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516-17; see also id. at 517 n.62 (suggesting that price
changes associated with changes in the S&P 500 Index may be due to real economic
changes occasioned by inclusion in the index, rather than by trading). Others understand
Fischel and Frank H. Easterbrook to have taken the position that demand is perfectly elas-
tic. See Booth, supra note 20, at 1083; Carney, supra note 29, at 354-55; Stout, supra note 27,
at 1242 n.39.
49 See ROBERT L. KuHN, INvEsTmENT BANKING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF HIGH-STAKES
DELM 'AIN' 271 (1990) (noting that firms selling stock typically encourage investment
bankers to find long-term investors who will be loyal to incumbent management); Claudio
F. Loderer et al., The Pricing of Equity Offerings, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 36 (1991) (suggesting
that underwriters actively promote seasoned offerings because they have incomplete
knowledge of individual investors' demand schedules); cf Parsons & Raviv, supra note 36,
at 392-94 (contrasting underwritten and rights offerings).
50 See Bagwell, Dutch Auctions, supra note 35; Bagwell, Heterogeneity, supra note 35; Car-
ney, supra note 29, at 355-57; see also Booth, supra note 20, at 1087-1103 (surveying evidence
and suggesting that block buying forces stock prices upward); Stout, supra note 27, at 1252-
58 (providing empirical evidence regarding heterogeneous shareholder valuation); cf.
Booth, supra note 20, at 1059 n.12 (listing works implicitly based on heterogeneous
valuation).
51 See ScHwARTZ, supra note 18, at 227-36, 272-73; Booth, supra note 20, at 1077-1103;
RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239, 252-53 (1984); Paul S. Schreiber & Robert A. Schwartz, Efficient Price Discovery in a
Securities Market: The Objective of a Trading System, in MARKr MAKING AND THE CHANGING
SmaUCruaE OF THE SECuRrriEs INDusrRY 19, 22-23 (Yakov Amihud et al. eds., 1985) [herein-
after MARKET MAKING]; Stout, supra note 27, at 1238 (describing the assumption of homo-
geneous expectations as "pure fiction"); cf. Booth, supra note 20, at 1059 n.12 (listing works
implicitly based on the assumption that securities have sloping supply curves).
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issuer. The supply of any particular security is limited, and someone
who wants a particular security-for whatever reason-must pursue
that finite supply. If some owners are unwilling to sell their securities
at the prevailing price, a buyer will have to pay a premium price to get
them.52 Thus, a person may be able to raise price by buying more
stock than owners are prepared to sell at the prevailing price.
A purchase is presumably most likely to exceed the supply avail-
able at the prevailing price, and thus to move price, when only a small
amount of a security is available for trading. Supply may be limited
because little was issued in the first place or because a substantial
amount is held by people who are reluctant to sell, perhaps because
they are closely associated with the issuer.53 Conversely, sales are most
52 The figure below illustrates situations in which the amount of a security that inves-
tors will buy or sell depends on the price.




Quantity of securities sold or bought
The curves labeled D, and D2 each represent excess demand functions in which a change
in price will alter net demand. The market clearing price (i.e., the price at which purchase
and sale interest offset each other) is the price at which the curves intersect the price axis.
At higher prices (represented by the portion of the curve on the negative side of the quan-
tity axis), market participants as a group would want to sell more than they would want to
buy. At lower prices, buying interest would exceed selling interest.
When a new trader enters the market, the excess demand function shifts to the right
(left) by the number of shares the new trader is willing to buy (sell) at a particular price.
Thus, if a person who wanted to buy entered a market characterized by curve D, the excess
demand curve would shift to the right to curve D2 and the price would rise. Excess de-
mand still shifts to the right (left) when a new buyer (seller) enters a market characterized
by perfectly elastic demand, as in Figure 1, supra note 29, but shifting the horizontal line
does not result in a change in the price at which purchase and sale interests intersect. This
price stability follows from the willingness of other traders to buy or sell any amount of the
security at the prevailing price.
53 See Booth, supra note 20, at 1079-81 (discussing the value of controlling a block of
shares). Small-capitalization stocks have recently figured prominently in so-called penny-
stock manipulations. See Ferrara et al., supra note 31, at 224-41;Joseph I. Goldstein et al.,
An Investment Masquerade: A Descriptive Overview of Penny Stock Fraud and The Federal Securities
Laws, 47 Bus. LAw. 773, 774 (1992); Joseph I. Goldstein & L. Delane Cox, Penny Stock
Markups and Markdowns, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 676, 676 (1991); Theodore A. Levine & Gerard
S. Citera, Manipulative Practices-Current Enforcement and Regulatory Initiatives, in MARKET MA-
NIPULATION, supra note 31, at 3, 35-41; see alsoJoseph A. Grundfest, Financial Scandals in the
United States and Japan, Am. ENTER., May/June 1992, at 34, 38-39 (noting that in both the
United States andJapan, targets of manipulation typically have small capitalizations or eas-
ily controlled float). The untoward behavior attributed to penny-stock brokers is often
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likely to exceed the amount demanded at the prevailing price when
only a few people are interested in buying a security, as in the case of
thinly traded securities54 or speculative penny stocks. Thus, manipula-
tion by taking advantage of inelastic supply is likely to be easier with
thinly traded securities. In fact, such securities are the subject of
many allegedly manipulative schemes.
55
2. Immediacy
Even if some market participants disagree with the market's valu-
ation of a security, it may take very large trades-and the concomitant
commitment of substantial resources-to move price by absorbing all
either grossly excessive commissions or simple fraud. See Goldstein & Cox, supra; see also
Fischel and Ross, supra note 8, at 539-42. Calling this behavior manipulation may do little
to farther analysis. Id. at 540. Fischel & Ross minimize the possibility of a broker dominat-
ing the market, suggesting that customers could simply take their trades to other market
makers. Id. at 541. Most descriptions of the penny-stock market, however, suggest that
brokers in this market do not face effective competition. Nonetheless, penny-stock opera-
tors are often alleged to bid up the price of the stocks in which they deal, and they are able
to do so because as they buy from the weakest holders, the reservation price of the margi-
nal holders rises. Aggressive brokers are said to pressure clients to buy stock while effec-
tively discouraging others from selling. See Goldstein et al., supra, at 786-88; William H.
Lash, III, Loose Change: The Campaign for Penny Stock Reform, 60 UMKC L. RE,. 1, 6, 13
(1991); Levine & Citera, supra, at 35-36, 38, 47.
54 See Booth, supra note 20, at 1100, 1105; Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Ap-
praisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 446 (1985) ("it is more
likely that shares ... are fairly associated with inframarginal value when they are not ac-
tively and widely traded"); Stout, supra note 27, at 1251-52, 1256 n.107, 1258 n.119. A
recent study of Dutch auction issuer repurchases developed preliminary findings indicat-
ing "that supply curves are more elastic when institutional holdings are high, dividend
yield is high, price has not varied much in the past 5 years, and the fraction bought ... is
large." Bagwell, Heterogeneity, supra note 35, at 221. The author of that study subsequently
concluded that elasticity is larger "for firms with large trading volume, firms included in
the S&P 500 Index, and firms that have been the targets of takeover activity." Bagwell,
Dutch Auctions, supra note 35, at 97. The market for the stock of companies that repur-
chase their stock in Dutch Auctions may differ from the market for thinly traded compa-
nies, but the factors that seem to indicate inelasticity in this study also characterize the
thinly traded and speculative stocks that are typically the subject of alleged manipulations.
5 See William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Market Manipulation, 22 REv. SEC. &
COMMODrrIEs REG. 103, 111 (1989); John E. Pinto, Jr., The NASD's Enforcement Agenda, 85
Nw. U. L. Ra,. 739, 745-46 (1991) (noting that NASD penny-stock cases typically involve
brokers who control the market in certain securities); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8,
at 518 ("It is frequently asserted that thinly traded stocks are more prone to manipulation
... perhaps because information and price pressure effects... may be accentuated in this
case."); Lawrence Kryzanowski, Misinformation and Security Markets, 24 McGiL L.J. 123, 123
(1978). When the Exchange Act was enacted, it was widely believed that manipulators
were most likely to operate in stocks with "easily controllable floating supply." Comment,
Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Ac 46 YAI.E L.J. 624, 626-27 (1937). Manipu-
lators were said to control supply by getting large holders to promise to keep their shares
off the market. Id. at 627 n.14; see also 8 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 39, at 3973 (listing
devices used by manipulators to " 'dry up' the overhanging supply of the [manipulated]
security."). After restricting supply, manipulators could allegedly bid up the share price by
buying, without fear that their purchase orders would be met by a flood of sales.
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of the securities supplied or demanded at the prevailing price.5 6 How-
ever, even if enough people are willing to trade at the prevailing mar-
ket price, so that a trade "need not have any effect on securities
prices," those willing to trade at prevailing prices are not always repre-
sented in the market.5 7 A trade may move price when people who
would be willing to trade at the prevailing price are absent from the
market.58 In other words, even if the potential supply and demand
are perfectly elastic, a trade may move price if potential offsetting
traders are not mobilized.5 9
56 That is, all but the largest traders may effectively face perfectly elastic demand. See
Carney, supra note 29, at 355; Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian
Theory, 17J. LECAL STUD. 165, 188-89 (1988) (concluding that it is realistic to assume that
shareholder values are captured in market values, although some people do derive unique
value from particular securities); Stout, supra note 27, at 1249-51 (Because investor de-
mand for stock is convex, at "the margin, the demand function is relatively 'flat,' so that
transactions exert only modest pressure on prices."); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at
513 n.39. This proposition is illustrated by an excess demand curve that is close to horizon-
tal around the price axis in Figure 2, supra note 52.
57 See SanfordJ. Grossman, The Informational Role of Upstairs and Downstairs Trading, 65
J. Bus. 509, 511-14 (1992) (discussing reasons people do not participate continuously in
the market).
58 See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 QJ. ECON. 33, 36 (1968); Grossman,
supra, note 57; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 570-71; cf. Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at
815-16 (stating that the price-pressure hypothesis, which the authors conclude may explain
the price effect of inclusion in the S&P 500 list, "assumes that long-run demand is perfectly
elastic... [but recognizes that] short-term demand curves may be less than perfectly elas-
tic."); Scholes, supra note 36, at 186 ("In any attempt to measure the slope of a demand
curve, it is, of course, essential to specify the relevant time span. In the very shortest of
short runs, all demand curves will be almost perfectly inelastic. Yet, by waiting perhaps
only a trivial length of time until news of a proposed sale had spread throughout the mar-
ket, the sale might be effected without price-pressure effects."); HASBROUCK & ScHWARz,
supra note 44, at 15 (noting the possibility that demand is relatively inelastic in very brief
trading intervals).
59 The figure below illustrates situations in which traders must pay a premium price
for trading quickly.
FIGURE 3: EXCESS DEMAND FUNCTIONS THAT VARY WiTH TIME




Quantity of securities sold or bought
This model assumes that the long-run demand for a security is perfectly elastic, so that an
infinite amount can be bought or sold at the prevailing price. The market maker will trade
some quantity at close to the prevailing price, but to trade more immediately, a buyer
(seller) will have to pay a premium (accept a low price). This premium will increase as
more securities are traded. Excess demand functions representing the situation faced by
traders who want to trade quickly are shown by the curves labeled "instantaneous" and
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Most of the cost associated with trading stock reflects the expense
of finding someone to take the other side of the trade.60 Investors
turn to the markets to find trading partners quickly and cheaply, 61
and organized securities markets are conventionally thought to de-
velop in response to investors' desires to trade quickly.62 In an earlier
article, Fischel himself stated that, "[a ] s with all marketplaces, the pri-
mary benefit of [stock] exchanges is that they save traders the cost of
independently searching for someone on the other side of the
transaction."
63
Some trading interest is likely to be represented in the markets at
any given time, as traders enter market orders and price changes trig-
ger limit orders.64 A significant part of NYSE trading, for example, is
made up of transactions between public customers.6 5 Those who
might buy or sell are not constantly represented in the market, how-
"very quick." These curves are relatively flat around the price axis because the market
maker will trade small quantities around that price. The demand function faced by a
trader in a hurry depends on the speed with which the trader wishes to complete the
transaction. The trader can reduce the premium necessary to trade a particular quantity
by waiting to trade, thereby moving to a longer-term demand function (e.g., from instanta-
neous to very quick). The trader can avoid the premium entirely by waiting long enough
to trade. The wait necessary to avoid any premium may be very short.
60 RcHARD IL LnmIsEy & ULRKE SCHAEDE, SPECIAuST vs. SAIrORI, MARKET MAKING IN
NEwYoRK AND TOKYO 21 (Yale Sch. of Org. & Mgmt. Working Paper No. 26, 1992); see also
Charles C. Cox & Douglas C. Michael, The Market for Markets: Development of International
Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 833, 842-43 (1987).
61 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, The Effect of Computer Based Trading on Volatility
and Liquidity, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19, at 59, 59-60; Macey & Kanda,
supra note 18, at 1018-20.
62 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BusmNss 648 (1989);
Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 61, at 59-82; Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 883, 886 (1981);
see also H. Kent Baker & Richard B. Edelman, AMEX-to-NYSE Transfers, Market Microstructure,
and Shareholder Wealth, 21 FIN. MGmT. 60 (1992) (noting that issuers switch from AMEX to
NYSE when the latter provides liquidity benefits); Arnold R. Cowan et al., Explaining the
NYSE Listing Choices of NASDAQFirms, 21 FIN. MGmT. 73 (1992) (finding that issuers look to
liquidity benefits when choosing between NASDAQ and NYSE markets); cf Macey &
Kanda, supra note 18, at 1010-24 (arguing that liquidity is only one of the services that
exchange markets offer).
63 Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,
54 U. Ci. L. Rxv. 119, 121 (1987); see also Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 842-43 (noting
that markets reduce search costs for buyers and sellers); Nicholas Wolfson et al., The Securi-
ties Markets: An Overview, 16 How. L.J. 791, 811 (1971) ("The economic purpose of a stock
exchange is to bring together buyers and sellers in one central market.").
64 See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 40-41, 43-44; Grossman, supra note 57, at 513.
65 See NYSE FAcr BOOK 19 (1990) (specialists were either buyer or seller in 19% of
share volume in 1989, and less than half of volume involved a NYSE member trading as
principal); Poser, supra note 62, at 889; see also Cowan et al., supra note 62, at 75 (investors
can bypass specialists and trade with each other on the exchanges within the spread); LIND-
SET & SCHADE, supra note 60, at 17 (suggesting that since specialists rarely participate in
block trading, the 19% specialist-participation figure implies that specialists participate in
about 39% of trading at their posts).
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ever,66 and an investor who wants to trade more than other investors
present in the market at prevailing prices must either wait or offer a
premium to attract other traders to the market.67 Market makers,
such as specialists on the exchanges, stand willing to take the other
side of many trades.68 This service has a price, however, since market
makers must be compensated for being available and for bearing the
risk of taking a position. 69 This compensation takes the form of a
premium price; market makers offer to buy at one price and to sell at
a higher one.
If market makers supply immediacy,70 then the bid-ask spread is a
cost of trading immediately.71 Because of the spread, the sequence of
orders reaching the market may cause changes in reported prices.
For example, if a market maker buys at the bid price and then sells at
66 See Schreiber & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 24-25 (explaining how costs of trading
impede price discovery); see also Grossman, supra note 57, at 511-14 (discussing the failure
of continuous participation and its consequences).
67 A price that either triggers limit orders or attracts the attention of other market
participants may mobilize traders. See Grossman, supra note 57, at 513 ("The customer who
was interested in selling the stock [but was not in the market] will see the price rise and
offer his stock for sale. The overall transaction is effected by prices conveying information
to customers. .. ."); HASBROUCK & SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 15 ("The temporary price
changes act primarily as a sweetener to attract new orders to the market."); Allen R. Myer-
son, Less is Brewing in Witching Hours, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1993, at D1 (finding that NYSE
announcements of order imbalances attract offsetting orders and stabilize prices); cf. P.C.
Grier & P.S. Albin, Nonrandom Price Changes in Association with Trading in Large Blocks, 46 J.
Bus. 425 (1973) (suggesting that investors need about 15 minutes to trade in response to a
trade's appearing on the tape).
68 See 17 C.FR. § 240.1lb-1 (a) (2)(iii) (1993) (requiring specialists to maintain fair
and orderly markets); 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2104 (1991); 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH)
9310 (1989); see also Dale A. Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Outmoded
Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17J. CORP. L. 223 (1992); Nicholas
Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
1970 DuKE LJ. 707.
69 See Demsetz, supra note 58; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240; Niederhoffer &
Osborne, supra note 40, at 904-05. Market makers must also be compensated for the possi-
bility that they may be trading with informed investors. See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider
Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist, 62J. Bus. 211 (1989); see also David
Easley & Maureen O'Hara, Pice, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. FIN.
EcoN. 69 (1987) (suggesting that the possibility that large trades convey information can
fully account for the price impact of large trades).
70 See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 35-37; see also Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 61
(noting the immediacy services that market makers provide); ScmvARrz, supra note 18, at
332-40, 389-91; Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING, supra
note 51, at 67, 78-82 (same);Jack L. Treynor, The Economics of the Dealer Function, FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 27 (defining market maker as someone who accommodates
traders for whom time is important).
71 See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 39-45; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 169-70, 332-
33, 389-91; Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 843-44; cf. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 391-97
(discussing other services provided by market makers). The spread is usually very small on
the NYSE. See NYSE FACT BOOK 22 (1990). The spread is larger for smaller issuers with less
trading volume. See Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an
Efficient Market, 39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984); HASBROUCK & SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 14, 31.
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the ask price, the price of the two consecutive trades will differ by the
amount of the bid-ask spread.72 Thus, as Fischel and Ross recognize,
an order to sell (buy) stock at the market that is filled after a buy (sell)
order will decrease (increase) the reported price.73 Brokerage firms
and their employees are well situated to engineer the change between
bid and ask prices, and sometimes this price change can create sub-
stantial profits.7 4
The bid-ask spread may not be the full measure of the potential
price impact of executing a trade quickly, however.75 Market makers
will be reluctant to take the opposite position in extremely large
trades even at a premium, and they may lack the capital to do so any-
way.76 Stock exchange specialists are required to trade to keep the
market orderly, but they are not required to support prices or keep
them stable. The prices at which they offer to buy or sell are good for
only limited quantities of securities.
77
Traders usually take care not to overwhelm the market when they
believe that the unaided market cannot immediately accommodate
their large trades.78 Their brokers may search for offsetting interest
72 Demsetz, supra note 58; Niederhoffer & Osborne, supra note 40; Roll, supra note
71, at 1128-30; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516; ScmvAR-rz, supra note 18, at 408-
09 (distinguishing between realized and quoted spreads); HASBROUCK & SessVARrz, supra
note 44, at 14-15 (discussing bid-ask spreads in larger markets).
73 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516; cf. Ronald C. Lease et al., An Investigation of
Market Microstructure Impacts on Event Study Returns, 46J. FIN. 1523 (1991) (arguing that a
significant part of abnormal returns conventionally associated with seasoned equity offer-
ings can be explained by spread bias resulting from a preponderance of sell orders on the
day before the offering).
74 See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
75 Fischel and Ross can be understood to treat the bid-ask spread as the full measure
of the price impact of trading immediately. They call the price premium (discount) that a
trader must pay (accept) a liquidity cost, and indicate that all traders bear it because of bid-
ask spreads. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 516. They do not, however, acknowledge that
it may be impossible to trade large quantities at the quoted spread, nor do they discuss the
upstairs market, the existence of which documents the limits of the liquidity that market
makers provide. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. They do, however, acknowl-
edge that a trader who insists on trading immediately may be unable to do so at the prevail-
ing price because offsetting interest may be absent at the moment that the order reaches
the market. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 515-16.
76 See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2514-16; Hasbrouck, supra note 38, at 200-
02; Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1028-32; see also Poser, supra note 62, at 952-56 (not-
ing that specialists may not always have sufficient capital to function properly).
77 See, e.g., 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2104.10 (1991); see also 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 39, at 2524-25 (noting that specialist's obligation to deal for his own account is not
unlimited); ScIvARTz, supra note 18, at 30; Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1025-34
(noting that market makers do not always have the incentive or capital to maintain price
continuity); Oesterle et al., supra note 68, at 268-95 (discussing evaluation of specialists);
Stoll, in MARKET MAKING, supra note 70, at 74-77 (discussing the market as price stabilizer);
cf. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368-70 (2d Cir. 1991) (price increase created
by buying more than the specialist would sell).
78 Consider the Bank of England's sale of approximately $970,000,000 of British Pe-
troleum stock at only a small discount, which Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers cite as a
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or effect the trades in smaller amounts over an appropriate period of
time.79 When traders believe their orders cannot be handled on the
exchange floor without a price concession, they often turn to the
firms that comprise the so-called upstairs market.80 These firms make
a business of facilitating large trades and locating any trading interest
that is not registered on the floor.8 ' The upstairs market, which com-
petes with the floor in providing liquidity, exists in part because very
large trades can overwhelm the trading interest that is present on the
floor.8 2 The capital, expertise and specialized facilities devoted to the
remarkable example of the extreme elasticity of demand for securities. See BREALEv & MY-
ERS, supra note 22, at 308. As Brealey and Myers emphasize, the Bank took applications for
nearly two weeks before the sale. Id.
79 See SCHwARTZ, supra note 18, at 108 ("Medium size orders are worked on the ex-
change to avoid the price impact of a market order or the price impact attributable to the
option value of a revealed limit order.");Jerry A. Hausman et al., An Ordered Probit Analysis
of Transaction Stock Prices, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 321 (1992) ("A floor broker seeking to
unload 100,000 shares of stock will generally break up the sale into smaller blocks to mini-
mize the price impact of the trades."); see also MARTIN MAYER, MARKETs 37 (1988) (recog-
nizing that brokers with large orders will bide their time and split orders); Hausman et al.,
supra, at 351, 352-53 (noting that brokers tend to split large orders and time the execution
of trades); cf Lawrence M. Benveniste et al., What's Special About the Specialist, 32 J. FIN.
ECON. 61, 67 (1992) (finding that specialists extract concessions from brokers by working
orders for them).
80 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2573; ScHwARrz, supra note 18, at 26-27.
81 See SclrwARTz, supra note 18, at 111 ("the negative market impact [of large trades is]
limited by the information gathering, selling, and risk taking activities of the block
trader"); Grossman, supra note 57, at 511-14; see also Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1032
("[T]he rise of block trading has caused trading by investment bankers, serving in their
capacity as 'upstairs market makers,' to assume the role traditionally performed by special-
ists on the exchange. These investment bankers, and not the exchange specialists, are the
real providers of liquidity for the block trading that has become the dominant form of
trading in modem securities markets."). Indeed, the NYSE rules that regulate block posi-
tioning recognize the limited ability of the floor to handle large trades. See 2 NYSE Guide
(CCH) 2127 (1991); see also id. 2097; Russo & Lobel, supra note 31, at 79. The NYSE
defines trades of over 10,000 shares as block trades, and over half of the trading volume on
the NYSE is effected in such block trades. NYSE FACr BOOK 17 (1990). However, the
market is able to handle many trades of 10,000 shares without disruption. See Holthausen
et al., supra note 37, at 244 n.9.
82 See Grossman, supra note 57, at 512-13 (describing the upstairs market as a deposi-
tory for information about unexpressed demand); see also DuaneJ. Seppi, Equilibrium Block
Trading and Asymmetric Information, 45 J. FIN. 73, 89 (1990) (noting that in the upstairs
market, a trader can obtain better prices by signalling that she is uninformed); HAMILTON,
supra note 62, § 18.7; 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2570-78; SCHWARTZ, supra note
18, at 106-13, 147; Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265-66; Macey & Kanda, supra note
18, at 1028-29. The off-exchange market in exchange-listed stocks developed, in part, as a
response to fixed commission rates on the NYSE, which have since been abolished. See
MAYER, supra note 79, at 38-39;James L. Hamilton, Electronic Market Linkages and the Distribu-
tion of Order Flow: The Case of Off-Board Trading of NYSE-Listed Stocks, in INFORMTION TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 19, at 265; Poser, supra note 62, at 898-901, 937; Wolfson et al., supra
note 63, at 824-25.
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upstairs market cogently document the fact that large trades taken
directly to the trading floor will disrupt price. 3
The idea that rapidly executed trades can distort prices might
seem inconsistent with the fact that very large blocks of stock are usu-
ally traded at or very near the prevailing market price. It might also
seem inconsistent with the widely held belief that much of the price
change occasioned by large trades is due to the information thought
to be impounded in those trades and not to the pressure of those
trades overwhelming the market.8 4 For example, Fischel and Ross ar-
gue that the evidence suggesting that almost one-half of all large
trades are effected at the same price as the preceding trade demon-
strates that a would-be manipulator cannot be confident that large
trades will move price.85 However, the minimal price effects that typi-
cally attend large trades do not show that a large trade designed to
move price will not do so. In fact, this evidence does not even show
that a carelessly executed trade can be made at the prevailing price.
The large blocks that are traded at or near prevailing market
prices are typically constructed so as to minimize or entirely avoid
making price concessions. Traders usually want to trade at the best
price possible, and if they expect a trade to overwhelm the market
they will not trade immediately. Instead, they will instruct their bro-
kers to work the trades or turn to the upstairs market 8 6 Thus, it is
hardly surprising that large trades are seldom effected in a way that
dramatically changes price by temporarily overwhelming supply or de-
mand. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that many traders were
willing to pay extra to trade quickly.
8 7
Most of the evidence indicating that large trades have a minimal
impact on stock prices relates to NYSE trading. The prices at which
83 The firms that handle large trades have specialized communications facilities and
expertise in locating trading interest, all developed at considerable cost. See HAMILTON,
supra note 62, at 426; 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2573-77; ScmvARrz, supra note
18, at 107-13. Computerized institutional trading systems allow institutions to trade large
blocks among themselves. HAMILTON, supra note 62, at 426-27; 5 Loss & SFsGMAN, supra
note 39, at 2577-78.
84 See infra part I.B.3.
85 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517. Fischel and Ross offer Robert W. Holthausen
and others to support the statement that "nearly half of all block trades occur with no
change in price." Id. at at 517 n.63 (citing Holthausen et al., supra note 37). However,
Holthausen et al. explain that stock exchange rules may distort the trading record, so
that their figures understate the frequency with which large trades change price. See
Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 257-60, 266; see also supra note 39 (discussing the execu-
tion of large trades).
86 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Fischel has noted elsewhere that a bro-
ker handling a large trade will bypass the specialist on the exchange floor and directly "call
other dealers and institutions to find one interested in the other end of the deal." Fischel,
supra note 63, at 126.
87 Cf ScmvARTz, supra note 18, at 106-07 (suggesting that institutions will pay extra
transaction costs to sell but not to buy).
1994] 237
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
trades are effected on the Exchange are the product of the profit-
maximizing behavior of traders. In addition, large trades are often
executed on the floor of the Exchange only after they are arranged in
the upstairs market.88 Accordingly, the great liquidity indicated by an
analysis of NYSE trading data reflects the use of liquidity-enhancing
devices. The fact that trades carefully structured to minimize their
impact do not move price much does not mean that unstructured
trades or trades structured to have an impact will fail to change prices.
On the contrary, traders go to considerable lengths to minimize the
effects of their trades precisely because unstructured trades might
"generate severe, adverse price effects if simply presented to the
market."8
9
The same article that Fischel & Ross cite for the proposition that
large blocks typically trade at market price emphasizes the limited rel-
evance of this finding to our inquiry.90 It begins with the caveat that
traders can select the lowest cost alternative for trading, and "[t]hus,
the results in the paper do not measure the costs of immediacy (i.e.,
the price disadvantage of transacting immediately) for a security se-
lected at random. Rather, the results indicate the actual price effects
associated with large trades given traders' maximizing behavior."91
The article ends on the same note, reiterating that the transactions
studied resulted from maximizing behavior-in particular, searches
for low-cost execution-and stating that "[t]he price effects docu-
mented in this paper should not be extrapolated to large transactions
in securities selected at random."92
Studies that focus on the impact of corporate sales of new stock
and substantial secondary distributions reveal even less about the ef-
fect of immediate trading, for such sales are typically handled by in-
vestment bankers who expend time and resources to find buyers.93
88 Cf. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 2576 (block positioners are generally obli-
gated to execute block trades on an exchange floor).
89 Roberts, at 106.
90 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 514 n.46 (citing Holthausen et al., supra note
37).
91 Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 239.
92 Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265; see also Hausman et al., supra note 79, at
350-53 (even flexible and powerful statistical model of stock trading does not reveal the
price impact of large orders that are not executed in small bundles to obtain the best
average price).
93 Myron Scholes' study is probably the most influential. Scholes studied secondary
distributions that were typically underwritten by investment bankers and sold after the
close of the market to subscribers at a subscription price at or near the closing price. See
Scholes, supra note 36, at 185. Scholes found these distributions uniquely appropriate for
his study precisely because the investment bankers had informed potential buyers of the
availability of the block. Id. at 186. In any event, Scholes analyzed daily return data, and
thus, his results do not illuminate any immediacy costs that sellers may have incurred. See
id. at 186-87; see also THOMAS E. COPELAND &J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND COR-
PoRATE POLicY 371-72 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the Scholes study). Studies of blocks
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Moreover, many new issues and secondary distributions must be regis-
tered with the SEC before they can be completed, and the delay be-
tween the filing of a registration statement and its effective date allows
substantial time for potential buyers -to mobilize.
94
Conventional traders try to get the best prices they can, employ-
ing disruption-minimizing techniques to ensure that they buy at the
lowest price possible and sell at the highest. Manipulators, on the
other hand, desire just the opposite: they want their purchases to
push prices up, and their sales to pull them down. Inasmuch as ma-
nipulators act on perverse incentives, the mechanisms that have devel-
oped to help conventional traders will not keep manipulators from
moving prices. Indeed, the development of these mechanisms sug-
gests that unassisted large trades do change price. A manipulator who
wants to disrupt reported prices may be able to do so simply by forego-
ing investment bankers or the upstairs market and taking a large trade
directly to the trading floor and effecting it all at once.
Although hastily effected trades can be used to move prices, the
would-be manipulator who takes this tack faces a special problem. If
the price of a security changes because a trade is effected too quickly,
the new price will be short lived.95 The price change occasioned by
executing a trade without allowing the market to mobilize is tempo-
rary because market participants who were away from the market
when the trade occurred will come to the market when they see that
trades are being effected at premium prices. In fact, the predictability
of this reaction allows specialists and other market makers to provide
offsetting trades for a relatively small premium, thereby reducing the
price effect of large trades.96 It follows that the more people pay at-
tention to trading in a particular security, the less impact large trades
will have on price. Again, the prices of thinly traded securities are
moved more easily than those of widely held securities.
97
traded during regular market hours consistently indicate that large sales often depress
price temporarily, suggesting that there is an immediacy cost, even for traders trying to get
the best price possible. See Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of
Price Adjustment, 4J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977); Holthausen et al., supra note 37; Kraus & Stoll,
supra note 29.
94 See Pettway & Radcliffe, supra note 43 (studying registered new issues and noting
effect of offering announcement on price); Scholes, supra note 36, at 204-06 (discussing
price effects of registered secondary distributions).
95 Economists look to the duration of price changes to determine whether they result
from immediacy or some other factor. See Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Pettway & Radcliffe,
supra note 43.
96 See Fischel, supra note 63, at 121-22; cf Treynor, supra note 70 (arguing that the
spread is determined by trades of value-based investors).
97 See WilliamJ. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
863, 887 (1987) ('In perhaps as many as seven hundred firms, liquidity is sufficient to allow




I address the possibility of profiting from manipulated prices be-
low, but it is not giving away much to say that it may be hard to profit
from price changes that last only a few minutes. However, if a price
move triggers a sympathetic response in the market, the trading of
other market participants may prevent price from returning to its pre-
vious level, even as other market participants are mobilized.98 More
importantly, a manipulator may be able to profit from moving prices
even briefly. Remarkably large profits can sometimes be secured by
moving prices just a very small amount for a very short time.99
3. Altered Expectations
Security prices rise and fall with changes in the market's expecta-
tions about the income that securities will produce, and those expec-
tations change as new information becomes available. 100 Trades may
convey relevant information, and as such are important determinants
of market prices.' 0 ' For example, if market participants believe that
the person who initiated a particular trade possessed nonpublic infor-
mation relevant to a security's value, the trade will cause them to
reevaluate the security and its price will change accordingly. 02 In-
deed, Fischel has suggested elsewhere that insider trading tends to
move prices,10 3 and there is at least some evidence that informed trad-
98 See infra part I.B.3.
99 See infra part ILA.
100 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29. The price effect of changed market expecta-
tions is illustrated by a shift of the excess demand function for a security. For example, in
both Figure 1, supra note 29, and Figure 2, supra note 52, line D 2 represents a situation in
which investors will purchase more of the security at any price than investors will purchase
at that price in the situation represented by line Dr. A positive development that leads the
market to a more optimistic evaluation of a security is illustrated by a shift from line DI to
line D2.
101 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 569-79.
102 See, e.g., BREALEv & MYERs, supra note 22, at 349-50 (discussing market reaction to
new issues); Scholes, supra note 36, at 182-84 (discussing price changes under the efficient-
market model); cf. Glosten, supra note 69, at 215-23 (suggesting that competitive market
makers will sometimes refuse to trade when some market participants have informational
advantages); Seppi, supra note 82 (a trader who can demonstrate it lacks information can
get better price in upstairs market). The information thought to be contained in trades
continues to influence price until it ceases to be relevant or is discovered to be incorrect.
Trades that change market participants' expectations about the value of a security change
the security's price even if the demand for the security is perfectly elastic and always pres-
ent in the market. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240; see also Fischel & Ross, supra
note 8, at 514-15.
103 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 857, 866-68 (1983); ef. id. at 892-93 (recognizing that insiders might use the informa-
tion signal of their purchases to manipulate price, but concluding that this is a short-run
phenomenon that corporate insiders will not use for fear that it will damage the value of
their human capital); see also FRANK H. EAsrERooK & DANIEL P- FiscHmL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTRE OF CORPORATE LAw 256-57 (1991) ("At the extreme, trading by insiders is as
revealing as disclosure."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel i Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAv. L. REv. 1161, 1168 n.18 (1981)
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ing moves prices significantly even when informed traders try to hide
their trades.10 4 The communicative aspect of trading is one of the
conventional explanations for the fact that some trades do cause price
changes. 10 5 In fact, the information content of trades may explain all
price changes associated with trading, including price changes associ-
ated with rapidly executed trades and price changes sometimes said to
show that investors place different values on securities.
106
A manipulator may be able to change a security's price by trading
in a way that convinces other market participants that privately in-
formed traders believe the security is mispriced. For example, a ma-
nipulator might increase (decrease) a security's price by entering
purchase (sale) orders in a pattern that suggests that people with valu-
able nonpublic information are buying (selling).' 07 Some trading
practices may be so indicative of an informed trader that the manipu-
lator will be able to achieve the desired result by mimicking them.
10 8
Large trades may be well tailored to convey the impression that
the trader has information. Market participants may believe that
those with the resources to trade on a large scale are more likely to
have access to nonpublic information, and that those with informa-
tion will make large trades, since their profits are a function of the
amount they trade.10 9 Large trades effected in a way that overwhelms
(arguing that "if there were no prohibitions against insider trading, shares would not sell
for less than a price incorporating all information, since insider trades would move prices
to reflect even corporate secrets").
104 Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661
(1992).
105 See BREALm. & MYERs, supra note 22, at 349-50; Holthausen et al., supra note 37;
Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29; Scholes, supra note 36; cf Martin Kimel, Note, The Inadequacy
of Rule 10b-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Reporters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1549, 1565 (1986)
("The underlying principle of the [efficient capital market hypothesis] is that investors
transmit information to the market by trading.").
106 Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517 (suggesting that new information may ex-
plain price effect of changes in S&P 500 list).
107 See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 509; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 574
n.81, 576 n.88. Market participants and researchers usually understand trades effected
above the previous price to be buyer-initiated and trades effected below the previous price
to be seller-initiated. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 244, 254-56, 265-66.
108 Mimicking trades play a key role in many economic models of manipulation. See
Allen & Gale, supra note 19; Allen & Gorton, supra note 19; Gerard & Nanda, supra note
19; Jarrow, supra note 19; Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19; Karl S. Okamoto, Rereading Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REv. 183 (1992); BAGNOLI & LIPMAN, supra note
19.
109 See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 240 ("The size of the transaction may...
proxy for the amount of information the trader has about a firm."); Scholes, supra note 36,
at 183-84; Thel, supra note 17, at 403-04; see also Easley & O'Hara, supra note 69 (arguing
that informed traders prefer trading large blocks because trade size changes perceptions of
the value of the underlying asset); Glosten, supra note 69; Hasbrouck, supra note 38, at 200-
02 (bid-ask spread widens in response to large trades, suggesting that market-makers infer
information from large trades); cf ScmVARTz, supra note 18, at 107 (Block sellers cannot
use limit orders because they will, "correctly or erroneously,... be interpreted as a symbol
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the trading interest present in the market may be particularly likely to
lead market participants to believe that the trader has important in-
sights. Since most traders want to trade at the best price possible
(buying low or selling high), a trade that appears not to have been
structured to minimize the cost of trading quickly may convey the im-
pression that the trader has reason to be confident that price will
change soon.11 0
Purchases may be more likely to create the impression of in-
formed trading than sales.1"' Sales are more apt to be motivated by
reasons unrelated to the traders' sense that the market price is wrong.
While a need to raise cash or diversify may motivate an individual to
sell,"12 investors seldom need to spend money quickly or make block
purchases to diversify. 1. 3 Additionally, because restrictions on short
sales make it difficult for informed persons to sell on bad news, in-
formed traders may be more likely to buy than to sell."14 Market par-
ticipants may also expect security owners to be impatient to realize
their profits, and thus the market may not read sales made after an
increase in a security's price to indicate that the seller knows of im-
pending bad news. 115 Finally, very large purchases may hint of a take-
over of the issuer, thus foreshadowing an imminent and substantial
of informational change."); Jennifer Conrad & Cathy M. Niden, Order Fow, Trading Costs
and Corporate Acquisition Announcements, 21 FiN. MGrm. 22, 23 (1992) (volume is high but
trades are not large before acquisition announcements); Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at
1016 (suggesting that the Exchange Act's requirement that large buyers disclose the size of
their investments effectively reveals the information they have acquired); Meulbroek, supra
note 104, at 1691-96 (volume is high on days that insiders trade illegally, but insiders'
trading is only a small part of total volume on those days). While large trades seem to
convey information, the size of a large trade may not be directly correlated with the
amount of information it is thought to convey. Compare Scholes, supra note 36 (no correla-
tion), with Hasbrouck, supra note 38 (correlation exists).
A trade need not be large to change the market's collective judgment of value. Cf
Meulbroek, suprd note 104, at 1691-96 (discussing market's response to relatively small
insider trades). Indeed, if the trading plans of a person thought to be well informed be-
come widely known, price may change even before she trades. See Pettway & Radcliffe,
supra note 43, at 19 (price changes around announcement of new issue); see also Scholes,
supra note 36 (price corrections after traders' identities are revealed).
110 Cf Grossman, supra note 57, at 522-23 (discussing limits of arbitrage between up-
stairs and downstairs markets).
111 Purchaser-initiated large transactions tend to have greater permanent effects on
price than do seller-initiated transactions. See Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265; see
also Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573-74, suggesting that purchases contain more infor-
mation than sales. Block positioners that are willing to buy large blocks for inventory are
reluctant to sell short to facilitate a purchase. Holthausen et al., supra note 37, at 265;
Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573-74. This may indicate that block buyers are more likely
than sellers to possess non-public information.
112 See Scholes, supra note 36, at 200-04.
113 See Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-25; cf Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 573
(stating that "blocks are sold, not bought").
114 Id. at 627-28.
115 Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 519-20.
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rise in share price.1 16 Indeed, given the natural interest of potential
sellers in the identity of those who wish to buy large blocks, a would-be
manipulator might increase price simply by refusing to reveal his iden-
tity when buying a block.
117
Trades are more likely to change price if the market overreacts to
new information or if market participants evaluate securities on the
basis of something other than issuer income. Now maybe the market
responds in a systematic way only to information about the value of
the income that securities are likely to produce, so that market prices
reflect the collective assessment of market participants regarding the
present value of that income."18 Yet, "[tihe popular image of the se-
curities markets is one of a noisy crowd easily manipulated by and
hypersensitive to rumors and fads."" 9 There is some support for this
image. Citing evidence that market prices overreact to certain events,
some economists suggest that market participants focus on something
other than the prospects of security issuers, such as the expected reac-
tions of other traders to fads or rumors. 20 If fads or information un-
related to fundamental values influence market prices in a predictable
way, "the correct smart money strategy may well be to jump on the
bandwagon, so long as it can be done early enough and the position
116 See Kraus & Stoll, supra note 19, at 573-85, 587; Scholes, supra note 36, at 184 n.12.
Scholes focused on secondary distribution in his early study of the effect of trades on price,
in part to exclude the information effect of large purchases. Scholes, supra note 36.
117 See Seppi, supra note 82; see also Carney, supra note 97, at 888-89 n.114 (block trad-
ers set price based on the likelihood that they are dealing with informed trader).
118 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 1165-68; see also COPELAND &
WEsTON, supra note 93, at 339-43 (discussing rational expectations and market efficiency).
119 Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Effi-
ciency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. RPv. 851, 852 (1992).
120 1d. at 857-72 (surveying existing literature); see also RCaAR H. THALER, QUAsI RA-
TIoNAL ECONOMICS 239-300 (1991) (discussing the theory of quasi-rational behavior in the
securities market context); Werner F. M. DeBondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985) (discussing the "overreaction hypothesis"); Kenneth A.
Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Specula-
tion, 47J. FIN. 1461 (1992) (suggesting herding equilibria in which rational market partici-
pants focus on information unrelated to fundamental value); id. at 1478-81 (discussing
other models); Thomas L. Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L.
Ray. 987, 995-1003 (1992) (discussing "irrational" factors contributing to investor behav-
ior); Kraakman, supra note 32, at 899-900 (suggesting that uninformed traders operate on
misconceived strategies, fashions and fads); RobertJ. Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in
Financial Markets, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARcErs, supra note 32, at 56 (noting that
"capricious changes in investor sentiments" influence prices in speculative markets); Rob-
ertJ. Shiller, Book Review, 47J. FIN. 2076 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER, QuAsI
RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991)). But seeJosef Lakonishok et al., The Impact of Institutional
Trading on Stock Prices, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 23 (1992) (suggesting that institutional traders en-
gage in relatively little herding or positive-feedback trading).
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liquidated in time."l2 ' A manipulator might go one step further and
make "visible 'irrational' purchases to trigger an overreaction.' 22
Fischel and Ross doubt that manipulators will be able to use in-
formation-conveying trades to change price. Noting again that most
trades do not move price, they argue that it is hard to appear in-
formed in an anonymous market. 2 3 Moreover, if the best way to ap-
pear informed is to effect large trades, the manipulator who would
use trades to cause the market to reevaluate (and reprice) a security
might have to put substantial capital at risk to try to move price.
Of course, a would-be manipulator cannot be sure that even large
trades will convince the market that he is well informed. Large trades
cannot always be counted on to move prices, let alone change percep-
tions. 124 However, the fact that many large trades do not change mar-
ket price does not mean that a manipulator cannot use trades to
change perceptions. Recall, once again, that most traders want to get
the best price possible and that reported market prices are the prod-
uct of profit-maximizing traders. Not surprisingly, those who think
that their trades may change the market's judgment of a security's
value try to disguise their identities, sometimes violating the law in
doing So.125 Conversely, traders without information have a strong in-
centive to signal their ignorance before they trade in order to avoid
affecting price.'
26
Again, large trades effected at prevailing prices do not show that
it is impossible to trade in a way that will influence price, nor do such
trades show that market participants are skeptical about the possibility
121 Langevoort, supra note 119, at 870; see also Froot et al., supra note 120, at 1480
(suggesting that if many traders use chartist models, chartism may be rational even if charts
contain no relevant fundamental or long-term information).
122 Langevoort, supra note 119, at 871 n.62; see also id. at 906 ("Much of recent noise
theory argues that there can be a contrived run-up in the price of a stock based on hopes
and illusions that the smart money either waits out or joins.").
123 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517; see also id. at 513.
124 Cf Carney, supra note 97, at 863 (arguing that few insider trades induce others to
trade).
125 See Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMEMCA 1315
(1985) (suggesting that informed traders maximize their profits by using noise trading to
camouflage their informed trading); see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d
Cir. 1991) (stock parking and secret accumulation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63 (1991));
Carney, supra note 97, at 874-75 (discussing insider trading and bids for corporate con-
trol); Meulbroek, supra note 104, at 1662-63 (noting that corporate insiders are not likely
to report their violative transactions to the SEC); Thel, supra note 17, at 403-04 ("[T] raders
who believe that revealing their trading will necessarily reveal information that they possess
... may try to hide their identities."); cf Levine et al., supra note 53, at 51-64 (discussing
parking); MICHAEL J. FISHMAN & KATHLEEN HAGERTY, THE MANDATORY DiscLosuRE OF
TRADEs AND MARKET LIQurDITY (Northwestern University Department of Finance Working
Paper No. 107, 1991) (finding that insiders will not voluntary disclose trades).
126 See BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 22, at 307-08; Scholes, supra note 36, at 205; Seppi,
supra note 82, at 73-75.
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that a trader is informed.127 On the contrary, one reason people with
information expend resources to hide their trades is that they believe
their trades will reveal their secrets. Similarly, the perceived informa-
tion content of trades explains why market professionals devote signif-
icant resources to finding out who is trading large blocks and why the
trading reports required of insiders by section 16(a) of the Exchange
Act are so widely followed.
Market participants will not ascribe any information to a trade
if they believe that the trader is either uninformed or a manipulator
who is mimicking an informed trader or trying to move prices for
some other reason. Ironically then, the more prevalent that manipu-
lation is thought to be, the more difficult it is to accomplish. Fischel
and Ross do not mention this barrier to manipulation, perhaps be-
cause it works only if market participants believe that manipulation is
possible. Fischel and Ross may not believe in manipulation, but some
market participants do,128 and this creates a problem for manipula-
tors, especially in situations that present obvious opportunities for
manipulation. Fortunately for the manipulators, however, market
participants also believe that many traders possess nonpublic informa-
tion, and manipulation is possible so long as market participants are
not sure whether trading is informed or manipulative.' 29
Although trades can be used to get other market participants to
reevaluate securities, manipulators will be reluctant to risk their capi-
tal on manipulative trades when there is no guarantee that their trad-
ing will have the desired effect. However, manipulators may be able
to move price with very little exposure by using so-called fictitious
transactions. Wash sales, in which the same party is buyer and seller,
and matched orders, in which confederates simultaneously enter off-
setting purchase and sale orders, are supposed to be standard manipu-
lative tools. For example, manipulators use these tools to create a rec-
ord of rising prices that suggests that informed interests are buying.130
127 Moreover, the perceived informational content of large trades may be higher for
smaller firms, which are more typically involved in alleged manipulations. See Hasbrouck,
supra note 38, at 197-200.
128 See House COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SHORT-SELLNG Acrvrrv IN THE
STOCK MARKET: MARKTr EFFEars AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION (PART I); H.R. REP. No.
414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991) ("many investors have a perception that short sellers
have great manipulative power over stocks"); see also id. at 15 (market participants may
believe manipulation is more common than it is).
129 See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 514-18; see also Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19
(investigating the potential for manipulation due to the interaction between secondary
market trading prior to a seasoned offering and the pricing of the offering); Vila, supra
note 19 (using game theory to present examples of market manipulation); BAGNOLI &
LIPMAN, supra note 19 (discussing the use of takeover bids to manipulate price).
130 See United States v. Rubenstein, Litigation Release No. 11,945, 1988 SEC LEXIS
2532 (D. Or. Dec. 20, 1988) (addressing guilty pleas); see also Litigation Release No. 11,973,
1989 SEC LEXIS 165 (Jan. 25, 1989) (complaint of crossed orders outside trading range
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Fischel and Ross seem to recognize that wash sales and matched
orders are sometimes used "to mislead market participants into believ-
ing that buyers and sellers are trading in a security when in fact no
transactions are taking place." 131 This concession is telling, for it ac-
knowledges both that trades can change the market's perception of
value, and that a manipulator bent on changing perceptions can use
trades to do it.132
The fictitious-trade cases highlight the possibility of manipulation
by brokers and market makers. Matched orders and wash sales at suc-
cessively higher or lower prices cannot change anybody's perception
unless the record of the completed transactions is published. If the
orders are exposed to the market, however, it may be hard to com-
plete the transactions because the orders may be matched against in-
dependent orders at the prevailing price.133 Market makers and bro-
kerage firm employees can avoid this problem by effecting fictitious
trades without exposing them to the market first.'34 Such trades are
said to be commonly used by penny-stock brokers who control the
entire supply of thinly traded securities and make the whole mar-
prevailing on AMEX); Comment, supra note 55, at 626-68; 8 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note
39, at 3952-58; Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 536-37; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at
576 n.89; Kryzanowski, supra note 55, at 124-26; Lewis D. Lowenfels, Sections 9(a)(1) and
9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Analysis of Two Important Anti-Manipulative
Provisions, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 698, 698-705 (1991); Thel, supra note 7, at 430-31; Thel, supra
note 17, at 410-11. Penny-stock manipulators are said to employ similar techniques. See
EdwardJ. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Goldstein et al., supra note
53, at 785-86; Lash, supra note 53, at 6; Levine et al., supra note 53, at 20-21, 35-51.
131 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510; see also id. at 536-37.
132 See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 576 n.89 (offering the "venerable
scam" of fictitious transactions by manipulators as persuasive evidence that market partici-
pants look for information in completed trades).
133 In other words, it is impossible to trade at a price above the excess demand func-
tion for a security. This proposition is illustrated by the excess demand functions in Figure
1, supra note 29, and Figure 2, supra note 52. These illustrations also suggest the communi-
cative power of matched orders and wash sales. If market participants understand that
traders are price takers, they will assume that reported prices represent demand conditions
and that a new price represents a new equilibrium price. Accordingly, a fictitious transac-
tion can (albeit falsely) communicate a substantial change in market expectations.
134 See In re Mercil, NYSE Hearing Panel Decision ("HPD") 86-99, 1986 WL 178917
(N.Y.S.E.) (Dec. 16, 1986) (specialist entered fictitious trades at the end of the day to
increase likely selling price of inventory); see also In re Nammack, HPD 86-98, 1986 WL
178916 (N.Y.S.E.) (Dec. 16, 1986) (related case); In re Blittner, HPD 82-30, 1982 WL
119035 (N.Y.S.E.) (Apr. 6, 1982) (bond clerk entered matched orders to depress price);
NYMEX Chairman, Others Charged With Trade, Reporting Violations, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 279
(BNA) (Feb. 26, 1993) [hereinafter NYMEX Chairman] (Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission charged exchange member with using wash sales to increase apparent value of
positions in order to avoid calls); see also infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
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ket. 3 5 Public investors can enlist the assistance of market makers or
brokers to effect fictitious trades as well.'
3 6
II
PROFTrING FROM MANIPULATED PRICES
Even if trades can be used to change reported prices, people are
unlikely to manipulate prices unless they can profit by doing so. The
profits of manipulation may not be easy ones; even if prices can be
controlled through trading, manipulation may still be a "sure-to-lose"
strategy that will deter itself.'
3 7
Fischel and Ross argue that manipulation is unlikely to be suc-
cessful if the manipulator's profits depend on trading at the manipu-
lated price. In a bull manipulation, for example, the manipulator
needs to bid the price of the stock up and then sell at the resulting
higher price. The difficulty is that the offsetting sales that are essen-
tial to the realization of a profit will tend to depress price. If the de-
pressing effect of the offsetting sales is symmetrical with the inflating
effect of the initial purchases, there will be no profit. Moreover, the
manipulative scheme may prove costly.' 3 8 Given the poor prospects of
moving price by trading and the high cost of trying, the argument
goes, manipulation is likely to be self-deterring. However, like the ar-
gument that prices cannot be controlled in the first place, the argu-
ment that profits cannot be made by controlling prices substantially
overstates the case.
A. Contracts
Whatever the strength of the argument that manipulation is self-
deterring, it is limited to cases in which the manipulator's profits are
solely derived by effecting offsetting trades at the manipulated price.
However, manipulative schemes are often most interesting-and, for
the manipulator, most attractive-when the profit comes not from
trading at the manipulated price, but from a contract or other ar-
i35 See Goldstein et al., supra note 53; Lash, supra note 53; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels &
Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Market Manipulations: An Examination and Analysis of Domina-
lion and Control Frontrunning, and Parking, 55 ALB. L. REv. 293, 295-312 (1991) (discussing
the concept of domination and control of the trading markets).
136 See United States v. Bloom (E.D. Pa. April 5, 1978), SEC Litigation Release No.
8,402, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1635 (May 3, 1978); Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28; see also
infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
137 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-19.
138 If it takes large trades to move a price, the manipulator will have to put substantial
capital at risk. The manipulator must also bear the liquidity costs of the offsetting trades
and pay brokers to handle both the initial and offsetting trades. Fischel & Ross, supra note
8, at 512-13, 518-19. However, the manipulator can avoid putting capital at risk by using
wash sales or matched orders, and transaction costs can be reduced or eliminated if a
broker or market maker participates in the scheme.
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rangement that will provide the manipulator with a profit if price
moves in a particular direction or reaches a certain level. If a manipu-
lator can benefit from controlling prices without making offsetting
trades, manipulation will be profitable even if the price effects of
purchases and sales are perfectly symmetrical, so long as the profit
made possible by the price change exceeds the costs of the manipula-
tive trades.
Contractual rights and obligations are often tied to reported se-
curity prices.' 3 9 Much wealth is held in the form of securities, and
people often enter into contracts designed to maximize or at least re-
alize the value of their securities. Reported market price recommends
itself as a measure or proxy for value in such contracts. Securities can
generally be bought or sold at reported prices, so in an important
sense reported price is the value of a security. Moreover, other ap-
proaches to valuation, such as appraisal, are expensive and indetermi-
nate, while reported prices, especially daily closing prices, are
precisely articulated and readily available.
When reported prices are used to measure or control rights or
obligations in contracts and other relationships, they are a tempting
target for manipulation. For example, two of the three recent and
well-known manipulation cases that Fischel and Ross discuss at length
involved allegations of contract-based manipulation. 140 Fischel and
Ross offer these cases as evidence of the increased interest in financial
market manipulation. Apparently, they feel that a major social cost of
the existing antimanipulation regime is that the much-publicized
prosecution of these cases has discouraged appropriate trading.
These cases do merit close attention, but not necessarily for the rea-
sons Fischel and Ross suggest.
Michael Milken, the central actor in the best-known securities liti-
gation of recent times, was the subject of one of the Fischel and Ross
cases. The United States charged Milken with manipulating the price
of the common stock of the Wickes Companies. 141 The government
dropped this charge when Milken pleaded guilty to other charges, but
asked the judge to consider it in connection with his sentencing.142
The judge eventually decided not to consider the Wickes manipula-
'39 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (1988) (congressional finding that the securities markets
must be regulated because security prices are used for determining taxes and the value of
collateral); Levine et al., supra note 53, at 16 (defining price manipulation as controlling
price either to induce trades at artificial prices or "to induce other business decisions or
behavior").
140 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 527-34.
141 Indictment, United States v. Milken 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41); see also
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530-32.
142 Government's Sentencing Memorandum 98-101, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (No. 89 Gr. 41); Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum 1-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(No. 89 Cr. 41).
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don charge in her sentencing decision. 143 Although we do not know
what Milken did, he does not appear to have disputed that someone at
his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, manipulated the price of Wickes
stock; he simply denied that he did it.'4 In any event, the circum-
stances of the case do show that manipulation can sometimes be suc-
cessful and quite profitable, and that is the reason the case is dis-
cussed here.
In 1986, Wickes had over $200,000,000 of exchangeable pre-
ferred stock outstanding, paying a 10% dividend. 145 Wickes wanted to
redeem this preferred stock as soon as possible, 146 but could not do so
until May 1, 1988, unless the closing price of Wickes common stock
equalled or exceeded $6 1/8 on twenty of thirty consecutive trading
days. Milken and Drexel, which was Wickes' investment banker, stood
to profit if Wickes redeemed the preferred stock.147
According to the government, after Wickes common stock had
closed at or above the trigger price for nineteen of twenty-eight con-
secutive trading days, Milken caused Drexel employees to ask Ivan
Boesky's firm to buy Wickes common stock for the purpose of causing
it to close at or above $6 1/8 per share.148 Later that day, Boesky's
143 United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
144 See Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4.
145 This discussion of the allegations relating to the manipulation of Wickes common
stock is based on the Indictment, supra note 141, the Government's Sentencing Memoran-
dum, supra note 142, and the Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142. These allega-
tions may be false.
146 The dividend on the preferred stock was a heavy burden, and Wickes wanted to call
the preferred stock as soon as possible. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2-3.
In December 1985, Wickes offered to exchange its common stock for the preferred, but
the offer was only moderately successful. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2.
Fischel and Ross cite the fact that Wickes had to pay investment banking fees as evidence
that a manipulation designed to trigger a redemption right had a small expected value.
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531 n.128. However, Wickes was free to decline to redeem
the preferred after the trigger was satisfied. Thus, Wickes' decision to redeem shows that
at least Wickes thought redemption would be advantageous.
147 Drexel stood to receive substantial fees in connection with a redemption. See infra
note 149 and accompanying text. Milken and Drexel had other reasons to desire a re-
demption. Wickes was an important client that generated over $118,000,000 in fees and
commissions for Drexel. Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 2; see also CoNNIE
BRUCE, TiE PREDATOR'S BALL 292-95 (1989) (stating that Wickes was so central to Milken's
business that he would not tolerate losing it as a client). Milken and Drexel wanted to
keep the client happy, and the client wanted the preferred stock redeemed. Milken and
Drexel stood to reap another, albeit unquantifiable, benefit if the redemption right was
triggered, because they would be able to tell potential clients of their success with the
Wickes preferred.
148 According to Fischel and Ross, the government alleged that "Milken... asked...
the Boesky organization ... to purchase enough Wickes stock to cause it to close at or
above 6 1/8 and... guaranteed Boesky against loss." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530.
In fact, the government alleged that Milken "caused" the Boesky organization to buy. In-
dictment, supra note 141, at 56. As noted in the text, Milken did not dispute the allegation
that Drexel initiated a manipulation, but only denied that he had done so himself. Appar-
ently, a lower-level Drexel employee asked Boesky to buy Wickes stock, and the question
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firm purchased 1,900,000 shares during the last half-hour of trading,
and the price closed at $6 1/8, entitling Wickes to redeem the pre-
ferred stock. Wickes then redeemed the preferred stock, and Drexel
earned $2,300,000 for handling the redemption. 149
Drexel and Milken faced a potentially profitable manipulative op-
portunity,50 and if the government's allegations are true the scheme
could hardly have been anything else. 151 When Boesky began to
trade, Wickes common stock was trading at $6 per share, so only a
small increase in price was necessary to trigger the redemption right.
was whether Milken was responsible for the request. See id. at 4-10. The Government's
Sentencing Memorandum does not identify the person at Drexel who directed the Boesky
organization to support the price of Wickes. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142,
at 100.
149 Indictment, supra note 141, at 57.
150 Fischel and Ross concede that "[o]n one level, the alleged scheme appears plausi-
ble." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 530. An apologetic popular account of the demise of
Drexel and Milken goes even further, concluding that "[t]he logic behind this allegation is
compelling." DAN G. STONE, APRIL FooLs 174 (1990); see also supra text accompanying note
144.
151 Fischel and Ross suggest that an innocent explanation of the charges against
Milken and Boesky is equally plausible, but there is no innocent explanation if the facts
that the government alleged are correct. As Fischel and Ross see it, Milken (or Drexel)
might have had Boesky buy simply because they thought Wickes common stock was a good
investment. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. In this version of the story, it is merely a
coincidence that Boesky committed over $11,000,000 to buy 1,900,000 Wickes shares late
in the afternoon of a day on which the price of Wickes common stock was down, but on
which a higher closing price would lead to a substantial profit for Milken and his firm, who
were directing Boesky's trades. That remarkable coincidence aside, it is unlikely that Bo-
esky's purchases looked like a good investment at the time, for, as Fischel and Ross them-
selves note, "stock returns are usually negative around the announcement of a call." Id. at
531 n.127; see also Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 8 (Drexel's trader ex-
pected redemption to depress the stock price). Moreover, Drexel's request and the
mechanics of Boesky's purchases are both inconsistent with investment intent. According
to the government, Drexel did not ask Boesky to buy a large amount of stock or to buy at
the best price; it asked the Boesky organization to move the price up. In any case, if the
Boesky organization was trying to make a good investment, presumably it would not have
bought a large amount so quickly that it would force price up.
Fischel and Ross also argue that it "is impossible using objective evidence to distin-
guish between the manipulative and non-manipulative explanations for the trading" in
Wickes stock. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. The intended meaning of this state-
ment is not clear, but whatever it is, the statement requires some qualification. Fischel and
Ross may simply be restating their initial position that manipulation is a crime of intent.
The question of whether Boesky's purchases of Wickes common stock were manipulative
does turn on the subjective state of mind of Boesky, Drexel or Milken, at least according to
Fischel and Ross' definition of manipulation. Objective evidence of state of mind is often
available, however. People sometimes say what they are thinking or explain why they make
requests, and such statements and explanations are fairly good, objective evidence of what
those people are thinking. The government claimed to have such evidence in the Milken
case, in the form of testimony that Drexel employees asked Boesky employees to bid up the
price of Wickes common stock. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 100; see
also Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4-5 (noting testimony of Peter Gar-
diner, a Drexel trader, that while Wickes was trading below $6 1/8 late in the day, Milken
directed his attention to his Quotron and said "Peter, Wickes, 6-1/8," which Gardiner un-
derstood to be an instruction to purchase in order to make the stock close at $6 1/8).
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Boesky and any confederates could have expected concerted trading
to produce a small price rise. Because only a small rise was to be engi-
neered, Boesky could have been reasonably confident of unwinding
his trades without incurring substantial losses. In any case, Drexel
stood to earn much more on the redemption than Boesky stood to
lose from trading, absent a dramatic fall in the price of Wickes stock.
Fischel and Ross question whether the prospect of investment
banking fees would have been a sufficient incentive for Drexel to ma-
nipulate the price of Wickes common stock, because "[a]t the time...
it seemed likely that Drexel would receive these fees soon in any
event."1 52 They point out that Wickes would have been entitled to
redeem the preferred anyway if its common had closed at or above $6
1/8 on the day Drexel allegedly asked Boesky to trade, or the next
day, or on any nine of the next seventeen days, or any twenty of thirty
days thereafter. In other words, Milken might have earned the fees
from redemption without manipulating the stock.
Wickes was in a hurry to redeem the preferred stock, however.
Moreover, Milken might have preferred the certain profits of a re-
demption triggered by manipulation to profits contingent on the mar-
ket rising on its own. Wickes common stock was trading below $6 1/8
late in the day on which Boesky bought, and Drexel's traders were
concerned it would close below that price.'53 As it turned out, Wickes
common never did satisfy the conditions of the redemption provision
after Boesky traded, so that, leaving aside the wisdom of violating the
law, Milken would not have been wise to wait.'54 Wickes presented a
profitable opportunity for manipulation, and if Milken and Drexel
manipulated the price of Wickes stock, they made a lot of money do-
ing so.
Another case that Fischel and Ross discuss at length is United
States v. Mulheren.'5 5 Boesky also figured prominently in Mulheren, but
this time as the protagonist. In 1985, Boesky acquired approximately
3.4 million shares of Gulf & Western Industries stock, "at the sugges-
tion of his long-time friend, Carl Icahn, a prominent arbitrageur and
152 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531.
153 Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4-5.
154 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 531. Fischel and Ross suggest that Milken
should have been confident that Wickes would be able to redeem the stock in any event
because the price of Wickes common stock was likely to rise further, because stocks gener-
ally have positive expected returns. See id. at 531 n.129. This suggestion seems strained,
however, particularly for a volatile stock like Wickes. See also Post-Hearing Memorandum,
supra note 142, at 3 (arguing that at the time of the alleged manipulation, the price of
Wickes common could have been expected to fall if Wickes terminated an announced
tender offer).
155 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991); see Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532-33 (discussing
Mulieren); see alsoJAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THirvms 197-200, 364-65 (1991) (recounting a
popularized version of the Mulheren facts).
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corporate raider," who also had a large position in Gulf & Western
stock.156 Later that year, Boesky proposed taking control of Gulf &
Western through a leveraged buyout, but his proposals were repeat-
edly and emphatically rejected by Martin Davis, the chairman of the
company's board of directors.157 After being rebuffed, Boesky pro-
posed selling his stock back to the company for $45 per share, which
was above the market price. Gulf & Western was engaged in a stock
repurchase program at the time,158 and Davis expressed some interest
in Boesky's proposal, but would not agree to pay $45.159
After the market closed on October 16, 1985, Boesky telephoned
Davis, again offering to sell his stock to the company for $45 per
share. Davis indicated that the company would buy the stock back,
but would pay only the market price prevailing at the time of the
sale.160 Gulf & Western had closed that day at $44 3/4. Later that
night or early the next morning, Boesky telephonedJohn Mulheren, a
principal of the brokerage firm of Jamie Securities Co. According to
the government, Boesky arranged to have Mulheren buy Gulf & West-
ern stock for the purpose of increasing its price. Boesky testified that
"Mulheren asked me if I liked the stock .... I said I liked it; however,
I would not pay more than 45 for it and it would be great if it traded at
45." To this, Mulheren responded, "I understand."1 6
1
Shortly after 11:00 on the morning of October 17, Jamie Securi-
ties ordered 50,000 shares of Gulf & Western at the market through a
floor broker. At 11:04 a.m., the broker bought 16,100 shares for $44
3/4 per share and, unable to fill the entire order at that price, bought
the rest at $44 7/8 per share between 11:05 and 11:08 a.m. Jamie
156 938 F.2d at 366.
157 Id. According to the government, Boesky and Icahn met together with Davis and
proposed a leveraged buy out. Brief for the United States at 8, Mulheren, (No. 90-1691).
158 938 F.2d at 366; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8.
159 According to the court of appeals, Boesky first proposed to sell his stock to the
company for $45 per share in a meeting with Davis, and Davis indicated that he would
consider the purchase but could not immediately agree to a price. 938 F.2d at 366. Ac-
cording to the government, however, Boesky's investment banker proposed the sale to
Davis, and reported back to Boesky that the company would buy the stock but only at the
market price. Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8-9. The court of appeals
mentions this meeting, but does not say what occurred. Thus, according to the govern-
ment, by early October, Gulf & Western had indicated that it would buy back the stock at
the market price, but Boesky wanted $45 per share. As the court of appeals recounts the
events, however, Boesky had indicated that he would sell at $45, but the company had not
yet decided whether it would repurchase, or if so, at what price.
160 According to the court of appeals, Davis told Boesky that Gulf & Western would
buy the stock, but only at the market price existing at the time of the sale, and instructed
Boesky to have his investment banker contact the company's investment banker to arrange
the sale. 938 F.2d at 367. According to the government, however, Davis told Boesky that
the company would consider buying the stock the following day, but only at the market
price. Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 9.
161 938 F.2d at 367.
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then ordered another 25,000 shares at $45 or less. The floor broker
was unable to get any stock at $44 7/8, and executed the purchase for
$45 at 11:10 a.m. A few minutes later, at 11:17 a.m., Boesky and Icahn
sold their stock back to the company at $45 per share. The stock fell
during the afternoon, and Jamie sold its 75,000 shares at the end of
the day for a loss of $64,406.162
Mulheren was later indicted for, among other things, purchasing
75,000 shares of Gulf & Western stock for the purpose of raising its
price to $45 per share.163 The government argued and-given that
Mulheren was convicted-the jury apparently found, that the import
of the telephone call between Boesky and Mulheren was that Boesky
wanted Mulheren to trade in a way that would move the price of Gulf
& Western to $45 and that Mulheren did as he was asked. The Second
Circuit disagreed and reversed Mulheren's conviction, finding that no
rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.16
The court concluded that the meaning of the cryptic conversation be-
tween Boesky and Milken was ambiguous at best, and that Jamie's
purchases were just as likely motivated by investment intent as the de-
sire to create a favorable price at which Boesky could sell his block
back to Gulf & Western.
Fischel and Ross agree with the Second Circuit's analysis of the
facts and with what they take to be the court's suggestion that trading
for the purpose of affecting the price of the traded security may not
be illegal. 165 As in the case of the Wickes allegations, we do not know
why Mulheren had his firm trade. Maybe he thought Gulf & Western
was a good investment, or maybe he wanted to move the price up so
that Boesky would increase his profits from the sale to Gulf & West-
ern. It is certainly possible that Mulheren was simply trying to profit
from what he thought was Boesky's advice. On the other hand, the
jury did find that Mulheren bought the stock in order to move its
price for Boesky. Perhaps the government did not prove this beyond
a reasonable doubt, but its story was not unreasonable. More to the
point, for the purpose of this discussion, this was a situation in which
manipulation would have been very profitable. That is to say, aside
from the risk of legal sanctions, the potential profits of manipulation
greatly exceeded the likely costs. Jamie's trades moved the price of
162 Id. at 368.
163 Id. at 365.
164 Id. at 366; see also id. at 368 (explaining government's theory and expressing
misgivings).
165 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 533 ("Although the court did not say so explic-
itly, its analysis calls into question whether actual trades should be prohibited as manipula-
tive."). The court's misgivings may have been directed at the government's argument that
failure to disclose an intent to manipulate is a violation of rule 10b-5. See Mulheren, 938
F.2d at 368 n.2.
1994] 253
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the stock, those trades entailed relatively little risk, and the price
change yielded a substantial profit.
Jamie's trades caused the market price of Gulf & Western stock to
increase 1/4 point in about six minutes. Fischel and Ross do not sug-
gest that the price would have changed without Jamie's trades, and
even the Second Circuit said that Jamie's purchases caused the stock
to rise from $44 3/4 to $45.166 WhenJamie began to trade, "the mar-
ket price was holding steady at $44 3/4.1167 Jamie's broker then
bought all of the stock that was available at $44 3/4 (16,100 shares),
all that was available at $44 7/8 (33,900 shares) and finally 25,000
shares at $45.
Not only didJamie's purchases boost the price, Mulheren could
have predicted that they would do so. Between the opening of the
market at 9:30 a.m. and the time Jamie began to buy, only 32,200
shares of Gulf & Western had traded,168 and the largest trade during
this period was only 5,000 shares. 169 Jamie then ordered 50,000 shares
at one time. When Jamie placed its second order a few minutes later,
it knew that it had already acquired all that was available at the previ-
ous prevailing price, and could have known that it was quickly absorb-
ing the supply immediately available in the market. This second order
was for 25,000 shares, and the Gulf & Western specialist testified that
at that point a 5,000 share trade "definitely" would have raised the
price at least another 1/8 point.'
70
If Mulheren was in fact assisting Boesky in a manipulation, it
turned out to be a profitable one. Although Jamie lost a total of
$64,406 on its trades, 17' Boesky made a much larger profit on the
price change those trades occasioned.' 72 The 1/4 point rise in the
reported price of Gulf & Western between the execution of Jamie's
first order and the closing of Boesky's sale of 3.4 million shares to Gulf
& Western resulted in Boesky receiving about $850,000 more than he
would have received had Jamie not traded. This figure may in fact
understate the profit Boesky stood to realize from moving the price,
166 938 F.2d at 368.
167 Id. at 367.
168 Id.
169 Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 10.
170 938 F.2d at 370. The court of appeals suggested thatJamie's purchase of 25,000
shares in its second order, when according to the specialist a 5,000 share purchase would
have been sufficient to move the price, was inconsistent with manipulative intent because
the large purchase exposedJamie to more risk than necessary to move the price. Id. How-
ever, Mulheren would not have known as well as the specialist how much he needed to buy
to move the price, and he could hardly have asked his broker to buy only as much as was
necessary to move the price. In any event, the riskJamie accepted when it bought an extra
20,000 shares was greatly outweighed by the profit Boesky was likely to realize.
171 Id. at 368.
172 The court of appeals ignored Boesky's disproportionate profit when it suggested
that Jamie's loss was inconsistent with a manipulation charge. See id. at 370.
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because he might not have been able to sell at all if the price had
stayed below $45. Boesky and Icahn had agreed that $45 per share
was a reasonable price for their stock,1 3 and Boesky might have been
embarrassed to sell for less; he might even have felt that he promised
Icahn not to do so. The $850,000 figure certainly understates the to-
tal profit that resulted from the price change that Mulheren's trades
occasioned, because Icahn sold his stock to the company at the same
time Boesky did. Together, Boesky and Icahn realized $1,678,925
more than they would have if they had sold at the price that prevailed
before Mulheren's purchases. 174 Leaving aside the cost of the subse-
quent litigation, the profit from the price change greatly exceeded the
costs associated with the trades that produced it.
Milken and Mulheren are prominent examples of recent manipula-
tion schemes, but they are not the only cases in which people are al-
leged to have used concerted trading to manipulate prices and thus
alter contractual rights or obligations. 175 Indeed, in the Milken litiga-
tion the government alleged that Drexel frequently manipulated
prices for the purpose of triggering the contractual rights of clients or
firms in which it was otherwise interested. 17
6
173 Brief for the United States, supra note 157, at 8.
174 Boesky and Icahn sold the company a total of 6,715,700 shares. Mulheren, 938 F.2d
at 368. Boesky never, in fact, suggested that Icahn was involved in the manipulation.
175 In 1978 a hearing panel of the NYSE found that a specialist had engaged in a
manipulative scheme remarkably similar to that alleged in Mulheren. See In re Fried, HPD
78-82, 1978 WL 22181 (N.Y.S.E.) (Nov. 1, 1978). The specialist that was registered for a
stock held 7.9% of the issuer's outstanding stock. The issuer, fearful of a hostile takeover,
authorized a repurchase but did not publicly announce the decision. The issuer then
agreed to buy most of the specialist's position for $8 per share. However, a proposed SEC
rule required an independent bid or trade at that price before the repurchase could be
made, and the stock had not traded at that price for a year. When the stock opened at $7
1/4 the next morning, the issuer ordered its broker to buy 225,000 shares (equal to most
of the block) at $8, but on the condition that there first be an independent bid or trade at
$8. Over the next two trading days, the specialist was a net buyer. The hearing panel
found that the specialist's bids and purchases placed a bottom on the stock's price and
helped continue its upward trend. Six minutes after the specialist purchased 100 shares at
$7 3/4, 2,700 shares traded at $8, and six minutes later the issuer purchased 225,000 shares
at $8, with the specialist selling 215,900 of those shares. The panel found that the specialist
had violated NYSE rules by trading for the purpose of influencing the market price.
176 See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 97 ("The manipulation of the
underlying common stock price to facilitate a convertible securities offering or other cor-
porate event was a frequent occurrence in the High Yield Department throughout the
early to mid 1980's, according to at least four former High Yield employees."). The gov-
ernment alleged that Drexel caused Boesky to bid up the price of Stone Container Corpo-
ration common stock in order to increase the price at which convertible securities could be
sold toward the end, encouraging Stone to proceed with the offering. Lowenfels & Brom-
berg, supra note 135, at 350-51 (discussing the Drexel indictment). The government also
alleged that Drexel had caused another entity to depress the price of the C.O.M.B. Co.
common stock in order to make it easier for the company to sell convertible securities to
the public. Id. at 351-54. Although the Stone and C.O.M.B. schemes played upon contrac-
tual conversion rights, they would succeed only if the price changes induced the public or
the issuer to trade. See infra part II.B.
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Price manipulations designed to trigger contract rights are not a
recent development. On the contrary, they have been cited as a seri-
ous problem since the federal securities statutes were first enacted. 177
One of the best-known examples involved the Georgia-Pacific Corpo-
ration (G-P). As part of a conglomeration program, G-P bought sev-
eral businesses and agreed to pay for them with G-P common stock,
the exact number of shares in each case to be determined by refer-
ence to the closing price of G-P common on the NYSE on particular
future dates. According to the Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC), G-P and related entities then bought G-P stock "in a manner
which would and did ... cause the last sale price of G-P common stock
on the NYSE to rise in order that G-P's obligation to issue additional
shares" under the agreements would be reduced or eliminated. 17s G-
P eventually consented to an injunction against "[b]idding for or
purchasing any security of G-P for the purpose of creating actual or
apparent active trading in or raising the price of any security of G-
P."17 9
The Georgia-Pacific case illustrates only one way that someone
whose fortune is tied to the reported price of securities may profit
from manipulation. Employees whose positions or compensation are
dependent on the price of stock might find manipulation profitable as
well.' 80 Manipulation is particularly unlikely to be self-deterring in
this situation, because the employee can use the employer's money to
trade and thus will not bear the full loss if the stock eventually returns
to its original equilibrium level. This scenario is common among trad-
ers employed by securities or brokerage firms. For example, a few
years ago a group of brokerage firm employees whose annual bonuses
were based on the prices of the securities held in the portfolio that
they managed caused the portfolio to buy large quantities of those
securities in the final minutes of trading on the day the bonus was to
be computed, and the prices rose. When the prices dropped the next
trading day, it was the portfolio, not the employees, that suffered the
loss. The brokerage firm discovered the scheme and refused to pay
the bonuses, but the employees would have profited handsomely from
the temporary price spike had they not been discovered.' 8 '
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988).
178 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,680, at 95,489 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 1966).
179 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,692, at 95,525 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966); see 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 4060
n.208.
180 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 523; see also MAYER, supra note 79, at 57-59 (as-
serting that investment funds employ practice of "guaranteeing the close," using concen-
trated purchases in a few stocks late in the day to enhance reported performance).
181 SEC v. Choset (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1983), SEC Litigation Release No. 10,036, 1983
SEC LEXIS 1466 (June 15, 1983); In re Choset, HPD 83-62, 1983 WL 116065 (N.Y.S.E.)
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This scheme illustrates the common practice of "marking the
close," in which trading at the very end of the day is used to control
reported closing prices. In recent disciplinary proceedings before the
SEC,' 8 2 NYSE' 83 and National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD),' 84 numerous traders and brokerage firm employees have
been found to have marked the close, employing
pattern [s] of actual or deliberate close-of-day trading designed to in-
fluence closing share prices of certain stocks. In those instances,
traders or salespersons attempted to artificially influence a closing
price because of inventory positions in particular securities, margin
(June 2, 1983) (consenting to censure, suspension and fine); In reLepley, HPD 83-63, 1983
WL 116066 (N.Y.S.E.) (June 2, 1983) (consenting to censure, suspension and fine); Rich-
ard E. Rustin & Gary Putka, Menill Lynch Unit Fires Two Executives in Risk Arbitrage for Viola-
tions of Policy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1982, at A4.
182 See, e.g., In re Levin, Exchange Act Release No. 31,124, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,046 (Sept. 1, 1992) (accepting settlement of charge that investor marked the close to
reduce or avoid margin calls); In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (finding that investor,
aided by broker, marked the close to reduce or avoid margin calls); In re Black, Exchange
Act Release No. 28,630, 1990 SEC LEXIS 3624 (Nov. 20, 1990) (affirming N.A.S.D. findings
and sanctions after trader admitted entering fictitious trades to enhance apparent per-
formance of portfolio); In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,340, 1978
SEC LEXIS 283 (Nov. 17, 1978) (instituting public administrative proceedings on charge
that on thirty-five of thirty-seven days customer entered market orders to purchase 100
shares at the close in an attempt to cause the price to close at the ask, thereby minimizing
margin calls); see also NYMEX Chairman, supra note 134 (noting that Commodity Futures
Trading Commission charged the chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange with
using wash sales to increase apparent value of positions in order to avoid calls).
183 Se e e.g., In re Beggs, NYSE HPD 89-105, 1989 WL 379964 (Nov. 20, 1989) (marking
the close to avoid margin calls); In rejahoda, NYSE HPD 88-45, 1988 WL 360185 (Nov. 2,
1988) (marking the close to reduce unrealized losses in firm account managed by manipu-
lator); In re Ross, NYSE HPD 87-13, 1987 WL 225759 (Mar. 10, 1987) (firm with capital
problems marked the close to increase the value of the firm's proprietary positions); In re
Sprague & Nammack, NYSE HPD 86-97, 1986 WL 178915 (Dec. 16, 1986) (by marking the
close, specialist firm increased apparent value of its positions and enhanced likelihood of
subsequently selling inventory at higher price or covering short positions at lower price);
In re Ohlandt, NYSE HPD 86-62, 1986 WL 178883 (Sept. 15, 1986) (block position trader
marked the close to improve apparent value of firm's inventory); In re Sheehy, NYSE HPD
86-63, 1986 WL 178884 (Sept. 15, 1986) (block position trader marked the close to im-
prove apparent value of firm's inventory); In reLunny, NYSE HPD 85-120, 1985 WL 152313
(Oct. 31, 1985) (block trader marked the close to help sales people sell the block at higher
price); In re Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., NYSE HPD 78-12, 1978 WL 22119 (Feb.
23, 1978) (marking the close to enhance margin resources).
184 See, e.g., In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139 (NASD Market Surveil-
lance Comm., June 22, 1992) (trader marked the close to avoid criticism for losses in port-
folio and perhaps to influence bonus based on closing prices); In reWeinraub, Decision in
Complaint No. MS-1037 (Dec. 18, 1991) (trader solicited customer orders and used them
to mark the close at higher price); In re Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, Decision in Complaint No.
MS-847 (Aug. 3, 1990) (trader admitted marking the close to avoid losing job for losses in
portfolio); In re Sherwood Securities Corp., Decision in Complaint No. MS-660 (Jan. 18,
1989) (fictitious trades at higher price reported when firm had long proprietary positions,
at lower price when firm had short position).
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difficulties in personal or customer accounts, or substantial per-
sonal or customer holdings in a stock.185
In marking the close, a manipulator can take advantage of the bid-ask
spread to move the closing price a small amount' 86 -enhancing the
apparent value of a long position by ensuring that the last trade is a
buy, or enhancing the value of a short position by ensuring that the
last trade is a sale. Even a small price move no greater than the bid-
ask spread can yield important profits for a manipulator with a large
position.18 7 The costs may also be low, because a trade of only 100
shares may be sufficient to move price between the bid and ask,'88 and
brokerage firm employees can sometimes hold back part of a cus-
tomer's order and use it at the close.' 8 9
The practice known as "shorting a seasoned offering" is another
form of contract-based manipulation.190 If an issuer or holder of a
publicly traded security wants to sell that security in a public offering,
it must file a registration statement for the securities and announce
that it will sell them at a future date.19' Thereafter, the seller and its
underwriters will try to determine the level of buying interest, typically
expressed in terms of the number of shares an investor will take at a
185 Members Urged to Monitor for "Marking the Close," NASD REG. & COMPLIANCE ALERT,
Dec. 1992, at 12. The NASD regularly advises its members to take steps to prevent marking
the close. See, e.g., NASD Focuses on Trading Activity at End of the Day, NASD REG. & COMPLI-
ANCE ALERT, Dec. 1990, at 3-4; NASD Targets Abusive Late Trade Reporting, NASD REG. &
COMPLANCE ALERT, Nov. 1989, at 8.
186 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., In re Levin, Exchange Act Release No. 31,124, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,046 (Sept. 1, 1992) (to avoid or reduce margin calls on position of over 400,000 shares
of an AMEX-listed stock, investor executed series of purchases at the close, usually causing
the price to close 1/8 to 3/8 higher by causing the price to uptick from the bid to the ask);
In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (similar trades, in which broker knowingly participated).
Those who mark the close often do so repeatedly over long periods. See, e.g., In re E.F.
Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,340, 1978 SEC LEXIS 283 (Nov. 17, 1978); In
re Beggs, NYSE HPD 89-105, 1989 WL 379964 (Nov. 20, 1989); In rejahoda, NYSE HPD 88-
45, 1988 WL 360185 (Nov. 2, 1988); In re Ross, NYSE HPD 87-13, 1987 WL 2257-59 (Mar.
10, 1987); In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139; In re Sherwood Securities,
Decision in Complaint No. MS-660.
188 See, e.g., In re E.F. Hutton & Co., 1978 SEC LEXIS 283; In re Beggs, 1989 WL 379964;
In re Sprague & Nammack, 1986 WL 178915; In re Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.,
1978 WL 22119; In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139.
189 See, e.g., In re Beggs, 1989 WL 379964; In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No.
MS-I 139; In re Weinraub, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1037; see also In re Bateman Eich-
ler, Hill Richards, Inc., 1978 WL 22119 (vice president who marked the close made unau-
thorized trades in client accounts).
190 See CHARL.ESJ.JoHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SEcurrmms LAWs 198-201
(1990); Thel, supra note 17, at 421-22; see also Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19 (modeling
manipulation by informed traders in the same context).
191 Some holders may be able to sell their securities directly into the market without
prior announcement, but the issuer and holders who control the issuer may have to regis-
ter their securities under the Securities Act before they sell. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), 77e
(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1992).
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particular discount to the market price at the time of sale. The seller
will then set the price for the securities-typically after the close of the
market the day before the sale-and include that price in the final
prospectus. 192 For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that
potential buyers can purchase in the market instead, this selling price
is usually set at or below the prevailing market price.
193
Manipulation may be possible when seasoned offerings are sold
at or below reported market price. Just before the price is to be set, a
manipulator can sell the stock short with the intent of depressing the
reported price and subscribing for part of the offering. If these short
sales depress price, the manipulator can cover its short position with
shares purchased in the public offering, thereby locking in a profit
that is a function of the price decline caused by its short sales.' 94 The
seller, on the other hand, will sell at a price below that which would
have prevailed absent the short selling. The seller can protect itself by
abandoning the sale, but in doing so will incur the cost of delay and
192 See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 39, at 317-19, 380-596, 1467-71, 1474-1574.
When the securities belong to a class already traded, the registration statement will initially
state that the offering price will be set by reference to market price at the time the security
is eventually sold. See i& at 533 n.52; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1992) (preliminary pro-
spectus need not include price information); Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 214, 219-
21 (discussing institutional practices in pricing secondary offerings); Loderer et al., supra
note 49, at 38-40 (modeling the pricing of secondary offerings). The issuer will eventually
change the registration statement to include the price at which the security is offered; the
final prospectus used when the securities are sold must include the selling price. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.430, 230.430A (1992).
193 See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 213, 220-21, 235 n.21; see also Loderer et al.,
supra note 49, at 42-45 (explaining that seasoned offerings are seldom priced above previ-
ous market price, and NASDAQ stocks are more likely to be priced below than are NYSE
stocks); Parsons & Raviv, supra note 36 (predicting that secondary issue will be priced be-
low previous market price).
194 In 1988, the SEC adopted a rule prohibiting short sellers from covering their sales
in a public offering. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T) (1992). The comments submitted to the
SEC while the rule was under consideration cite many examples of the practice. See Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,028, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,315,
at 89,386 (Aug. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Exchange Act No. 26,028]; Exchange Act Release
No. 24,485, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,127 (May 20, 1987); see
also In reJ.A.B. Securities Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,948, 17 SEC Docket 1086
(June 25, 1979) (citing three such instances); Exchange Act Release No. 34-31,003, 1992
SEC LEXIS 1831, at *25 (Aug. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 31,003];
H.R. Rep. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 22 (1991);JoHNsoN, supra note 190, at 199-200
(discussing circumstances surrounding the adoption of Rule lOb-21); Gerard & Nanda,
supra note 19, at 213-16 (predicting that manipulative selling will occur during seasoned
offerings and suggesting that empirical findings are consistent with manipulation of the
sort predicted by their model); id. at 222 ("The larger the new issue and the smaller the
secondary market order flow, the cheaper and the more prevalent is manipulation."); cf.




the expense of the distribution effort. If the seller goes ahead, it will
receive less than it would have in an unmanipulated market.195
Program trading, in which substantial investors trade large pack-
ages of securities as part of various investment strategies, may also
present opportunities for manipulation. The execution costs of these
large trades (consisting of commissions and price changes occasioned
by the trades) cannot be predicted with certainty, yet the investors
may require certainty for their own ends. Thus, brokers sometimes
guarantee these investors a certain price for the entire package of se-
curities. For example, if an investor wants to sell a large package at
the end of the day, early in the day its broker might promise the inves-
tor the closing price of the package less a discount. When, as in this
example, the guaranteed price is a function of a future price level,
manipulation is possible: the broker might sell stock at the end of the
day to depress closing prices and, accordingly, the amount due the
investor.19
6
Stock-index futures may also create manipulative opportunities,
because they involve contractual rights that are a function of reported
market price.' 97 The owner of a stock-index future does not get the
stocks in the index at expiration, but receives a cash payment based
on the reported prices of those stocks at expiration. A manipulator
might buy futures and then, on the settlement date, bid up the price
of the underlying stocks. 198 The manipulator will receive an inflated
settlement, and sell the stock, perhaps at a loss if the effect of the spot
purchases dissipates. The scheme will be profitable if the spot market
195 However, market participants, including the seller, discount for the possibility of
foreseeable manipulation. Thus, short-selling affects price less than it would otherwise.
Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 213-15; see also infra notes 276-79 and accompanying
text.
196 SeeJEFFREY D. MILLER ET AL., PROGRAM TRADING: THE NEW AGE OF INVESTING 121-27
(1989); cf. In re Salomon Bros., Inc., NYSE HPD 90-169, 1990 WL 446685 (Dec. 10, 1990)
(broker purchased more securities than customer's program required, kept low-priced se-
curities and allocated high-priced securities to customer). Program traders have devel-
oped strategies to protect themselves from brokers, which suggests that the problem is a
real one. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
197 See Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19, at 1487-95; see also Thomas A. Levine et al.,
Manipulative Practices, in 3 ALI-ABA POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
1431 (1990) (discussing capping, pegging and mini-manipulation between options and
underlying stock); Wood, supra note 19, at 147-48 (describing a "manipulative legging
strategy" which "is purportedly one of many similar strategies that can be utilized to tempo-
rarily push markets out of equilibrium for gain").
198 This "manipulation" differs from the so-called manipulative squeeze or comer that
typically concerns commodity regulators. See Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Un-
derstanding Commodities Market Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1990); Thel, supra note
17, at 432-35. As Fischel and Ross observe, squeezes and comers present a different prob-
lem (one of monopoly power). Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 542-52. While squeezes and
comers do not involve trades designed to change price, the abuse of monopoly power may
be within the power of the SEC to regulate "manipulative" activities. See Thel, supra note
17, at 432-35, 437-38; Thel, supra note 7, at 431 n.202, 487 n.287.
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is less liquid than the futures market and the futures position is larger
than the spot position.199
Thus, contracts in which rights are contingent upon reported se-
curity prices create tempting opportunities for manipulation. The Ex-
change Act itself cites the possibility that manipulation can injure
contractual parties as justification for federal control of the securities
markets. Contract-based manipulations also figure prominently in Fis-
chel and Ross' discussion of manipulation. Nonetheless, manipula-
tion is not limited to triggering or avoiding contractual obligations.
B. Offsetting Trades
In the schemes just discussed, the manipulator profited merely by
moving the reported price of the manipulated security; she did not
need to trade at that price. Profit was available because another was
obliged or disposed to confer a benefit on the manipulator that was
tied to reported price. The securities manipulator of lore, however, is
not someone who takes advantage of a contract (although the public-
ity surrounding the Milken affair may have changed this popular con-
ception). Instead, the manipulator takes control of the market and
trades at the manipulated price: bull manipulators pushing price up
with purchases and then selling at a profit, bear manipulators pulling
price down with short sales and then covering at a profit.
Manipulations that depend on profitable offsetting trades are
much more likely to be self-deterring than contract-based manipula-
tions-at least in the sense that the manipulator cannot be as confi-
dent of success. In addition to moving price, the manipulator whose
profits are to arise from trading must trade at the manipulated price.
A bull manipulator, for example, must buy in a way that raises price,
and then sell at that price. Trading at a manipulated price may be
more difficult than moving the price in the first place.200
For a trade-based manipulation to succeed, the initial trades must
change the value that other market participants place on the security.
If the initial purchases drive up the prevailing price solely because
they absorb all the stock held by holders willing to sell at the previ-
ously prevailing market price, offsetting trades cannot be made at the
resulting price, because no one (other than the manipulator) will buy
stock above the previously prevailing price. Anyone who valued the
stock at the new price would have already purchased at the previously
prevailing lower price.201 Moreover, those from whom the manipula-
199 See Kumar & Seppi, supra note 19 (suggesting that manipulation of this sort may be
profitable under a wide range of assumptions in futures markets with cash settlement).
200 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-19.
201 The manipulator's situation is illustrated by the excess demand functions shown in
Figure 2, supra note 52. When the manipulator enters the market to buy, he shifts the
1994]
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tor bought may be unwilling to buy back what they sold even at their
sale price, 202 and if they are willing to buy it back, presumably they will
not buy more than they sold. Consequently, if a manipulator boosts
prices solely by buying enough stock to shift the price at which buying
and selling interests intersect, when he is ready to sell he will not find
buyers who will buy for more than he paid.
In addition, trade-based manipulations cannot be based on initial
purchases that increase price only because they are effected too
quickly to allow offsetting supply to mobilize. Such a price increase
will last only until supply responds to the premium price, and the ma-
nipulator will not be able to profit even by effecting offsetting trades
before the price rebounds. The higher price simply results from the
manipulator's purchases, and, like the price created by buying a lot of
stock with inelastic supply, reflects only the manipulator's buying in-
terest. Accordingly, the manipulator will find no buyers at the higher
price.203
Thus, offsetting trades cannot be profitable unless the initial
trades change the market's valuation of the security. As discussed
above, it is possible for trades to alter the market's perceptions; in-
excess demand function from curve D, to curve D2, and the market-clearing price rises.
When the manipulator sells, however, the excess demand function shifts to the left, and
the price falls. If no other market participants' preferences have changed in the interim,
the price will fall at least to the level maintained before the manipulator began to buk, and
may in fact fall further.
Fischel and Ross may actually understate the difficulty of manipulation in this context.
They note the high cost of moving price up by taking advantage of inelastic supply, but
they fail to mention the difficulty (and perhaps impossibility) of effecting offsetting trades
at the resulting price. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518-19. This omission may reflect
their suspicion that trades move price only when they convey information. If a trade
changes price by conveying information, price will not immediately revert to its previous
level after a change.
202 Sellers may be willing to buy back stock if they initially believed that the intrinsic
value of the stock was higher than the market price. See Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion
in Complete Markets, 40J. FIN. 309 (1985). Even then, however, their opinions may change
after they part with the stock. Moreover, the sellers might have had a high reservation
price because of factors no longer relevant after they sold the stock, such as the tax impli-
cations or transaction costs of their sales. See Bagwell, Dutch Auctions, supra note 35, at 81;
David T. Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Determinants of Tendering Rates in Interfirm and
Self-Tender Offers, 65J. Bus. 529 (1992) (suggesting that capital-gains tax liabilities explain
differing reservation prices); Kraakman, supra note 32, at 899. Disparate valuation is most
likely to present opportunities for manipulation in the market for penny-stocks. In that
market, disparate valuation is likely to result from the difficulty that holders face when they
try to sell, and it seems unlikely that those holders will be willing to buy again after they
sell. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
203 The manipulator's problem is illustrated by the excess demand functions in Figure
3, supra note 59. If the manipulators's initial trade takes place above the prevailing price, it
is because the quickly executed trade takes place at a very short-term equilibrium price.
When the manipulator unwinds, the trade will take place at the lower, long-term equilib-
rium price. If the manipulator unwinds quickly, the trade will take place at the even lower
short-term equilibrium price for sales.
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deed, the dominant view among financial economists is probably that
trades change price only by conveying information.20 4 Nevertheless,
even if the manipulator can change the market's valuation of a secur-
ity, at least two barriers stand in the way of profiting from offsetting
trades. First, the reported price must not change too quickly; the ini-
tial trades must convince the market that the manipulator possesses
important secrets, but the manipulator must take a position before
that change in conviction changes market price.205 Second, the offset-
ting trades must be effected at the manipulated price. This will be
difficult if the offsetting trades convey an impression counter to that
conveyed by the initial trades, because that impression will offset the
price effect of the first set of trades.20 6 For example, if the initial set of
purchases boost price by conveying the impression that the buyer has
good news, the offsetting sales may depress price by giving the impres-
sion that the manipulator-now a seller-has bad news. Thus, the
manipulator must construct the offsetting sales so that they do not
convey offsetting information, or at least so that the offsetting infor-
mation will not be incorporated into market prices until after the off-
setting trades are completed.
20 7
The first task-taking the initial position at the pre-manipulation
price-should not be too difficult. The market takes time to incorpo-
rate new information into prices; 208 it does not translate the informa-
tion content of trades into price changes instantaneously.209 Prices
may respond very quickly to trades that convey information, but even
on the NYSE prices do not instantaneously adjust fully to the new in-
formation conveyed by trades.210 Thus, a manipulator may be able to
trade in a way that conveys information, but complete the trade
204 In any case, a price change resulting from immediate trading or inelastic demand
may itself change other investors' perceptions. See supra part I.B.2.
205 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 517-18 (suggesting the difficulty of taking a
position before price changes).
206 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518.
207 Moreover, if the offsetting sales are large (which is likely if the manipulation is to
be worth the trouble) the manipulator may pay immediacy costs to unload quickly, making
it even more difficult to profit. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 518-19.
208 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29; cf. Harris & Gurel, supra note 29, at 816
("[I]immediate information about non-information-motivated demand shifts may be costly,
and hence... short-term demand curves may be less than perfectly elastic."); Hasbrouck,
supra note 38; Kyle, supra note 125 (suggesting that the nonpublic information of informed
traders is gradually incorporated into price as trading occurs).
209 See Dann et al., supra note 93; Scholes, supra note 36, at 207; see also Allen & Gale,
supra note 19, at 508-09. Delay in market response to the publication of new information is
to be expected. The speed of price adjustments is limited by the fact that profit-maximiz-
ing participants will trade only if the expected profits of their trades exceed their costs. See
Dann et al., supra note 93, at 3; Scholes, supra note 36, at 207; see also Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 29, at 592-626; Kraus & Stoll, supra note 29, at 571 n.10.




before the price changes to fully reflect that information (although if
the trade is large, the manipulator may have to pay some premium for
trading quickly).21' In any event, manipulators can avoid the problem
by taking a position before entering the initial price-affecting trade.
212
The second task-effecting offsetting trades at the manipulated
price-may be more difficult. Even if the manipulator takes a posi-
tion before manipulating the price, offsetting trades will not be profit-
able if purchases and sales have symmetrical and offsetting effects on
the market's perception of value, at least not if those effects lead in-
stantly to a new market price.213 Offsetting trades may not, however,
have offsetting effects on price. As noted above, sales may convey less
information than purchases,214 so that a manipulator may be able to
bid price up with purchases and then sell without depressing price.
215
Moreover, a manipulator may be able to structure the initial trades to
maximize their impact on price and the unwinding trades to minimize
their impact. Perhaps the impression conveyed by a large initial
purchase effected in a way that maximizes its price impact will not be
offset by several small sales effected later at prevailing market prices.
Alternatively, a manipulator might buy a large block on the exchange,
signalling that he is informed by foregoing the upstairs market. The
manipulator might then sell the block in the upstairs market, where
he can credibly establish that he knows nothing. Purchases and sales
are even less likely to have symmetrical effects on price if the market is
prone to overreact to new information or if substantial numbers of
market participants are preoccupied with trading data rather than
fundamental stock value.216 For example, a manipulator might push
211 See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 507-14 (presenting model in which a successful
trade-based manipulator acquires her position in trades that imitate those of an informed
investor, leading to an increase in market price); Hasbrouck, supra note 38, at 182-85; Kyle,
supra note 125, at 1315-17. It seems unlikely that the market will fully reflect the informa-
tional content of a trade as the trade is executed, given the expense of acquiring and
analyzing information. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Presumably the market
takes time to respond to new information impounded in trades for the same reasons it
takes time to respond to the disequilibrium occasioned by immediate trading.
212 In the 1930s, manipulators were thought to begin their operations by acquiring
options on large positions. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934), re-
printed in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURrnIEs AcT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE
Acr OF 1934, at Item 18 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGIS-
LATrWv HIsTORY]; 8 LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3959-62; Thel, supra note 7, at 439.
More recently, penny-stock manipulators are said to begin their schemes by acquiring the
entire company whose shares they plan to manipulate. See Goldstein et al., supra note 53,
at 776-78.
213 See Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-28; Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 214.
214 See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
215 Allen & Gorton, supra note 19, at 624-28.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 118-22; cf. DeBondt & Thaler, supra note 120, at




price to a level that others take as a buy signal, and then sell into the
resulting new demand.
As a theoretical matter, then, trade-inducing manipulations are
not necessarily self-deterring. As a practical matter, however, trading
in a way that will induce others to follow suit is undoubtedly difficult.
A would-be contract-triggering manipulator knows the upside of the
scheme before beginning and does all of the trading that makes the
scheme work. A manipulator who wants to cause others to trade, on
the other hand, cannot be confident that moving the price will be
enough .to induce others to trade. Faced with this uncertainty, people
who want to trade at a manipulated price have an incentive to lie
about the securities that they want to trade. In fact, most people
charged with using trades to induce others to trade are charged with
making false statements as well.217 Perhaps relatively few trade-based
manipulations are carried out without false statements,218 although
there might be more silent manipulations if manipulative trading
were permitted.21 9 Nevertheless, trade-induced price movements can
lead people to reevaluate securities, and people sometimes trade to
cause others to engage in such reevaluation.
220
Offsetting Trades into the Market-The events leading to the col-
lapse of the stock market in 1929 offer at least anecdotal evidence that
trades can induce overreaction, and that offsetting trades need not
have offsetting effects on price. Although section 2 of the Exchange
Act justifies regulation by referring to the way manipulated prices in-
jure people who are not trading, the legislative history emphasizes the
activities of manipulative pools. 221 According to the conventional
conception of how they worked, the pools typically manipulated the
stock of companies whose float they could control. After making sure
217 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28 (discussing "simplified composite pic-
ture" of manipulative pools); see also sources cited supra note 53 (discussing false state-
ments and other inappropriate practices used by penny stock manipulators).
218 But see Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 521.
219 It is not clear what (if any) significance Fischel and Ross would attach to trading in
cases in which a person buys a stock while making false positive statements about it and
then sells at the resulting higher price. The buyer's state of mind will be at issue if a rule
1Ob-5 case is brought on the basis of the false statements. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). A pattern of purchases accom-
panying the price increase followed by large sales, might suggest that the speaker did not
believe that her statements were true. See Booth, supra note 20, at 1115 n.207. Attaching
evidentiary significance to those trades, however, might undercut the goals that lead Fis-
chel and Ross to conclude that actual trades should not be prohibited regardless of intent.
220 Cf Vermaelen, supra note 20 (arguing that announced issuer repurchases at pre-
mium prices communicate positive information).
221 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACrICES, S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-55 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note
212, at item 21; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SEcUlrry MARKETs 563-609 (1935);
Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 503-04, 536-38; Thel, supra note 7, at 424-61; Thel, supra
note 17, at 362-82.
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that no large holders would sell into the market, they secured
favorable publicity and then bought and sold stock to increase the
price and create the illusion of substantial buying interest. After the
public began to buy, they then carefully unloaded their positions at a
profit.222 The pool operators found (or at least the supporters of the
Exchange Act thought they found) that it was possible to buy in a way
that indicated one had information and then sell without revealing
the secret. In other words, purchases and sales did not necessarily
carry symmetrical information effects.
The pools may be problem of the past, if they were ever really a
problem, but recent evidence indicates that trades are sometimes
used to cause other market participants to reevaluate and trade securi-
ties. In many cases litigated since the Exchange Act was enacted, mar-
ket operators have been charged with bidding up the price of a stock
with conspicuous trades in order to induce others to buy at the result-
ing inflated price. 223 More recently, at least one commentator has
suggested that the profits reaped from this type of manipulation may
help to explain why "[1] arge traders frequently buy and then sell sub-
stantial blocks of stock, even though they are apparently not inter-
ested in taking over the firms.22 4
Trade-based manipulation may prey on investors who rely on the
price history of a security in deciding when to trade it. For example,
so-called technical analysts often take certain prices to be resistance
levels, which, when realized, indicate that the prices will subsequently
rise or fall.22 5 If a substantial group of traders take the market's
achievement of a particular price as a signal to buy, a manipulator
could use concentrated trades to move the price to that level, thereby
triggering a market reaction that would allow the manipulator to real-
ize a profit by selling a previously acquired position or by selling short.
One might object by arguing that trading strategies based on past
222 See S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 221, at 36-50; Comment, supra note 55, at 626-28;
see also 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3941-42 (quoting Comment); Fischel & Ross,
supra note 8, at 536-37 (quoting Comment).
223 See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (offering the
use of trades to create a "portrait of an active market with a broad base of interested bro-
kers" that attracts buyers); SEC v. Torr, 22 F.Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ("It is axio-
matic that it is the ticker record of a stock that attracts customers."); 8 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 39, at 3967-76 (offering proof that prices were manipulated to induce others to
trade); Kryzanowski, supra note 55, at 125 (suggesting that by actively trading and moving
price up, manipulators may be able to entice others to buy at the inflated price); Lowen-
fels, supra note 130, at 702-13 (discussing cases).
224 Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 521; see also BAGNOLI & LiPMAN, supra note 19 (dis-
cussing the possibility that takeover bids are sometimes motivated by a desire to increase
share price so that the bidder can sell his initial holdings and drop the bid).
225 BURTON G. MAUGEL, A RANDOM WALK DoNN WALL STREET 113-19 (1990).
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prices do not work,226 but many people nonetheless base their trading
decisions on technical analyses of price trends.227 So long as people
treat price changes as trading signals, manipulative trading to set off
technical triggers may work.228 In fact, manipulative schemes of this
type are reportedly common in the commodities markets, where for-
mal trading systems are widely used.
2 29
Negotiated Offsetting Trades-Large transactions and public distri-
butions often are effected in negotiated deals or through a sales force
at prices derived from contemporaneously reported prices. An engi-
neered price movement may improve the manipulator's price in such
transactions. A person who owns a large amount of a security, for
example, might bid up the security's price in the market and then sell
the whole block at the market price in a negotiated deal.
230
Manipulations of this sort are possible because the price-setting
and market-clearing mechanisms in the trading market and the nego-
tiated deal are different, but participants in the negotiated deal con-
tinue to look to reported market prices for an indication of value.
23 l
People will treat the reported market price of a security as a measure
of its value-and thus will be willing to trade at the reported price-if
they believe that securities can be traded at contemporaneously re-
226 See COPELAND & WESrON, supra note 93, at 349-50; LORIE ET AL.., supra note 27, at 56-
63. But see Williarm Brock et al., Simple Technical Trading Rules and the Stochastic Properties of
Stock Returns, 47J. FIN. 1731 (1992) (arguing that trading strategies based on past prices are
sometimes successful).
227 See MALKmEL, supra note 225, at 142-51; Brock et al., supra note 226, at 1731-32 (dis-
cussing the long history of technical analysis and asserting that it is enjoying a renaissance);
cf. Froot et al., supra note 120, at 1480 (observing that technical trading persists in the face
of a consensus that better forecasting methods probably exist and suggesting that this per-
sistence is rational).
228 See supra text accompanying notes 118-22. Limit and stop loss orders, which con-
template trades being made after prices change, also present manipulative opportunities.
See ScWvTARrz, supra note 18, at 17, 46-49 (describing limit and stop-loss orders).
229 See Elyse Tanouye, 'Gunning' Plays Can Claim Victims in the Futures Pi WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1992, at Cl (describing concerted trading designed to trigger stop orders).
230 This pattern of manipulation is similar to contract-based manipulation, in that the
manipulator profits by getting price to rise to a particular level. Here, however, price is
manipulated to induce offsetting trades by people who look to reported prices for informa-
tion or evidence of value, whereas in contract-based manipulations, price is changed to
trigger a right to trade under a preexisting contract. See Thel, supra note 17, at 418 n.249.
The practice of shorting into a public offering, discussed supra text accompanying notes
190-95, might be considered trade-based manipulation of the sort discussed here, for the
person making the public offering is not obligated to complete the offering. Shorting into
the public offering, however, plays on the fact that the offeror is effectively obliged to sell
at or below reported price because of the money already sunk into the registration state-
ment and sales effort.
231 See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 214 ("The situation around a [seasoned offer-
ing) is special because the price-setting and market-clearing mechanisms in the secondary




ported market prices.23 2 Many people do believe, however, that they
can trade securities at or near the prevailing price.233 They are usually
correct too, inasmuch as securities usually can be bought or sold at
reported prices234 (recall that Fischel and Ross' premise is that it is
(nearly) impossible to trade at anything but reported prices).
It is probably easier to effect profitable offsetting trades in negoti-
ated transactions or through a sales force than through anonymous
sales into the market. If the offsetting transactions in a trade-based
manipulation are to be made in the market, the manipulation will not
be successful unless the manipulator can actually effect offsetting
trades in the market at reported prices. However, if the offsetting
trades are to be made in negotiated deals or through a sales force, it
will be enough if trading partners believe that trades can be effected
on the market at reported prices.
The last of Fischel and Ross' three high profile cases, United States
v. GAF Corp.,235 may have involved trading designed to manipulate
price to facilitate a negotiated transaction. In October 1986, the GAF
Corporation held almost 9.6 million shares of Union Carbide Corpo-
ration common stock after an unsuccessful tender offer. The price of
Union Carbide stock had been falling for several months, and GAF
began to solicit possible buyers for all or part of the block.2 36 The
GAF executive in charge of the sale, James T. Sherwin, received bids
that were slightly below prevailing market prices,2 37 and knowledge
that GAF's block was available threatened to depress the price of
Union Carbide further.238 In mid October, Sherwin asked the chief
executive officer of Jefferies & Co., a firm that specialized in trading
large blocks for institutional investors, whether it could make Union
Carbide stock close at or above a particular price for several days in a
row. 23 9 The Jefferies executive indicated that it could.240
On October 28, Union Carbide closed at $21 7/8, and publicly
available information suggested that a large amount of Union Carbide
232 SeeJAMEs D. Cox Er AL., SEcuarriEs REGULATION 314 (1991) ("By far the most accu-
rate reflection of a security's value is its price in a free and efficient market.").
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (1988). It is noteworthy that broker-dealers often use re-
ported prices to gauge the performance of portfolio managers. See supra notes 180-85 and
accompanying text.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
235 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 527-29 (dis-
cussing the GAF case).
236 The fact that GAF was unwilling simply to sell the stock into the market is
instructive.
237 928 F.2d at 1256.
238 Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1991) (No. 90-1352).




stock was available for sale below $22.241 On October 29, Sherwin
asked the CEO ofJefferies to cause Union Carbide to close at or above
$22 that day, and the executive agreed to do so. Shortly before the
NYSE closed for the day, Jefferies' chief trader placed an order to buy
140,000 shares of Union Carbide. Jefferies' broker bought 50,000
shares at $21 7/8, exhausting the supply available at that price, and
then bought several thousand more shares at $22. The Union Car-
bide specialist then executed three buy-at-close orders at $22, which
were the last trades of the day on the NYSE. Jefferies then bought
8,000 shares on the Pacific Stock Exchange for $22,242 which was the
consolidated closing price reported in the newspapers.
243
Even though Jefferies' broker acquired only 60,000 of the
140,000 shares thatJefferies ordered on October 29, Jefferies was not
in the market the next morning. Union Carbide traded below $22
until late in the day, when Jefferies again intervened.2 44 In the last
half hour of trading, Jefferies had its broker purchase 27,100 shares at
$21 7/8, then bought 10,000 shares in the last two trades of the day on
the NYSE, causing the stock to close at $22 1/8.245 Jefferies then
bought all the Union Carbide shares available on the Pacific Stock
Exchange at $22 1/4, and then another 1,500 shares at $22 3/8, at
which price the stock closed. 246 Jefferies sold its Union Carbide shares
at a loss on November 3 and 4. GAF sold 5,000,000 shares for $115
million in a negotiated transaction on November 10.247
The government brought criminal charges to trial three times,
arguing that Jefferies' October trades were designed to increase the
price of Union Carbide common stock in order to attract buyers and
increase GAF's price in a negotiated sale. Fischel and Ross find this
interpretation implausible; in fact, they cannot see any clear purpose
for the alleged manipulation.2 48 The third jury, however, apparently
accepted the government's argument, convicting both GAF and Sher-
win. Maybe juries are unable to understand Wall Street, butJefferies'
trades might indeed have been designed to get a better price for GAF.
As a preliminary matter, Jefferies probably did cause the price of
Union Carbide to close higher on October 29 and 30, notwithstand-
ing Fischel and Ross' suggestion that there might be other explana-
241 Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 5.
242 928 F.2d at 1256.
243 Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 8.
244 928 F.2d at 1256; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 10-11.
245 Fischel and Ross state that the NYSE closing price was $22 7/8. Fischel & Ross,
supra note 8, at 528.
246 928 F.2d at 1256; Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 11.
247 Ferrara et al., supra note 31, at 211.
248 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 529.
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tions.249 Had it traded earlier in the day, Jefferies might have effected
its purchases at lower prices, and thus, the closing prices might have
been lower. According to the court, a substantial amount of stock was
thought to be available at less than $22 while Jefferies was buying.
250
Yet on each day, Jefferies did not order until late in the day and its
purchases exhausted the supply represented in the market. As a re-
sult, its orders had to be completed at prices above the previously pre-
vailing price. On both days, the market closed at those higher
prices. 251
Fischel and Ross insist that the October trades could not have
been designed to influence the price that GAF would realize in its sale
of Union Carbide stock, because GAF did not sell its Union Carbide
stock until November 10, eleven days after the manipulation and sev-
eral days afterJefferies sold its stock at a loss. As they see it, any pur-
chaser negotiating to buy the Union Carbide stock on November 10
would have considered all recent price changes, so that small changes
in the price on October 29 and 30 would not have had any effect on
the price GAF received for its shares. Finally, Fischel and Ross con-
clude thatJefferies' sales on November 3 and 4 "negated any possibil-
ity of profit from the alleged scheme, which suggests that there was
never a scheme in the first place."252
However, GAF was trying to sell its stock when Jefferies traded.
Thus, the eventual buyer, with which GAF was negotiating when Jef-
feries traded, may have been influenced by earlier prices when it eval-
uated the Union Carbide stock. 253 In any event, in trying to figure out
whether the October trades were part of a "scheme," the critical in-
quiry is not what GAF did afterJefferies sold, but what GAF wanted to
do when Sherwin asked Jefferies to buy. GAF had an interest in the
price of Union Carbide stock on October 29 and 30, and it stood to
benefit from a scheme such as the one the government alleged. Even
though GAF did not have a contract that allowed it to sell at market
price, any buyer in a negotiated block trade would be influenced by
249 See id. Fischel and Ross seem to take the position that, if a trade occasions a price
change because of liquidity costs or the bid-ask spread, the trade does not cause the price
change.
250 GAF, 928 F.2d at 1256.
251 In fact, most ofJefferies' October 29 order was not even filled. The price fell dur-
ing October 30 trading while Jefferies failed to support it. Id. See also In re Melton, Ex-
change Act Release No. 28,313, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2817 (Aug. 6, 1990) (Jefferies' trader
placed orders so that resulting trades would be the last reported for the day, and bought
enough to clear the specialist's book).
252 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 529.
253 See SEC v. GAF Corp. & Sherwin, Litigation Release No. 12,401, 1990 SEC LEXIS
376 (Mar. 8, 1990) (in its civil complaint against GAF and Sherwin, which was settled, the
SEC alleged that GAF had begun negotiating with its eventual buyer by October 29).
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reported market price.254 Potential buyers would look to the market
for information about the likely future of Union Carbide stock, or at
least for a sense of what the buyer would get if it decided to resell. By
inflating the market price, Jefferies' October trades might have influ-
enced the buyer's thinking.
The market's collective judgment about Union Carbide was in
flux when Jefferies traded. The stock had rallied in October, but on
October 28 it closed down for the first time since October 7. In those
circumstances, the closing price on October 29 was important. Last
sale prices are widely reported, and the daily change was likely to
shape potential buyers' impressions of the market.2 55 Moreover, large
trades on an uptick might have conveyed an impression that was par-
ticularly important to those buyers. GAF might not have been able to
convince the market that Union Carbide would have unexpectedly
large income. However, by buying large amounts of Union Carbide
stock at premium prices, apparently without regard to liquidity costs,
Jefferies could have conveyed the impression that substantial traders
thought that Union Carbide was a likely takeover candidate.256 Union
Carbide had been the subject of a takeover bid, but speculation had
diminished when GAF entered into a widely publicized standstill
254 See id. (SEC civil complaint alleged that, at the time of the alleged manipulation,
GAF was negotiating with buyers whose bids were made in relation to the market price of
Union Carbide stock).
255 See, e.g., In re Sprague & Nammack, HPD 86-97, 1986 WL 178915 (Dec. 16, 1986)
(finding that by marking the close, specialist firm enhanced likely selling price of inven-
tory); In re Lunny, HPD 85-120, 1985 WL 152313 (Oct. 31, 1985) (finding that block trader
marked the close to help sales people sell block at higher price); cf In re Mercil, HPD 86-
99, 1986 WL 178917 (Dec. 16, 1986) (finding that specialist entered fictitious trades at the
end of the day to increase likely selling price of inventory); In re Nammack, HPD 86-98,
1986 WL 178916 (Dec. 16, 1986) (discussing related circumstances).
256 Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 537 (quoting charge that pool operators dissemi-
nated false rumors of impending mergers). The importance of takeover rumors at the
time of the Jefferies' trades is evidenced by one of the charges to which Milken pleaded
guilty, involving the sale of a large block of the stock of MCA, Inc., held by Golden Nugget,
Inc., a Drexel client. After Golden Nugget decided to sell the stock, Milken asked Boesky
to buy MCA stock in the market, at some point guaranteeing Boesky against any loss upon
his resale. Milken pleaded guilty to the charge that the conduct violated section 10(b) and
rule 101>5. In connection with Milken's sentencing, the government argued that the price
of MCA would have fallen had the market learned that Golden Nugget was not interested
in acquiring MCA, and that Milken had caused the sales to be made through Boesky in
order to hide the fact that Golden Nugget was selling. Government's Sentencing Memo-
randum, supra note 142, at 37-41; see also Levine et al., supra note 53, at 1533 (maintaining
that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the fact that Golden Nugget was selling
and to create the appearance of additional demand). Milken admitted that he had made
the guarantee and stated that his purpose was to allow Golden Nugget to get a better price
on its sale. He argued that there was nothing wrong with masking Golden Nugget's sales,
and suggested that the reason the conduct was illegal was that he failed to cause the Boesky
guarantee to be reflected on Drexel's books. Sentencing Memorandum of Michael i.
Milken 83-86, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41); Allocution of
Michael i. Milken, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41), reprinted in
STONE, supra note 150, at 201-205.
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agreement. Jefferies' large trades might have led the market to be-
lieve that arbitrageurs still thought Union Carbide was in play. Sub-
stantial purchases effected in the way that these were may change the
market's judgment of value and create new buying interest, especially
if the market is keyed to respond quickly to takeover speculation.
GAF could have expected to profit from that buying interest when it
sold its stock.
The fact that Jefferies sold at a loss on November 3 and 4 does
not mean that GAF never had reason to expect that the scheme would
be profitable. GAF might have expected to close its own sale quickly
when Jefferies bought, or at least to complete its sale before Jefferies
sold.25 7 In any case, Jefferies' sales might not have convinced poten-
tial buyers of GAF's block thatJefferies' initial purchases did not dis-
close important positive information about the value of the stock.
Potential buyers might have ignored the decline occasioned by Jef-
feries' sales, and in any case, the decline might have seemed less sig-
nificant than the price increase. For example, Jefferies structured its
initial sales (unlike its purchases) to avoid overwhelming the mar-
ket.258 EventuallyJefferies dumped its stock, but even those sales may
have conveyed little news, since they were effected only after the mar-
ket began to react adversely to other news about Union Carbide.
259
Although GAF might have profited from the scheme that the gov-
ernment alleged, Fischel and Ross suggest that the only evidence of
Jefferies' manipulative intent was the timing of its trades and GAF's
promise to make up any trading loss Jefferies suffered.260 The timing
of the trades is suspicious, but it is hardly the only evidence that the
government offered. The government alleged that Sherwin askedJef-
feries to raise the price of Union Carbide. Indeed, the defendants
never took Fischel and Ross' position thatJefferies' trading was inno-
cent. Although GAF denied that Jefferies had acted on its behalf, it
did not deny thatJefferies had manipulated Union Carbide. On the
contrary, the defendants conceded thatJefferies had manipulated the
stock; they simply argued thatJefferies did so "on its own initiative...
and for its own purposes."
261
257 Nor did Jefferies' loss, as opposed to its sale, negate the prospect of a profitable
manipulation. If GAIT was trying to manipulate Union Carbide stock, it was hoping to
profit from its negotiated sale of five or ten million shares. The incremental profit from a
small price increase in such a large sale might easily have offsetJefferies' loss on its trades
of 100,000 shares.
258 928 F.2d at 1256.
259 Brief for the United States, supra note 238, at 12.
260 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 528-29.
261 928 F.2d at 1258, 1262; id. at 1266 (MahoneyJ., dissenting); Brief for Defendant at
30, United States v. GAP Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1352). In both crimi-
nal and administrative proceedings, BoydJefferies, the C.E.O. ofJefferies & Co., admitted
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Another recent high-profile manipulation case, United States v. Re-
gan,262 involved the manipulation of reported prices for the purpose
of inducing a seller to enter into a large transaction, but with the in-
teresting twist of a public sale in the background. In 1985, Drexel was
underwriting an offering of convertible debt for C.O.M.B. Co., and
believed that the company was bidding up the price of its common
stock to get a better price for its convertible debt.263 Drexel allegedly
responded by asking Princeton/Newport Partners, a Drexel client, to
sell C.O.M.B. stock in order to drive the price down and offset the
C.O.M.B. manipulation. With the stock price lower, Drexel could
more easily sell the convertibles. 26 In a lucky break for the govern-
ment, Princeton/Newport recorded the telephone call in which a
Drexel trader instructed a Princeton/Newport trader to sell C.O.M.B.
stock and promised to cover any losses Princeton/Newport suf-
that he had manipulated the price of Union Carbide stock. ScotJ. Paltrow, BoydJefferies in
Exie, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1989, Pt. IV, at 1.
Jefferies traded Union Carbide again on November 6 and 7, and at trial the defend-
ants argued that the patterns of these trades were identical to those of October 29 and 30.
928 F.2d at 1258. Fischel and Ross cite this argument to support their point that trading at
the end of the day is not evidence of manipulative intent. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at
528 ("Indeed, the defendants pointed out thatJefferies & Co.'s purchases on November 6
and 7, which were not alleged to be part of the manipulative scheme in the government's
bill of particulars at the third trial, also occurred at the end of the day."). Fischel and Ross
can be read to suggest that the defendants argued-and, more importantly, that the gov-
ernment conceded-that the November trading was not manipulative. Neither is true.
The government's first bill of particulars, filed before the first trial, stated that both
the October and November trades were part of the series of manipulative trades alleged in
the indictment. 928 F.2d at 1257-58; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 528 n.111.
Before the third trial, the government amended the bill of particulars to include only the
October trades. 928 F.2d at 1258. The government presumably omitted the November
trades because it feared that its failure to prove that both sets of trades were manipulative
would prevent it from prevailing on either. See id. at 1264-65 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
Nor did the defendants suggest that the November trades were innocent. On the
contrary, they acknowledged that the November trades were unlawful; their "chief conten-
tion" was simply thatJefferies was responsible for the trades. Id. at 1255. The defendants
argued that, because the trading patterns were identical andJefferies was responsible for
the November trades, Jefferies must have been responsible for the October trades. Id. at
1258, 1262. Far from denying that the October (and November) trades were manipulative,
the defendants argued thatJefferies "had motives to manipulate Union Carbide stock on
its own behalf, and in fact did exactly that." Id. at 1266 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
262 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), modified, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
2273 (1992); see also United States v. Zarzecki, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1482 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1992) (No. 88 Cr. 517) (vacating the sentences of two defendants).
263 937 F.2d at 829; see also Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 108-10. Issu-
ers want the conversion price of convertible securities to be high; that is, they want to give
less of their stock in exchange for surrendered convertible securities. Conversely, buyers
want the conversion price to be low; in other words, they want to get more stock in return
for their surrendered securities. The conversion price is typically set just before the con-
vertible securities are sold to the public. This price is conventionally a function of the
closing price of the underlying common stock on the day before the public sale.
264 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 351 (citing Information, United States v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41)).
1994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
fered.265 Princeton/Newport responded by making substantial short
sales, driving the price of C.O.M.B. down to the requested level. The
C.O.M.B. convertibles were priced on the basis of a lower stock
price.266 Drexel subsequently admitted manipulating the price of
C.O.M.B. stock;267 the Drexel trader who initiated the trades and the
head trader at Princeton/Newport were convicted on criminal
charges.2
68
GAFand Regan are not the only recent cases in which the govern-
ment has plausibly alleged that prices were manipulated with a view
toward effecting offsetting transactions at the manipulated market
price in negotiated deals or through a sales force. Dealers in penny
stocks, for example, set prices in controlled markets and then use
high-pressure sales tactics to convince customers to buy at those
prices.2 69 Borrowers who have pledged securities as collateral are
often accused of supporting the reported price of the securities in
order to convince their creditors that the collateral is valuable, and
thus, to discourage them from calling their loans.270 The practice of
stabilizing the market while distributing securities may be designed to
influence potential purchasers who look to the market for an assur-
ance of value.
Stabilization is a complicated subject, and the practice has long
been controversial. 271 Fischel and Ross find stabilizing trades some-
thing of a mystery. Reasoning that there is no need to support the
market, and that underwriters probably cannot support prices anyway,
they offer the surprising suggestion that stabilizing trades may never
265 Id. at 352 (quoting the transcript of the telephone conversation).
266 Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 142, at 109-10. Underwriters may employ a
similar technique to dispose of sticky offerings. For example, in November 1990, under-
writers of a large distribution of Conagra Inc. stock, which was to be offered at the consoli-
dated closing price on November 20, expected the price to close at $33 and arranged sales
at the price. A trade at the end of the day caused the price on the NYSE to close at $33 3/
8. This price would have yielded more money for Conagra, but would have made it more
difficult to complete the distribution. The underwriters then arranged a trade at $33 1/4
on the Pacific Stock Exchange, which closed after the NYSE. As a result, the offering was
completed at $33 1/4. See Laurie P. Cohen, Shearson, Ex-Stock Trading Co-Chief Settle Alleged
Share Manipulation Case, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1992, at Cl; Richard D. Hylton, Shearson Sus-
pends Officials for Stock Trade Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at D1.
267 See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94, 474, at 93,026 (June 20, 1989); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 353.
268 937 F.2d at 829-30.
269 See sources cited supra note 53.
270 See United States v. Gleave, Litigation Rel. No. 12024, 1989 SEC LEXIS 466 (D.
Utah Mar. 8, 1989) (manipulating price with a view toward pledging stock as collateral);
Goldstein et al., supra note 53, at 782 (discussing the use of manipulated securities as collat-
eral for loans); supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
271 See 9 Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 39, at 3987-4071; Cox Er AL., supra note 232, at
314; Hanley et al., supra note 19, at 194; Nicholas Wolfson, Rule 10b-6: The Illusory Search for
Certainty, 25 STAN. L. REv. 809, 810 (1973).
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occur.27 2 We may not know what motivates underwriters to stabilize
the market during distributions, but it is clear enough that stabiliza-
tion has not been rare.2 73 Potential buyers in underwritten distribu-
tions may use reported market prices to measure the value of the
distributed security, inasmuch as the market offers both an alternative
source for the security and an indication of the price at which they will
be able to resell. If buyers are looking to the market, the underwriters
have an interest in supporting the market price with trades.
274
The SEC requires underwriters who want to stabilize the market
to disclose their plans, 275 and Fischel and Ross suggest that potential
buyers will discount market prices if they know that the market is be-
ing stabilized.276 Underwriters apparently sometimes find stabiliza-
tion worthwhile, however, even when they must disclose it. Potential
buyers may rely on the availability of market prices, even when they
know that those prices may have been stabilized, so long as they are
confident that stabilizing trades cannot hold up the price against a
consensus valuation, but can, at most, only offset the temporary price
272 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 538-39; see also id. at 534-37.
273 See Exchange Act Release No. 17,371 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,705, at 83,850 n.17 (Dec. 12, 1980) (Witnesses "testified that stabilization fre-
quently occurs in offerings of equity securities, but almost never in offerings of debt securi-
ties."); 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 3993 n.19 (noting that between 1939 and
1952, the right to stabilize was reserved in over one-half of registered offerings, and prices
were actually stabilized in about 1/6); Hanley et al., supra note 19 (arguing on the basis of
changes in bid-ask spreads that stabilization is common); Ruud, supra note 19 (contending
that underwriter stabilization may explain the anomoly of the underpricing of inital public
offerings); id. at 140 ("Practitioners are reluctant to speak in specific terms about the fre-
quency of IPO stabilization .... They do acknowledge that it would not be atypical to find
that 10-20% of IPO's are stabilized."). The SEC requires that those who effect stabilizing
transactions keep records, but it no longer requires reports of stabilization. Id. at 3990-91.
It is therefore difficult to document how often stabilization is employed. Stabilization may
have become less common recently due to improved pricing or innovations such as bought
deals. SeeJENNINGS ET AL, SECURmTES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIAIS 584-85 (1992).
Underwriters still want the opportunity to stabilize in some situations, however, as evi-
denced by the requests that the SEC receives to exempt international offerings from the
stabilization rules and the rule changes it has proposed in response. See 9 Loss & SELIG-
MAN, supra note 39, at 4011-12; Stabilizing to Facilitate a Distribution, Exchange Act Rel.
No. 28,732 [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84,704 (Jan. 3, 1991).
274 Fischel and Ross question the existence of and incentive for stabilization because,
they insist, the distribution will not temporarily depress the market price and underwriters
cannot bid up the price anyway. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 538-39. Once again,
however, the evidence that distributions do not have a temporary pressure effect is itself
based on distributions in which underwriters have taken steps to dissipate the pressure,
perhaps including the step of stabilization.
275 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-6, 240.10b-7 (1993).
276 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 538. Fischel and Ross' conclusion that stabilization
may be rare is all the more remarkable given their argument that the very announcement
of a plan to stabilize is likely to drive price down. Id. Prospectuses frequently announce
that the underwriters reserve the right to stabilize. As Fischel and Ross have it, underwrit-
ers depress the market price by making this announcement in order to preserve the right
to stabilize, a right that is of little value and one that they do not use anyway.
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pressure of the distribution. Perhaps investors are confident of this;
they may assume that the SEC rules governing stabilization prevent
distortion of the market, or like Fischel and Ross, they may be confi-
dent that stabilization cannot prevail against real trading interest.
Nevertheless, Fischel and Ross are probably right when they sug-
gest that supporting the market price while negotiating large distribu-
tions is more likely to be profitable if the supporting transactions can
be kept secret. Substantial sellers sometimes resort to secret
purchases.277 For example, in another of the high-profile cases that
Fischel and Ross mention, the principal of a brokerage firm pleaded
guilty to criminal charges, agreed to disgorge $475,000 and consented
to the imposition of administrative sanctions in connection with the
manipulation of the closing price of a stock. The manipulation oc-
curred on the day that the sale price of 8,000,000 shares of the stock
and 8,000,000 warrants to buy the stock was to be set. The principal,
who had significant financial ties to the firm selling the stock, was
charged with causing the price of the stock to rise 1/8 point by having
Jefferies & Co. buy 410,000 shares. 278 Admitting that the charges were
true, the principal offered the novel explanation that he was merely
trying to counter others who were selling the stock in an attempt to
depress the price in the public offering.2 79
Milken and Drexel were also charged with manipulating prices in
order to influence the price at which underwritten securities could be
sold to the public.2 80 For example, in March 1986, Stone Container
Corporation asked Drexel to manage the distribution of $200,000,000
of its convertible securities. Stone was reluctant to proceed with the
offering until its common stock was trading at $46, so that the conver-
sion price would be about $60.281 The stock remained below $46
from early April until April 14, 1986, when Drexel allegedly instructed
277 Cf James Sterngold, New-Issue Practices Draw Fire, N.Y. Tims, March 23, 1987, at DI
(suggesting that the practice of stabilization is common).
278 See SEC v. Lewis, SEC Litigation Rel. No. 12,569, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2834 (Aug. 6,
1990) (consent decree); In re Lewis, Exchange Act Rel. No. 28,333, 1990 SEC LEXIS 2886
(Aug. 13, 1990) (administrative proceedings); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at
348-49; William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement; 46 Bus. LAw. 797, 812 (1991); Kurt
Eichenwald, Fine and Probation for Lewis in Stock Manipulation Cas4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1989, at Dl; Stephen Labaton, A Prominent Trader Admits He Schemed to Rig a Stock Pric N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at Al; Brokerage Firm is Censured, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1989, at D7; see
also United States v. Lewis, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,479
(S.D.N.Y.June 15, 1989) (criminal proceedings); Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 505 (men-
tioning case).
279 See Labaton, supra note 278; see also Eichenwald, supra note 278.
280 According to the government, on several occasions Milken manipulated the price
of common stock down to make it easier to sell derivative securities. See Sentencing Memo-
randum, supra note 142, at 110-11 (alleging that Milken manipulated the common stock
price lower in order to reduce the price that would be set for the exercise of warrants, thus
facilitating the sale of the warrants).
281 See supra note 263.
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the Boesky organization to buy Stone common, making it clear that
the trades were supposed to support or increase the price. The
Boesky organization bought a substantial portion of the shares traded
that day, and the stock closed at $46 3/4. Stone agreed to go ahead
with the deal and Drexel earned substantial fees.
28 2
The temptation to manipulate may be particularly acute when
the manipulator contemplates the acquisition of an entire company in
a single transaction. Around the same time that the SEC accused
Georgia-Pacific of boosting its share price with purchases in order to
minimize its contractual obligations,283 the Commission charged
Genesco, Inc. with boosting the price of its stock while negotiating the
amount of stock that it would give in exchange for businesses that it
was acquiring. Genesco denied any wrongdoing, but agreed that it
would make subsequent repurchases only under conditions similar to
those that Georgia-Pacific had accepted.
28 4
In an interesting variation that occurred a few years later in con-
nection with a takeover contest,285 the Second Circuit found that a
rival suitor used price manipulation to defeat the Crane Company's
efforts to acquire Westinghouse Air Brake Company. After Crane an-
nounced that it would solicit proxies to elect directors to Air Brake's
board, the directors of Air Brake decided to support a merger with
American Standard, Inc. In response, Crane offered to exchange $50
face amount of its securities for each share of Air Brake stock
tendered. On the day that the offer was to expire, Air Brake opened
at $45 1/4 on the NYSE. During the day, American Standard bought
170,000 shares of Air Brake on the NYSE, and Air Brake eventually
282 This description is based on the SEC's civil complaint against Drexel and Milken,
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 6209 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1988) (as sum-
marized in SEC Litigation Rel. No. 11,859 [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,999 at 90,659 [hereinafter Drexel Litigation Release)), and the information in
United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1989) (No. 89 Cr. 41)
(as summarized in Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, at 350-51), and the Sentencing
Memorandum, supra note 142, at 94-98.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
284 See Genesco, Inc., Prospectus 19-23 (May 10, 1966), reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,354. Genesco was also selling its convertible securi-
ties to the public at the same time. Id.
Similar allegations were made a few years later in Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 264 A.2d 597
(Pa. 1970). Davis sued Pennzoil to recover compensation for providing Pennzoil's prede-
cessor with a business plan that contemplated Pennzoil's advancing the price of its stock by
purchasing its shares in the open market and subsequently using the stock to acquire other
businesses. Id. at 599-600. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that any promise to
pay compensation for the plan was unenforceable because the repurchases that the plan
recommended would violate the federal securities laws. Id. at 604.
285 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.
1973); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1000 (1975) (disgorgement under Exchange Act § 16(b)).
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reached $50, with American Standard buying all but 100 of the 26,300
shares that traded at that price.286 Crane's offer appeared less attrac-
tive as the market price of Air Brake rose, and the tender offer
failed.287 The Second Circuit found that American Standard's ex-
traordinary purchases caused the increase in the price of Air Brake
stock and the consequent failure of the Crane tender offer.2 88 The
court also found that American Standard bid up the price of Air Brake
stock to frustrate Crane's tender offer.
28 9
More recently, in yet another variation, the SEC charged an ac-
quirer with selling substantial quantities of its target's stock just before
commencing a tender offer, thereby depressing the price and making
the tender offer more attractive.290 The most notorious use of manip-
ulation to facilitate an acquisition, however, was probably Guinness
P.L.C.'s manipulation of its own stock in connection with the $4 bil-
lion takeover of the Distiller's Company, which the New York Times
286 419 F.2d at 792-93. Before the market opened, Standard agreed to sell 100,000
shares at $44 1/2 to an institutional investor in an unreported trade. Id.
287 Id. at 792.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 792-93; see also Edward C. Schmults & EdmundJ. Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-
Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115, 124 (1967) (noting the possibility that issuer repurchases
might drive up prices enough to defeat a tender offer). According to the court of appeals,
The net result of [American Standard's purchases] was to represent to the
public, whose primary source of information is the tape, that there was a
great demand for Air Brake at an increased value. It is reasonable to con-
clude that many Air Brake stockholders who might otherwise have chosen
to tender to Crane chose not to do so because their own holdings in Air
Brake looked better as the price went up.
.... [On April 19, Standard] sold 120,000 shares at a price of just
above $44 1/2, and purchased 170,000 shares at an average price of $49.08,
for a net trading loss exceeding one-half million dollars. Standard had
"painted the tape" in Air Brake stock ....
Standard's extraordinary buying here, coupled with its large secret
sales off the market, inevitably distorted the market picture and deceived
public investors, particularly the Air Brake shareholders. The effect of
these purchases was to create the appearance of an extraordinary demand
for Air Brake stock and a dramatic rise in market price, as a result of which
Air Brake shareholders were deterred from tendering to Crane.
419 F.2d at 792-93. The court may have been wrong about American Standard's motives,
of course. The court rejected American Standard's argument that it bought large quanti-
ties on April 19 because that was the last day it could acquire stock that it would be entitled
to vote at the upcoming shareholders' meeting. 419 F.2d at 792 n.9, 795. See also 490 F.2d
at 336 n.4. American Standard might also have bid up the price to $50 as it sought to
acquire all the stock anyone might be willing to tender in response to Crane's exchange
offer.
290 See SEC v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc., Litigation Rel. No. 11,617, 1987 SEC
LEXIS 3093 (Dec. 2, 1987) (announcing complaint); SEC v. Zico Investment Holdings,
Inc., Litigation Rel. No. 11,763, 1988 SEC LEXIS 1205 (June 13, 1988) (announcing con-
sent to injunction and stating that by controlling closing price for four days, the manipula-
tors created the impression in the financial press that the target's price was falling and
caused the price to decline for ten days).
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called "Britain's biggest financial . . . scandal in decades."29 1 In a
heavily contested bid for control of Distiller's, Guinness offered Distil-
ler's shareholders cash and Guinness stock in exchange for their Dis-
tiller's stock. After Guinness prevailed, it was revealed that several
Guinness executives had arranged for large purchases of Guinness
stock in order to increase the reported price, making the Guinness
offer appear more attractive to Distiller's shareholders. 29 2 In subse-
quent criminal prosecutions, no one seemed to deny that Guinness
bid up the price of its stock; the chief executive officer of Guinness
simply denied knowledge of the scheme, and the people who ar-
ranged or made the trades just denied that they knew that their ac-
tions were illegal. These defenses were unavailing, and the




Contract-based and trade-based manipulation is neither impossi-
ble nor self-deterring. Plausible economic models indicate that ma-
nipulation can be profitable. Manipulative trading may or may not be
common, but it is possible and tempting in a variety of significant and
common situations. Some, or even most, of the cases discussed above
may have innocent explanations, but we cannot be confident that ma-
nipulation does not occur.
The exact contours of the manipulation problem are obscure,
and this obscurity may be irremediable. The trading techniques used
to manipulate prices must be keyed to market structure, as well as
trading and contracting practices. Accordingly, manipulative tech-
niques change as those structures and practices evolve, and thus, at
any given time, manipulative practices may vary among markets.
Aside from being diverse and transitory, the details of common ma-
291 Deborah Stead, Guinness Trial BeginningAfter Many Legal Delays, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12,
1990, at D12; see also 'Guinness Affair' Shakes British Financial Circles, LA. TIMES, May 13,
1988, Pt. IV, at 5 (describing the case as the "financial trial of the century").
292 The government charged that Guinness had caused outsiders, including Boesky, to
buy Guinness stock, and had paid them fees and promised to hold them harmless against
losses arising from their purchases. The Guinness Affair, THE ECONOMisT, Sept. 1, 1990, at
72; see alsoJohnJones,Jan. 13, 1987, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing guarantees
that Guinness' investment bankers allegedly made to induce outsiders to boost the price of
Guinness stock); Stead, supra note 291; 'Guinness Affair' Shakes British Financial Circles, supra
note 291 (discussing Guinness' investment of $185 million in a Boesky fund after Boesky
bought Guinness shares and Guinness' subsequent efforts to recover $46 million in pay-
ments made to those who bought Guinness stock during the takeover battle); American Tied
to British Fraud Case Arrested, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1987, Pt. IV, at 5 (reporting that Guinness
wrote off $205 million for payments and investments relating to illegal actions in the
takeover).
293 The Guinness Affair, supra note 292, at 72.
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nipulative techniques are hard to discover. The success of many ma-
nipulative schemes often depends upon the target's ignorance, and
often the techniques employed are illegal. Thus, manipulative prac-
tices are likely to be disguised, and accordingly, they are hard to study.
While the manipulation problem cannot be deemed nonexistent
and ignored, the ambiguity surrounding the problem makes it hard to
craft a solution. This ambiguity counsels against incautious legal in-
tervention. I am not sure exactly how the law should respond to ma-
nipulation, but the complexity of the problem indicates that the
response should not be guided by the flights of legal imagination that
the subject of manipulation sometimes inspires.
A. Private Responses
If manipulation is taking place, market participants can be ex-
pected to be wary of manipulative practices and respond accordingly.
In fact, private actors do recognize and address manipulative trading.
Although this reaction suggests that manipulation is not self-deter-
ring, it also shows that manipulation can be deterred.
1. Contractual Precautions
People who agree to govern themselves by subsequent security
prices can, and often do, try to protect themselves from manipulation.
The fact that private parties take extensive measures to reduce the risk
of manipulation suggests that manipulation really is possible.294 At
the same time, private precautions serve as a reminder that the exis-
tence of a problem does not necessarily justify government interven-
tion, although perfect contractual protection is no more possible here
than elsewhere. 2
95
Those who structure their contractual relationships on the basis
of reported market prices can take a number of steps to reduce the
risk that a party will manipulate market price. They might simply
agree that no party will trade in a way that will influence market price,
and in fact this may be an implicit term or legal norm incorporated
into any contract that turns on market price. 296 Even if the parties are
prepared to agree to forego trading, however, a contractual prohibi-
294 Even Fischel and Ross acknowledge that contracting parties are concerned about
the possibility of manipulation. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130 (The Wickes
"preferred stock indenture was designed to make... manipulations highly unlikely.").
295 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 525.
296 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs §§ 225, 245 (1981); Fischel & Ross, supra
note 8, at 523-24; cf. In re Sheehy, HPD 86-63, 1986 WL 178884 (Sept. 15, 1986) (firm
withheld bonus from employee who marked close to influence apparent value of portfo-
lio); In re Genovese, Decision in Complaint No. MS-1139 (NASD Market Surveillance
Comm. June 22, 1992) (firm terminated trader who marked the close); Rustin & Putka,




tion is an incomplete solution for at least two reasons. First, a party
may be able to trade in violation of the agreement without being dis-
covered. 297 The parties might address the difficulty of monitoring
compliance by providing a substantial sanction in the event of discov-
ery, but courts would likely treat such a provision as a punitive damage
clause and refuse to enforce it.298
Second, even if the parties can somehow prevent each other from
trading, their rights and obligations may be determined by price aber-
rations caused by other people's trading.299 Consider the undisputed
facts of United States v. Mulheren.300 Gulf & Western repurchased Carl
Icahn's stock at the same time it bought Boesky's. Had Gulf & West-
ern bought Icahn's shares at the price that would have prevailed if
Mulheren had not traded, it would have paid Icahn about $800,000
less.301 Icahn reaped-and Gulf & Western paid-an extra $800,000
as a result of Mulheren's trades, regardless of whether Icahn had any-
thing to do with Mulheren's trades, and indeed even if Mulheren
traded innocently.
Icahn was probably entitled to receive the manipulated price for
his stock because the contract seemed to allocate to Gulf & Western
the risk of a price spike occasioned by trading like Mulheren's. The
problem, however, is that the risk of disruptive trading is one the par-
ties would rather not have to allocate. People usually tie contractual
rights and obligations to reported market prices because they are con-
cerned with the price at which securities can be traded and they be-
lieve that securities can be traded at reported prices. Whenever trades
result in reported prices that do not indicate the price at which trades
can be made, the market's value as a price discovery mechanism is
compromised.302 To the extent that reported prices may deviate from
297 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 148-49, 160-62 (discussing allegations of
trading through another). The allegation that Milken traded through Boesky is particu-
larly revealing in this respect, for, according to Fischel and Ross, the indenture for the
Wickes preferred stock "was designed to make such manipulations highly unlikely." Fis-
chel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130.
298 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 356(1) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-718(1)
(1990); E. ALLAN FARNSwoRTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRAGTS § 12.18 (1990).
299 See, e.g., In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29,545 [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,842 (Aug. 12, 1991) (noting that marking the close has
repercussions for indexes and margin credit); H.R. REP. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1991) (price declines due to short sales can trigger margin calls); cf Floyd Norris, Salo-
mon's Error Went Right toFloor, N.Y. TimES, Mar. 27, 1992, at DI (explaining how at the close
of the market, brokerage clerk erroneously entered order to sell $11,000,000 of stock as
order to sell 11,000,000 shares, precipitating a price drop).
300 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra text accompanying notes 155-74.
301 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. As noted above, however, it is not
clear that Gulf & Western in fact had contracts with Boesky and Icahn. See supra notes 159-
60.
302 The importance of reported prices for price discovery is the subject of a growing
literature. See ScI-WvARTz, supra note 18, at 514-28; Schreiber & Schwartz, supra note 51, at
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market value-because of the trading of parties or strangers to the
contract-they are unsuitable as contractual proxies for available
price.
Contracting parties can sometimes address both the possibility of
manipulation and the risk of independent disruptive trading by
changing the contractual trigger from the reported price at a particu-
lar time to the average or sustained price over a period of time. 0 3 For
example, Wickes was allowed to redeem its preferred stock only if its
common stock closed at or above $6 1/8 for 20 of 30 consecutive trad-
ing days. An extended trigger period like this makes manipulation
more difficult and temporary price aberrations less important. It does
not, however, make manipulation impossible, as Milken demon-
strates.30 4 Moreover, a contractual trigger can be extended only so
far. An extreme term, such as one requiring that the price remain
above a certain level for a long period,305 simply shifts the risk of dis-
ruptive trading. It also creates the possibility that the other party will
be able to avoid its obligations by manipulating price.
The technique of extending the contractual trigger is a less effec-
tive response to manipulation and disruptive trading in other con-
texts. It does not work as well when parties use reported price to set
the amount of a payment, rather than to trigger the payment of a
certain sum. For example, if a corporation is to compute an officer's
bonus on the basis of the reported price of the corporation's stock, it
cannot eliminate the risk of manipulation and disruptive trading by
making the bonus a function of the average price over an extended
period of time. Disruptive trading by strangers or manipulation of the
price by the parties themselves during part of the period will still influ-
ence the market bonus, albeit to a lesser extent than they would if the
bonus were based on a single closing price. An extended contractual
reference period may be entirely unsuitable when the contract is to
trade at the reported price in the future. For example, a program
trader who must sell a basket of stocks at the closing price wants to be
23-27. Legal scholars have so widely accepted the proposition that reported prices ought
to reflect contemporary equilibrium market value that they generally ignore it in discuss-
ing the importance and achievement of stock market efficiency.
03 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 524-25.
304 Nonetheless, it is much more difficult to manipulate prices for twenty to thirty days
than for one day in thirty. Thus, even if a contract like that involved in the Wickes case is
manipulated, the manipulation is unlikely to trigger an event except when the parties
could probably trade in the market at or near the trigger price, which is presumably the
point of the contract. Slight manipulation might even be thought appropriate on the the-
ory that it mitigates the all-or-nothing quality of the triggered condition.
305 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 524-25 (suggesting that a firm concerned about
manipulation could condition a bonus on share price remaining above the trigger price
for a certain period).
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promised the closing price for that day, not the average closing price
over several days.306
The parties may find other ways to structure their affairs so as to
reduce the risk of manipulation. For example, program traders who
pay their brokers for the promise of the closing price for a package of
securities can protect themselves from broker manipulation of the
closing price by refusing to describe the package of securities pre-
cisely. They may reserve the right to deliver one of several packages
or contractually describe the package so that the specific securities to
be delivered cannot be determined before delivery. The broker can-
not easily manipulate the closing prices because it does not know what
stocks it will have to buy.30 7 These strategies, however, also leave the
broker unsure of exactly what risk it has assumed, and the premium
price that the trader must pay to get the broker to accept this uncer-
tainty is a cost of the possibility of manipulation.
Notably, all of these strategies for dealing with manipulation and
disruptive trading in the context of contracts tied to reported market
prices have evolved over time. Even contracting parties who recognize
that manipulation is possible cannot protect themselves against all
forms of manipulation.308 Because even sophisticated market partici-
pants sometimes fail to protect themselves against manipulation, it
would seem that public investors are particularly unlikely to take con-
tractual precautions. Investment bankers may attend to the interests
of public investors, but they have mixed motives. For example, even if
Milken and Drexel Burnham did nothing wrong in connection with
the Wickes redemption, the prospect of future investment banking
fees from Wickes may have tempered their incentive to bargain hard
for a contract that would have protected the buyers of the preferred
stock.309 Similarly, when a public corporation is the target of contract-
306 See supra text accompanying note 196. An extended reference period will not pre-
vent manipulative shorting into a public offering or marking the close to prevent a margin
call. See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
307 See MULER ET AL., supra note 196, at 121-24; see also id. at 126 ("The program trad-
ing relationship between broker and money-manager client begins to resemble an exotic
dance.").
308 Cf Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 532 n.130 ("At the time the [wickes] indenture
was written no one would have expected the price of the stock on any one day to matter.").
Note that brokerage firms frequently use closing prices rather than the less-manipulable
midpoint of the bid-ask spread to evaluate employees and to calculate margin calls. See
supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
309 Of course, the price at which securities are first sold to the public may reflect the
possibility of manipulation. Cf Allan C. Eberhart & RichardJ. Sweeney, Does the Bond Mar-
ket Predict Bankruptcy Settlements7, 47 J. FIN. 943 (1992) (violations of the absolute priority
rule, which are common but small, are fairly well predicted in market prices for bonds
around the bankruptcy announcement date). However, there is reason to question
whether initial sale prices respond to such possibilities. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Bond-
holders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1821, 1825-27,
1849-52 (1992) (questioning the assumption that the market price of debt instruments
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based manipulation, management may have insufficient incentive to
protect public shareholders. For example, when Gulf & Western
agreed to repurchase well over $300,000,000 of its stock from Boesky
and Icahn, it apparently did little to protect itself from manipulation
or the risk that a small, temporary price change would cause it to
spend millions of dollars extra. Indeed, the management of Gulf &
Western might have been tempted to permit manipulation of its stock
so that it could pay a premium price without appearing to pay
greenmail.
Although contracting parties can reduce the possibility of manip-
ulation and the effect of disruptive trading by unrelated parties, they
cannot completely eliminate the problems by themselves. 310
2. Trader Reactions
Traders who look to reported price for an indication of value and
to reported trades for information also have an interest in protecting
themselves from manipulation. As a precaution, traders may develop
a skepticism of reported prices, especially in situations where manipu-
lation is likely. Moreover, other traders have an incentive to search
for manipulation, because they can profit by taking advantage of ma-
nipulative trades. Consider, for example, the way that the market will
react to trading around the time a secondary offering is being priced.
When outsiders learn that a holder or issuer is about to sell a
large quantity of a publicly traded security, they may be tempted to
depress the market price for the purpose of lowering the offering
price.311 Sellers who suspect such manipulation can try to convince
potential buyers that the reported price has been manipulated. More
importantly, investors who suspect that manipulation is occurring will
bid in the market and in the secondary offering in an attempt to ob-
tain bargain prices. This bidding will work against the manipulator's
sales, making it more difficult to depress price.3 12
Investor skepticism about market prices is not likely to prevent all
manipulation, however. So long as investors cannot be sure whether
discounts for the possibility of debtor opportunism); see also Allan C. Eberhart, Chapter 11-
Surprisingly Good for Shareholders, WALL ST.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at A14 (noting that it is virtually
impossible to test whether the original issue price of debt is discounted for future viola-
tions of the absolute priority rule).
310 Because parties cannot construct a perfect contractual response to manipulation,
Fischel and Ross concede that there may be some benefit to a legal prohibition of manipu-
lation, although they suggest that such benefit may be trivial. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8,
at 524-25.
311 See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 220-21; see also supra text accompanying notes
190-95.
312 The seller cannot offset the manipulative trading, however, because of rules against




reported trades are the product of informed trading or manipulation,
manipulation may be profitable.313 Moreover, investor skepticism
provides no check at all when the market fails to recognize a manipu-
lative opportunity. Market participants are likely to underestimate the
potential for manipulation when off-market transactions are being ef-
fected at market price or when contracts are tied to reported prices.
The opportunities for manipulation in these circumstances arise not
from the dynamics of the market, but from exogenous circumstances;
market participants who are unaware of these contracts or transac-
tions will not be on the alert for manipulation. Those involved in the
transaction have reason to be careful, but they may not fully compre-
hend that market prices are susceptible to manipulation. Once again,
it is instructive to note that contractual precautions against manipula-
tion have evolved in response to the development and employment of
unforeseen manipulative techniques. Consider once again the facts of
Mulheren. Although it is not clear that Gulf & Western and Boesky had
an enforceable agreement,3 14 Gulf & Western nevertheless paid the
reported price for a tremendous quantity of its stock just after the
price had jumped 1/4 point. Although the sellers had the incentive
and wherewithal to manipulate the price of the stock, the buyer
showed no skepticism at all.
Investor skepticism is a significant check on manipulation, but it
is unlikely to prevent all trade-based manipulation. Even when it
works, investor skepticism may be excessively costly. Skeptical inves-
tors have to investigate and put their capital at risk. Duplicative inves-
tigation by many market participants may be wasteful. In fact, the
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws are often justi-
fied with the argument that they reduce the cost of investigation by
skeptical investors. Perhaps the prevention of manipulation is also a
public good that ought to be provided by a centralized agency that
can efficiently investigate and address the problem.
3. Market Reform
The market itself can be structured to reduce manipulation. The
prices reported from a market depend very much on the way that se-
curities are traded in that market. Thus, different markets are likely
to be more or less susceptible to different forms of manipulation.
Those who operate the markets can arrange them so that manipula-
tion is difficult.
Reported prices are one of the most important products of finan-
cial markets, and providers of market services have an interest in en-
313 See Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 509; Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 220-22;
BAGNOLI & LiPMAN, supra note 19, at 1-5.
314 See supra notes 159-60.
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suring that reported prices reflect the price at which trades can be
made.315 To the extent that traders and issuers are worried about ma-
nipulation, they will turn to markets that minimize the problem. As
competition for listings and trading increases among securities mar-
kets, those who provide market services may find it worthwhile to per-
fect and offer measures that will protect the pricing process and
discourage manipulation.
316
The organized securities markets have taken many measures
against manipulation,3 17 and the NASD's recent initiative on short
selling suggests that markets may act against manipulation in response
to competitive pressure. SEC rule 10a-1 prohibits short sales of ex-
change-listed stocks except on or after an uptick; that is, short sales of
exchange-listed stocks must be made at a price above the last different
price.318 The uptick rule does not apply to stocks that are traded on
the NASDAQ and not listed on an exchange. Many NASDAQ issuers
want the protection of an uptick rule, however, and thus, they might
list on an exchange that provides such a safety measure.3 19 In re-
sponse, the governors and members of the NASD approved an uptick
rule for NASDAQ.3 20 When the NASD filed the proposed rule with
the SEC, it discussed both sides of the short-sale debate.3 21 The ulti-
315 See Mulherin et al., supra note 18; Van Zandt, supra note 18.
316 See Baker & Edelman, supra note 62, at 71 (surveying literature on issuer choices of
trading market and concluding that issuers transfer listings from the AMEX to the NYSE
when the latter offers liquidity benefits); Cowan et al., supra note 62 (surveying literature
on issuer choices of trading market and concluding that firms move from NASDAQ to the
NYSE for liquidity); Cox & Michael, supra note 60, at 842-43 (detailing the use of linked
markets to preserve liquidity); Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1014-16 (describing com-
petition among stock markets); David M. Schizer, Note, Benign Restraint: The SEC's Regula-
tion of Execution Systems, 101 YALE Lj. 1551 (1992) (arguing that competition among
markets will yield the best mix of systems for executing trades); cf. Jerry W. Markham, The
Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977 (1991) (con-
cluding that trading abuses would decline if exchanges were permitted to compete in trad-
ing particular contracts).
317 See supra note 6. Of course, these rules and procedures may have been adopted in
response to pressure from government regulators or market professionals pursuing their
own interests rather than the demands of consumers of market services. See Thel, supra
note 7, at 436-37 (discussing stock exchange rules against manipulative practices in place
before 1934); Myerson, supra note 67, at D1 (explaining NYSE adoption of rules to limit
volatility upon expiration of futures contracts in order to keep investors from leaving the
market); see also Hazen, supra note 120, at 1012-13, 1031-32 (describing NYSE responses to
volatility).
318 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1992); see Ralph S.Janvey, Short Selling 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 270,
277 (1992); Macey et al., supra note 31, at 805-08.
319 See H.R. REaP. No. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1991); Exchange Act Release No.
31,003, supra note 194, at 6 (hundreds of issuers submitted short form responses favoring a
short-sale rule for NASDAQ); id. at 25 (investment bankers may recommend exchange
listing due to the lack of NASDAQ short-sale regulation); JENNrNGs ET AL., supra note 273,
at 583 (issuers have defected from NASDAQ to get protection of uptick rule);Janvey, supra
note 318, at 277.
320 Exchange Act Release No. 31,003, supra note 194.
321 Id. 1992 SEC LEXIS 1831, at *20-28.
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mate concern of the NASD, however, was that, without a rule, it would
lose listings to the exchanges.
3 22
B. Legal Intervention
The inability of private ordering to prevent manipulation does
not dictate that the law should intervene. Perhaps markets work best
without government intervention. However, even Fischel and Ross,
who express as much confidence in the power of markets as anyone,
do not make the simple argument that a rule against manipulation is
bad because markets should not have rules. Instead, they argue that
the social costs of such a rule outweigh any benefits that it might
yield.3 23
This conclusion is difficult to evaluate. Fischel and Ross justify it
in terms of relative costs and benefits, but the costs of manipulation
and the existing legal regime are not clear. We do not know how
often prices are manipulated, how much harm manipulation does or
how existing manipulation rules influence behavior. Given the avail-
able evidence, it is hard to justify either the status quo or radical
change. In the face of this uncertainty, perhaps regulators should
study the markets and the way that their rules work, reforming the law
as evidence becomes available. Fischel and Ross, on the other hand,
argue that the evidence already available demonstrates such a clear
imbalance between costs and benefits that the law should be changed
now.3 24 They may, however, exaggerate the cost of legal rules.
1. Objective Rules
According to Fischel and Ross, the legal prohibition of manipula-
tion creates extraordinary-and unacceptable-costs because "manip-
ulation depends entirely on the state of mind of the trader."325 The
costs of enforcing a prohibition of intentional manipulation are par-
ticularly high because observable acts do not reliably signal manipula-
tive intent. Moreover, they argue, because intent is hard to discern,
any legal regime prohibiting intentional manipulation will be under-
inclusive or overinclusive, or both. Fischel and Ross' biggest problem
seems to be that a rule against manipulative trading casts a broad
shadow on innocent and useful trading: "Because the sanctions for
322 Id. at *27 ("Finally, the NASD believes that adoption of the proposed rule will en-
hance the Nasdaq Stock Market's ability to compete with exchange markets for listings.
From a competitive standpoint, some exchanges regularly use the lack of a short sale rule
as an argument to try to persuade companies to list."). The proposal specifically noted that
issuers were concerned that the lack of a short-sale rule would subject them to shorting
into seasoned offerings. Id. at *25.
323 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 522-23.
324 See, id., at 535-36.
325 Id. at 522.
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engaging in manipulation are severe and include criminal penalties as
well as the possibility of a lifetime ban from the securities industry,
traders, particularly high profile traders such as takeover arbitrageurs,
will avoid conduct that might be characterized as manipulative." 26
The overdeterrence that so worries Fischel and Ross can be ame-
liorated if severe sanctions are applied only to ill-motivated acts.
3 27
Failing (or supplementing) this, overinclusiveness can be avoided if
clear rules can be tailored to prevent objectionable practices without
discouraging a great deal of appropriate conduct.328 Rules that
clearly state what they require or forbid may have problems of their
own, but they need not cause the sort of investor paralysis that Fischel
and Ross think results from a blunt prohibition of trading with manip-
ulative intent.
If the law prohibits trading for a particular purpose, then enforc-
ing the law entails troublesome inquiries into what traders are think-
ing.3 29 These inquiries can be avoided with rules that proscribe
trading practices that are often used for the purpose of influencing
prices, without regard to the reason the trades are effected in a partic-
ular case. Rules that do not turn on a trader's intentions obviate most
of Fischel and Ross' criticism. Objective rules can interdict undesir-
able trades without a costly and perhaps hopeless inquiry into the
trader's motives. If they are carefully targeted and clearly state what
they require or forbid, such rules can also reduce the risk of
overdeterrence. 330 If the regulated conduct is easily detected, such
rules can be enforced with relative ease.33 '
Rules that do not turn on intent have the additional advantage of
controlling entirely innocent trading that temporarily disrupts re-
326 Id. at 523.
327 See infra part III.B.2.
328 See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ.
65 (1983) (exploring general assumptions concerning administrative policy); Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)
(discussing efficiency of the legal process as a function of specificity);James A. Henderson,
Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CoNELL L. REv. 901 (1982) (explaining the effect of
efficiency considerations on substantive tort law); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992) (comparing the relative costliness of promulgat-
ing rules and standards).
329 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 507, 512.
330 Cf Wolfson, supra note 271, at 810 (The stabilization rules represent "an effort to
get away from the vagueness of [statutory prescriptions] and to provide government regula-
tors and the regulated with a clear and precise description of specific, prohibited
behavior.").
331 The SEC's regulation of short sales is a good example of a rule that clearly states
what it requires and is easily enforced. 17 C.FR. § 240.10a-1 (1992). Cf Kaplow, supra




ported prices.332 Recall that the temporary price changes associated
with the trading of Milken and Mulheren had important conse-
quences that the parties to the Wickes and Gulf & Western contracts
probably would have wanted to avoid, and that the trading had those
consequences regardless of whatever motivated the traders. Similarly,
even if Jefferies bought Union Carbide only because it thought the
stock was a good investment, the price spikes caused by the purchases
may have misled other investors.33 3 Legal rules that reduce the inci-
dence of trades that produce temporary price anomalies may be bene-
ficial regardless of the reason that those trades are effected.
This is not to say that rules that precisely specify what traders can
and cannot do are worth the price. Even economists who believe that
manipulation is possible warn that "the welfare effects of banning ma-
nipulation are ambiguous. ''334 So long as the mechanisms by which
trades affect price are in dispute, any set of manipulation rules will
rest on controversial premises, and if those premises are wrong the
rules may well have grossly inappropriate consequences.33 5 These
problems aside, even very clear rules directed at particular trading
practices may deter some socially desirable trading, and rules suffi-
ciently narrow to avoid overdeterrence may not deter anything.33 6 For
example, the harsh criticism sometimes directed at the SEC's stabiliza-
tion rules suggests that it is not always possible to draft rules that
clearly state what is required of the regulated.33 7 On the other hand,
the SEC's very clear and easily enforced rules on short selling may
deter desirable conduct.3 3 8 Nevertheless, rules can be fine tuned to
increase their benefits and reduce their costs. If precise rules are in-
adequate, it is not because high-profile traders faced with Draconian
sanctions will abstain from trading because they cannot determine
what is prohibited.
One attempt to discourage manipulation while limiting the bur-
den on socially desirable trading is the SEC's rule on short selling
332 See Myerson, supra note 67, at DI (restrictions on computerized trading, publica-
tion of securities with order imbalances, morning expirations and developments in trading
strategies have reduced volatility when options and futures expire).
333 Cf Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (alleging that plaintiffs
were induced to buy stock when defendants bid up price to discourage shareholders from
tendering shares to issuer).
334 Allen & Gale, supra note 19, at 507; see also id. at 521; Gerard & Nanda, supra note
19, at 231-32, 234-35; BAGNOLI & LrPmAN, supra note 19, at 17-20; cf Allen & Gorton, supra
note 19, at 626-28 (restrictions on short sales create opportunities for manipulation).
335 The perhaps irresolvable dilemma that discordant economic theories pose for
those responsible for making corporate and securities law has attracted attention recently.
See Booth, supra note 20, at 1114-16; Kraakman, supra note 32, at 938-41; Langevoort, supra
note 119, at 872-73, 886-89, 912-13, 919-20.
336 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 522-23.
337 See, e.g., Cox Er AL.., supra note 232, at 314-15; Wolfson, supra note 271.
338 See Macey et al., supra note 31.
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prior to secondary offerings. As discussed above, when an issuer an-
nounces that it will sell securities into the market, a manipulator may
sell the stock short in order to depress the market price, thereby low-
ering the price at which the issuer will sell. The manipulator may plan
to cover the short-sales in the public offering, thus earning a profit at
very little risk, or he may simply hope to buy stock in the public offer-
ing for less than what he believes the stock is worth.
SEC rule lOb-21 (T) regulates short-selling in connection with sec-
ondary offerings into the market.33 9 The rule provides that a person
who sells an equity security short after a registration statement for se-
curities of the same class is filed may not cover those sales in the pub-
lic offering. This rule makes it unlawful to earn a quick profit by
depressing price with short sales and then covering those sales in the
offering. The rule does not provide complete protection, however,
because a manipulator may still sell stock he already holds and then
buy more at a bargain price in the offering, or sell short and cover in
the market at a bargain price after the secondary distribution takes
place. Whatever good the rule does, it does it at relatively low cost.
The rule does not prohibit short selling,3 40 and thus should have mini-
mal impact on the non-manipulative and perhaps beneficial short
sales of traders who simply believe the stock is overpriced.
3 41
Rule 10b-21 (T) may still be a bad rule, of course. It makes short-
sales of bona fide investors more expensive than they would otherwise
be because without the rule such sellers might be able to cover their
short positions more cheaply in the public offering. Furthermore, it is
possible that by discouraging some manipulators, the rule may actu-
ally hurt issuers and other market participants.3 42 Perhaps in recogni-
tion of this uncertainty, the Commission adopted rule 10b-21 (T) on a
temporary basis, suggesting that it might revisit the issue after the rule
has been in place for some time.343
Fischel and Ross themselves seem to recognize the value of pro-
phylactic rules against certain trading practices that are convention-
339 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T) (1992).
340 Fischel and Ross describe rule lOb-21 (T) accurately in a footnote, see Fischel &
Ross, supra note 8, at 522 n.81, but in the text they incorrectly state that it prohibits short
sales in advance of public offerings. Id. at 522. On that premise they argue that the rule
"imposes costs because it prevents those with negative beliefs ... from acting on them by
trading." Id.
341 A rule prohibiting all short sales before a public offering might discourage people
who believe that a security is overpriced from selling short, and thus would undermine the
informational content of reported prices. See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 234-35;
Macey et al., supra note 31, at 800, 813-14. In adopting rule lOb-21 (T), the SEC empha-
sized that it would not interfere with non-manipulative short sales. See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 26,028, supra note 194, at 89,387-88, 89,390-91.
342 See Gerard & Nanda, supra note 19, at 226-29, 234-35.
343 See Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 194, at 89,387 n.16. The SEC may
also grant exemptions from rule 10b-21(T). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(T)(c) (1992).
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ally called manipulative-wash sales and matched orders. As noted
above, manipulators sometimes move price and stimulate trading in-
terest with wash sales, in which the same party is both buyer and seller,
and matched orders, in which confederates simultaneously enter off-
setting purchase and sale orders. 344 Fischel and Ross call wash sales
and matched orders "a form of fraud by conduct," and would appar-
ently forbid them absolutely, going substantially further than current
law, which forbids them only when employed for certain purposes.3 45
2. Intentional Manipulation
Fischel and Ross' thesis is that the law should not prohibit actual
trades as manipulative regardless of the trader's intent.3 46 The core of
their argument is that if severe sanctions turn solely on a trader's state
of mind, fear of prosecution will deter socially desirable trading.3 47
Although this argument has at least two targets, heavy sanctions and
344 See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
345 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510-11; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1) (1988)
(wash sales and matched orders are unlawful when used "[f]or the purpose of creating a
false or misleading appearance of active trading ... or a false or misleading appearance
with respect to the market.").
Although Fischel and Ross seem to find wash sales and matched orders objectionable,
they insist on characterizing them as a species of fraud, "designed to mislead market par-
ticipants into believing that buyers and sellers are trading in a security when in fact no
transactions are taking place." Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 510.
As a technical matter, those initiating wash sales or entering matched orders do not
act fraudulently-they neither make false statements nor cause others to do so. They de-
liver and pay for the securities that they trade, and they do not report transactions that
never occur. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976) (misrepresentation is an
element of fraud). To be sure, they do not expect their transactions to result in a change
in beneficial ownership, but they never maintain otherwise. At most, they play on the
market's understanding that reported trades represent transactions between traders deal-
ing at arms' length. Nevertheless, these traders do not affirmatively misrepresent their
opinions, intentions or any other fact; moreover, there is no reason that the market's inter-
pretation of the act of entering an order is binding on traders so as to make matched
orders and wash sales "false." If the market's understanding is enough to make matched
orders "false," then it would seem that a purchase designed to increase price is just as
"false," given the market's understanding that buyers try to get the lowest price possible. In
fact, the common law had trouble dealing with fictitious transactions, and the language of
the opinions finding such transactions objectionable would often apply equally to trades
designed to move price. See 8 Loss & SEUIGmAN, supra note 39, at 3946-53.
Fischel and Ross insist that the concept of fraud cannot be used to forbid actual
trades. They argue that the concept of fraud works for wash sales and matched orders
because those "fictitious" trades are "bad acts," so that the law can identify objectionable
conduct by applying objective criteria. Actual trades, on the other hand, are objectionable,
as Fischel and Ross see it, only if made with bad intent; thus, the law cannot be made to
turn on objective evidence. Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 511. However, laws against
actual trades can turn on objective evidence if the law simply makes it unlawful to effect
actual trades in certain situations. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10a-1 (short sales), 240.10b-
21(T) (shorting into seasoned offering) (1992).
346 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 507, 553.
347 See id. at 522.
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open-ended, intent-based rules, Fischel and Ross focus on the lat-
ter.3 48 To put the argument in perspective, however, it is important to
bear in mind that the government brings relatively few securities ma-
nipulation cases, let alone criminal cases.3 49 Moreover, the setbacks in
United States v. GAF Corp. and United States v. Mulheren will likely cause
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York to
pause before initiating new criminal cases. The likelihood of future
prosecutions was further reduced when the criminal sentences for ma-
nipulation in the Princeton/Newport case were vacated. In that case
the trial judge concluded that the defendants "made a persuasive ar-
gument that the government would not have proceeded criminally
against these defendants solely on the" manipulation charges.350
Even if few cases are brought, there remains the question of
whether the law should inquire into the motives of securities traders.
It may be impossible to prevent manipulation without resorting to a
residual rule against willful manipulation.35 1 Because market and
contracting practices are diverse and constantly changing, neither pri-
vate parties nor regulators (whether self-regulatory or government
agencies) are likely to foresee all possible manipulative devices or to
be able to describe those devices in precise rules.3 52 Moreover, any set
of objective rules sufficient to catch all or even most intentional ma-
nipulative trades would almost surely cover a substantial amount of
348 For a discussion of the use of criminal sanctions in securities cases, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter
and the Enduring Problem of Overriminalization, 26 AM. CRM. L. REv. 121 (1988). As Coffee
notes, "[flair notice alone does not minimize [the cost of complying with the law]; only
restricting the scope of the criminal law can do that." Id. at 151.
349 See McLucas & Angotti, supra note 55, at 633 n.1. The SEC aggressively pursues
penny-stock schemes, but these typically involve fraud and breach of fiduciary duty as well
as manipulative trading. Id.
350 United States v. Zarzecki, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1482 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1992); see
also Christi Harlan, Law Firm is Barred from Taking Case Against Former Client AM?, WAL. ST.
J., Sept. 9, 1992, at B8 ("Calling the alleged manipulation of [C.O.M.B.] securities 'suppos-
edly criminal,' Judge Carter said that an administrative disciplinary action was a more ap-
propriate response than a criminal prosecution.").
351 Edmund Kitch has criticized rule lOb-5 on the ground that Congress would have
enacted a generalized prohibition itself if it wanted one. Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision
of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REv. 857, 861 (1984). I have previously indicated sympathy
with Kitch's position. SeeThel, supra note 7, at 463. However, section 10(b) may be inter-
preted to allow the SEC to decide whether to address manipulation with a generalized
prohibition, and the SEC's decision to adopt rule lOb-5 reflected the decision that a gener-
alized approach was appropriate. See American Bar Association, Conference on Codification of
the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Lv. 793, 922 (1967) (Milton Freeman describing adop-
tion of rule 10b-5); Milton V. Freeman, Foreward: HaMy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of An-
tifrand Regulation, 61 FoRDHam L. REv. 51 (1993); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5
as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FoRDAm L. REv. 57 (1993) (arguing that the ambiguity of Rule
10b-5 has contributed to its survival).
352 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 328, at 268.
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innocent and valuable trading. Accordingly, an effective legal regime
may have to supplement precise rules with broad standards. 353
Fischel and Ross argue that the law cannot identify traders who
trade for the purpose of moving price. They argue that a person who
trades for the purpose of moving price does not engage "in any con-
duct that can be objectively determined to be socially undesirable.
The only act is trading, trading that cannot be distinguished from
other trading using objective measures."3 54 However, a plaintiff can-
not prevail in a manipulation case simply by proving that the defen-
dant's trades moved price, or even that those trades moved price and
induced others to trade.355 Indeed, the securities laws do not make it
unlawful to trade for the purpose of moving price. The closest they
come is section 9 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful
to change price for the purpose of inducing others to trade.3 56 Rule
10b-5, which does not even use the word manipulate, is violated only
when a defendant acts with the intent to deceive. 357
Objective evidence may demonstrate that a defendant acted with
an intent to induce others to trade or to mislead traders who believe
that reported prices reflect trades between market participants who
are trying to buy and sell at the best price possible. Consider once
again the Milken, Mulheren, GAF and Princeton/Newport cases. This
article discusses these cases only as situations in which manipulation
may be possible, and I express no opinion on what the defendants
were trying to accomplish or on whether what they did was unlawful.
Nonetheless, these were important cases, and the record should be
clear.
Fischel and Ross suggest that it is unlikely that the first three of
these cases involved manipulative schemes. They also suggest that the
objective evidence of manipulative intent was too ambiguous to allow
for a determination of manipulative intent. However, the government
did not rest on ambiguous evidence of trading patterns in any of the
353 For an argument that the intent-based rules against commodities manipulation has
been successful despite some lapses, see 3 PtLiu MCBRrDEJOHNSON & THOMAs LEE HAZEN,
COMMODmES REGULATION ch. 5 (1989). Other commentators reject this conclusion, how-
ever. See Friedman, supra note 17, 35-37;Jerry Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices-The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 281 (1991); Wendy Collins Perdue, Ma-
nipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 345 (1987).
354 Fischel & Ross, supra note 8, at 511.
355 See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
356 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1988).
357 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus-
tries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); cf. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992) (SEC rulemaking power under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (2) extends to nondeceptive conduct).
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four cases. In each, the government offered objective evidence of ma-
nipulative intent that was not equally consistent with innocent trading.
In Milken, the government had a witness prepared to testify that he
understood Milken to order him to manipulate the price of Wickes
common stock. In Mulheren, Boesky testified about his conversation
with Mulheren. In GAF, Jefferies' principal testified that the defend-
ants asked him to manipulate Union Carbide stock. In Princeton/
Newport the request that initiated the manipulation was captured on
tape. Perhaps these witnesses lacked credibility, or perhaps the con-
versations were innocent; regardless, it is clear that probative, objec-
tive evidence of state of mind may be available in manipulation cases.
Of course, innocent traders should not have to bear the burden
of criminal prosecution or the risk of wrongly being found to have
acted with forbidden intent. However the government does not seem
to have been pursuing frivolous cases, and liability in private civil ac-
tions rests on proof of intent. Often the defendant will have realized
some benefit from a price change that will itself serve as objective evi-
dence that the defendant had a purpose in moving price. In any case,
accused manipulators enjoy the same procedural protections as other
defendants, and they are more likely to have the resources necessary
to mount a vigorous defense.
Perhaps juries are apt to be too quick to believe the worst of de-
fendants in manipulation cases. Judicial review is still available, how-
ever, and Fischel and Ross' three high-profile cases show that judges
are sensitive to the plight of those accused of manipulation. The con-
victions in GAF and Mulheren were reversed on appeal, and the trial
judge ignored the Wickes transaction when she sentenced Milken.
Moreover, the Second Circuit, when it reversed Mulheren's convic-
tion, displayed its uneasiness with the concept of a crime that suppos-
edly exists entirely inside the defendant's head. Indeed, the judge
who vacated the Princeton/Newport sentences expressed doubts
about whether manipulation is even a crime.
A prohibition of purposeful manipulation might chill socially de-
sirable trading, but that chill can be ameliorated. Some prominent
commentators who oppose extensive government intervention in the
securities markets have expressed support for broad rules against will-
ful misconduct.358 Consider, for example, Judge Winter's dissenting
opinion in United States v. Chestman.359 Judge Winter, whose dissent is
probably the best judicial description of the quagmire of insider trad-
358 See Coffee, supra note 348, at 152 (Concluding that the proper approach is to re-
strict criminal prosecutions to "narrow, context-specific statutes (such as Rule 10b5) as
opposed to broader, sprawling rules borrowed from the common law.").




ing law, recognized "that regulation of insider trading without legisla-
tive or regulatory guidelines would involve a mare's nest of analytic
and definitional problems."3 60 Nonetheless, he argued that it is a
crime to trade on misappropriated information, even though there is
no obvious relationship between such a proscription and the language
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.3 61 Although he sympathized
with the majority's concern over the difficulty of drawing lines, he had
"little difficulty"3 62 in concluding that a criminal conviction could be
affirmed where the defendant's conduct indicated knowledge that his
actions were improper.
3 63
Consider also the position of former SEC Commissioner Edward
Fleischman. Near the end of his term, Commissioner Fleischman
published a letter to President Bush in which he vigorously criticized
the Commission's regulatory program.364 Commissioner Fleischman
argued that the SEC should replace or supplement the command-and-
control rules that it regularly imposes with broadly stated perform-
ance standards. Taking the same tack as Fischel and Ross, Commis-
sioner Fleischman argued that the problem with the existing regime is
that the benefits of regulation have been exaggerated and the costs
have been minimized.3 65 He did not conclude, however, that the gov-
ernment should abandon market regulation. Instead, he argued that
broad standards protect the public and promote liquidity better than
detailed rules do. He insisted that performance standards and gen-
eral rules afford a safeguard against both harmful practices and intru-
sive regulation, suggesting that they should be used in place of-or as
alternatives to-detailed rules.
3 66
Commissioner Fleischman specifically advocated the use of broad
rules to regulate manipulation. Thus, he proposed that rule 10b-6,
which regulates trading by persons interested in the distribution of a
security, be changed to exempt transactions not engaged in for the
purpose of raising the price of the distributed security.3 67 He sug-
gested the same approach for the rules governing issuer repur-
chases.3 68 Commissioner Fleischman did not suggest that broad
360 Id. at 573.
361 Id. at 578.
362 Id. at 579.
363 Id. at 580-81.
364 Letter from Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman to President George H.W. Bush
(March 25, 1992) (on file with the Cornell Law Review).
365 Id. at 8-9.
366 Id. at 10.
367 Id. at 7.




language should be limited to safe harbors, either.36 9 He praised the
use of "general anti-manipulative" rules to prevent recurrence of
"[t]he 'bear raids' of the 1920s [which] were manipulative at their
core,"3 70 and urged revision of the rules regulating short sales in a
similar manner.
37'
Commissioner Fleischman took leave of the conventional criti-
cism of the SEC's regulatory program when he took as his model rule
10b-5, the Commission's "single most renowned rule."372 While he
recognized that broad rules may be harder to enforce, he considered
the cost worthwhile:
[R] eform of this Agency's regulatory program has the inevitable con-
comitant of expansion of the Agency's policing and prosecuting
program. ... [This] leads me to the ultimate conclusion that this
Commission's enforcement program can fulfill the resulting addi-
tional responsibility and can fulfill it well-at a far lesser systemic
cost than prevails under the Commission's regulatory approach....
[Tihis Commission could and should be willing to rely more heavily on
a well-directed policing and prosecuting program to remove a real
amount of systemic cost without removing anywhere near an equal
extent of direct and indirect benefits to investors.
Performance standards, market mechanisms, and clarity in
rulemaking all contribute to removal of systemic costs. To the ex-
tent that in the securities markets those regulatory methods rely on
enforcement by market forces, by self-regulatory organizations and
by this Agency, that reliance is both well-founded and well-directed
to the maintenance of the fundamental investor protections that
have made and have kept the primary and secondary securities mar-
kets in the United States... "the deepest, the most liquid and the
fairest securities markets anywhere in the world."
3 73
CONCLUSION
As Fischel and Ross emphasize, "[m]uch of the regulation of fi-
nancial markets seeks to prevent manipulation." The law should not
lightly abandon this quest, Fischel and Ross' arguments notwithstand-
ing. Manipulators can sometimes control prices with trades, and by
369 For example, he may have meant to suggest that illicit purpose should be a thresh-
old element of rule lOb-6.
In fact, the underlying objective of the rule, which is to allow the free forces
of supply and demand to fix the trading price for securities in distribution,
would be achieved so long as persons interested in the distribution did not
engage in transactions for the purpose... of creating actual or apparent
active trading or of raising the price of the distributed security.
Id. at 7.
370 Id. at 11.
371 Id. at 11-12.
372 Id. at 10.
373 Id. at 23-24.
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doing so they can reap profits, whether by taking advantage of preex-
isting contracts or by inducing other market participants to trade at
manipulated prices.
Private actors and institutions can do much to discourage manip-
ulation, and when the problem appears acute, private agents do re-
spond. However, it is unlikely that manipulation can be completely
deterred without legal intervention, and deterring manipulation has
been a central goal of the federal securities laws. Nonetheless, the
law's primary method of dealing with manipulation has not been to
make it unlawful to trade for the purpose of changing price, notwith-
standing Fischel and Ross' heated argument that the law should not
prohibit actual trades on the basis of a trader's intentions.
The securities statutes do not forbid people to trade for the pur-
pose of influencing price,3 74 and they do not forbid the employment
of "manipulative devices" except in certain exceptional circum-
stances.375 Instead, the Exchange Act makes it illegal to engage in a
few clearly defined practices for specific purposes.3 76 Otherwise, it
simply allows the SEC to regulate manipulative devices and contriv-
ances. In turn, the Commission has promulgated a series of rules
against particular trading practices, most of which do not turn on a
trader's motives. These rules are supplemented by rule 101>5 when
manipulators use novel or particularly outrageous practices.
For the most part, this response is what Fischel and Ross have
shown is necessary. It is often hard to tell what motivates a particular
trade, so rules that turn on intentions would be unlikely to prevent
intentional manipulation. Objective rules may more accurately iden-
tify and prevent manipulative trading, but they have their own
problems. The contours of manipulation are difficult to discover, and
it is unlikely that any set of rules could discourage all inappropriate
trades, and only inappropriate trades. Moreover, practices in finan-
cial markets change quickly, so that even if a perfect set of rules could
be drafted, they might soon become obsolete. Accordingly, the SEC
and markets themselves are likely to do better ajob of regulation than
Congress, because administrative rules can be modified as their conse-
quences become clear or practices change. Finally, precise rules will
leave loopholes, especially if practices evolve more quickly than rules.
Judicious use of rule 101>5 for novel or outrageous conduct can pro-
vide a useful backup to the regulatory scheme.
374 The closest that the Exchange Act comes is to prohibit effecting trades in an ex-
change-registered security changing the price of such security, "for the purpose of induc-
ing the purchase or sale of such security by others." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1988).
375 The Exchange Act forbids brokers and dealers and those involved in tender offers
to employ manipulative devices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 78o(c) (1988).
376 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1988).
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Remarkably, the Exchange Act established this regulatory scheme
almost sixty years ago in response to many of the same arguments that
Fischel and Ross have just made.3 7 7 After the stock market collapsed
in 1929, numerous proposals were made to prohibit manipulative
trading.378 However, both thoughtful reformers and those to be re-
formed objected on the grounds that trading practices were too com-
plicated and dynamic to be governed by blunt rules.379 Members of
Congress also heard about how difficult it would be to determine the
intentions of market participants.3 8 0 The argument that carried the
day in 1934 was that trading should be regulated gingerly, if at all, and
that any regulations should be constantly reexamined and refined. In-
stead of simply making it unlawful to trade for the purpose of chang-
ing price, the law charges administrators with studying and carefully
regulating manipulation. The law recognizes manipulation for the
complicated problem that it is.
377 The history of the law governing securities manipulation is also remarkably consis-
tent with the predictions of Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner's dynamic model of the
process by which legal actors determine the degree of specificity with which legal com-
mands are expressed. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 328, at 272-75.
378 See Thel, supra note 7, at 411-17 (discussing legislative proposals); see also id. at 451,
459 n.343 (noting that early House and Senate versions of the Exchange Act would have
prohibited trading for the purpose of changing price); id. at 451 n.306 (discussing rejected
amendment that would have prohibited stabilization).
379 For example, a prominent committee studying reform, organized by the Roosevelt
Administration, argued that
Stock exchanges raise essentially new problems in Federal regulation. They
do not present a static situation susceptible to fixed standards. On the con-
trary, it is a highly dynamic, ever-changing picture, subject to untold and
unknown possibilities and combinations that are today unpredictable. The
thing to be avoided is the placing of this complex and important mecha-
nism in a straitjacket.
Report to Secretary of Commerce of Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation 6, in Letter
from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency with an Accompanying Report Relative to Stock Exchange Regulation (S.
Comm. Print 1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISroav, supra note 212, at Item 16; see also
David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 627, 658 (1963) (section 10(b) was designed to allow regulation of new manipu-
lative devices); Thel, supra note 7, at 419-24 (consensus for administrative regulation); id.
at 434-36, 439, 441, 447-78 (citing stock exchange support for administrative regulation);
id. at 438 n.233 (noting argument that heavy sanctions for violations of open-ended rules
would keep responsible people from participating in the market); cf. id. at 437-38 (citing
criticism of unclear provisions and heavy sanctions).
380 See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S.
Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 57 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6508-11, in 6
LEGISLATvE HISTORY, supra note 212, at item 22; Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings Before
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on H.R. 7852 and HR. 8720, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 112-13, reprinted in 8 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 212, at item 23.
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